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In September 2020, the European Commission published what it 
described as a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (emphasis added) that 
lays down a multi-annual policy agenda on issues that have been central 
to debate about the future of European integration. This book critically 
examines the new Pact as part of a Forum organized by the Horizon 2020 
project ASILE – Global Asylum Governance and the EU’s Role. 
ASILE studies interactions between emerging international protec-
tion systems and the United Nations Global Compact for Refugees (UN 
GCR), with particular focus on the European Union’s role and the UN 
GCR’s implementation dynamics. It brings together a new international 
network of scholars from 13 institutions examining the characteristics of 
international and country specific asylum governance instruments and 
arrangements applicable to people seeking international protection. It 
studies the compatibility of these governance instruments’ with interna-
tional protection and human rights, and the UN GCR’s call for global 
solidarity and responsibility sharing. 
ASILE facilitates groundbreaking insights into the role and impacts 
of legal and policy responses – instruments – on refugee protection and 
sharing of responsibility from the perspective of their effectiveness, 
fairness and consistency with refugee protection and human rights. It 
does so through an examination and mapping of UN GCR actors – and 
their legal responsibilities and accountability – that have varying roles in 
the design and implementation of mobility and containment instruments 
applied to people in search of international protection across various 
world regions. The project studies the impacts of vulnerability and status 
recognition assessments – which often find expression in these same 
instruments and actors – on individuals’ rights and refugees’ agency. 
ASILE also aims at identifying lessons learned and ‘promising practices’ 
on refugee protection.
ii Preface
The Chapters that follow assess the new components and policy pri-
orities laid down in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum from different 
multidisciplinary perspectives and world regions experiences. They 
explore the rights and international protection implications, enshrined 
both in the foundations of the UN GCR and the EU Treaties as well as 
policy and governance arrangements both domestically and interna-
tionally. They address the implications of these policy and governance 
approaches for the geopolitics of international law, paying attention to the 
relations that the Pact seeks to promote between states and other relevant 
international and regional actors, and also how its proposed policy 
roadmap can be expected to transform or reconfigure these relations. 
In light of the ASILE project objectives, the Chapters pay particular 
attention to the scope of the mobility and containment components of 
asylum governance instruments and their implementing actors in Europe 
and other world regions, as well as their inclusionary or exclusionary 
effects on individuals’ rights and international protection.
We would like first to express our gratitude to all the contributors of 
this volume for their most insightful Chapters and their excellent cooper-
ation during the implementation of the Forum and the production of this 
Book. Special thanks go to Professors Gregor Noll, Jens Vedsted-Hansen 
and Thomas Spijkerboer for their key roles in the original idea, design 
and launch of the first ASILE Forum on the EU Pact on Migration and 
Asylum, as well as their most helpful comments and invaluable advice 
during the drafting of the kick-off Essay included in Chapter 1 of the 
Book. We are very grateful for all the substantial contributions and inputs 
by Heidi Betts, who has played a key role in the professional editing of 
all the Chapters and the Forum, and by Miriam Mir (Project Manager 
at CEPS), who played an equally central role in the daily running and 
successful completion of the first ASILE Forum. Finally, we would like to 
thank Andrew Fallone for his great assistance and inputs in completing 
the editing and formatting of the Book.
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This Chapter examines the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum (herein-
after the Pact), published on 23 September 2020 (European Commis-
sion, 2020a), as conditioned by the United Nations Global Compact on 
Refugees (UN GCR) and the EU Treaties. It is the kick-off contribution 
opening the first Forum organised in the scope of the H2020 Project 
ASILE (Global Asylum Governance and the EU’s Role). The analysis pays 
attention to the cognitive dimensions of the Pact, and how they affect 
trust and legitimation of EU migration and asylum policies. By ‘cognitive 
dimensions’ this Chapter means the ensemble of cognitive work that 
needs to be done to put into effect the core priority underlying the 
Pact. This comprises “establishing status swiftly on arrival” at Schengen 
external borders and categorising individuals either as “non-returnable 
refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection”, or as “expel-
lable irregular immigrants”. Accordingly, individuals would be either 
immediately refused entry or transferred to asylum or return procedures. 
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1.2 Whose Pact? Intergovernmentalising EU asylum and 
migration policies
The idea of a ‘European Pact’, as originally advanced by Commission 
President von der Leyen at her Opening Statement in July 2019, not new 
(von der Leyen, 2019). It originated in a 2008 proposal advanced by the 
French Presidency of the EU for a European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum (European Council, 2008). This earlier ‘Pact’ was criticised as 
a failed attempt by one Member State to ‘renationalise’ policies falling 
under clear EU competence and scrutiny under the Treaties, and catapult 
some domestically contested priorities into common EU policy agendas 
through an intergovernmental arrangement (Guild and Carrera, 2008). 
A prior question that can be asked is what exactly is a pact, and 
between whom is it concluded? A pact implies an agreement or an official 
promise (or engagement) between two or several parties. It does not 
always qualify as a treaty or international agreement. The terminology of 
a pact may therefore lead to confusion, and it is not entirely clear to whom 
the new Pact in question actually belongs, and between whom it has been 
concluded or agreed upon. The Pact on Migration and Asylum does not, 
in fact, qualify as a pact. 
To be clear, the Pact envisages the European Commission policy 
agenda aimed at setting up a “Common European Framework for 
Migration and Asylum Management” during the (current) 9th EU legisla-
ture. The Commission alone is the owner of this Pact. Moreover, while the 
Commission has carried out long consultations and informal exchanges 
with EU Member States and other actors, this does not formally mean 
that the Pact has been concluded or agreed in any way or form by any of 
these national governments (Euractiv, 2020) or the European Parliament.
In fact, one may wonder if the EU actually needs a Pact at this advanced 
stage of European integration. The EU Treaties are clear about the fact 
that inter-institutional decision-making rules among EU Member States 
and the European Parliament come into effect once the Commission offi-
cially presents or publishes any new legal acts. This also applies in full to 
migration, asylum and border policies. 
One of the expressly stated objectives of the Pact is promoting and 
reinforcing “mutual trust” through asylum policies “acceptable to all EU 
Member States”. It says that it has been “shaped by collective learning” 
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from the inter-institutional debates during the previous Juncker Com-
mission, particularly the failing Commission’s 2016 proposals to reform 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the EU Dublin 
Regulation (European Parliament and Council, 2013). However, if there 
is any lesson to be learned from the outputs of inter-institutional nego-
tiations over the Commission’s package of 2016 legislative proposals to 
reform the EU Dublin Regulation, it is that allowing a decision-making 
logic of consensus or de facto unanimity among EU Member States does 
not work at all. 
Previous CEPS research has shown that the 8th legislature corre-
sponding with the Juncker Commission was characterised by intergov-
ernmental and nationalistic logics “in the name of the 2015 European 
refugee crisis” (Carrera, 2018). The European Council and EU Member 
States’ ministries of interior – some of which were in the hands of radical 
right-wing parties – played a central role in re-injecting intergovernmen-
talism and ‘flexible’ patterns of cooperation in communitarised policies. 
They were the ones responsible for blocking the 2016 Commission CEAS 
reform by insisting on negotiating all the legislative files as a ‘package’ 
dependent on the Dublin regulation’s revision.
This was despite the existence of a broad understanding and over-
whelming amount of evidence that the first irregular entry rule for dis-
tributing responsibility for assessing asylum application carried profound 
deficits and should be abandoned, and the European Parliament calling 
for much-needed asylum reform based on equal solidarity (European 
Parliament, 2016). This intergovernmental logic was in clear violation 
of the Treaties and the QMV – and not the unanimity – rule applicable 
under the ordinary legislative procedure to migration and asylum policies 
(Carrera et al., 2020). 
The Pact runs the risk of resurrecting the artificial need to build 
consensus among EU Member States – even in advance of the presenta-
tion of the actual legislative proposals. This is both risky and counter-
productive in policy domains where one could expect the Commission 
to pursue a genuine Migration and Asylum Union (Carrera and Lannoo, 
2018). 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty aimed quite deliberately to change previous 
intergovernmental and nationalistic modes of cooperation in Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA). As a key condition for ‘merited or deserving trust’, 
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the Treaties require that common EU policies on borders, asylum and 
migration must be negotiated among all European institutions, not only 
among Member States. The ‘Lisbonisation’ of JHA meant recognising the 
European Parliament as a full co-legislator and co-owner in these policy 
areas, and unlocking judicial control held by the Luxembourg Court. 
A consensus-building strategy among EU Member States makes no 
sense in light of EU Treaties. Intergovernmentalising EU policy-making 
in these domains is illegal and at odds with the inter-institutional balance 
and loyal cooperation foreseen in the Treaties. Furthermore, the method-
ology applied in the Pact has resulted in a number of ‘early concessions’ to 
some EU ministries of interior before the actual publication and start of 
inter-institutional negotiations of the accompanying legislative proposals. 
The risk here is that currently applicable and debatable national policies 
and practices – some of which have been found unlawful by European 
Courts and human rights bodies – will be reshaped into ‘EU’ ones. 
A case in point is the priority given to fast screening procedures at 
EU external borders, or the call for mandatory border procedures and 
safe-country notions. Some EU governments like the one of Germany 
advocated these ideas, which were openly stated in the Programme for 
Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union (German 
Government, 2019; Council of the EU, 2020). One of the key problematic 
features of the Pact has been for some Member States to ‘transplant’ some 
of their own national priorities to the EU level, and in the Commission’s 
most important policy agenda document for the years to come in these 
areas. Little consideration has been given to the actual transferability of 
such restrictive ‘models’ to EU external land and sea borders in southern 
and central-east EU Member States in the Schengen Area. In particular, 
what is considered by some as a ‘best practice’ in some northern European 
countries may well become a ‘worst practice’ when travelling to other EU 
Member States and facing their local dynamics. 
The current picture in the EU is that several governments are already 
implementing containment policies that are incompatible with existing 
EU asylum and migration law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the UN Global Compact on Refugees. These include for instance 
expedited expulsions or hot returns, accelerated determination proce-
dures, expansive uses of detention and not rescuing people at sea and dis-
embarking boats in their territories. Some Member States’ governments 
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may see this Pact as indirectly bringing supranational legitimacy to some 
of their national policies that have been widely criticised by international 
and regional human rights bodies for leading to rule of law and human 
violations running contrary to EU’s constitutional principles. This could 
enable them to trump effective access to justice and violate the right to 
seek asylum and the prohibition of collective expulsions in the EU. 
The Pact’s proposal to set up a joint pilot project on a ‘migration 
management centre’ at the EU hotspot in Moria, Lesvos (Greece) is one 
example (Politico, 2020). This was recently burned down after protests in 
the camp (BBC, 2020). The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights stated that the response to the protests should not lead to “more 
and longer detention” of the people (Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2019). However, the joint pilot project (Task Force) runs a sound risk of 
legitimating the Greek government’s policy on detentions and unlawful 
expulsions (European Commission, 2020j). It could set a worrying 
precedent of European Commission’s support of detention camps inside 
the EU.
1.3 Localisation, speed and de-territorialisation 
The Pact emphasises the external borders of southern and central/eastern 
EU Member States. It states that “The external border is where the EU 
needs to close the gaps between external border controls and return pro-
cedures”. It pursues the idea of mandatory pre-border screening so that 
“entry is not authorised to third-country nationals unless they are explic-
itly authorised entry”, and therefore that an application for asylum does 
not unlock “an automatic right to enter the EU” (European Commission, 
2020d).
The Pact advocates a model that emphasises an accelerated decision 
as to whether an individual has access to the right to seek asylum at 
specific border crossing points identified by EU Member States. It pays 
special attention to third-country nationals who cross Schengen external 
borders at specific border crossing points designated by EU Member 
States, those entering in unauthorised ways - not fulfilling entry condi-
tions in the Schengen Borders Code (European Parliament and Council, 
2016), as well as those who are disembarked after search and rescue 
(SAR) operations at sea. 
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This model finds expression in the newly amended Proposal for 
an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2020) 611 final (European 
Commission, 2020c) – which applies to both asylum and return rules 
on border procedures, and the Proposal for a Regulation on screening 
at the external borders COM(2020) 612 final (European Commission, 
2020d). During the envisaged ‘screening’ process, which is expected to 
be concluded within five days from apprehension in the external border 
area, disembarkation or presentation at border crossing points, indi-
viduals concerned are deemed as non-authorised to enter the Member 
State’s territory. 
During this time, third-country nationals are obliged to remain in 
“the designated facilities during the screening”, which according to these 
proposals should be in principle at or in proximity to the external borders 
or transit zones. This therefore entails detention as a clear scenario. 
Moreover, this period can be extended to 12 weeks in cases where indi-
viduals appeal against a decision rejecting an application for interna-
tional protection. It can further extended depending on the time needed 
to prepare return or implement the expulsion process envisaged in the 
EU Returns Directive, which has been under inter-institutional negotia-
tions since 2018 (European Commission, 2018).
In light of the ‘cognitive dimensions’ of these two proposals, after 
mandatory pre-border screening procedures, individuals are expected 
to be either immediately refused entry into EU territory or be chan-
nelled into asylum or return procedures. The screening is supposed to 
cover identification, security checks - against EU databases such as the 
Schengen Information System II and their Interoperability (European 
Parliament and Council, 2019) - as well as registration of biometric data 
(fingerprints and facial recognition) in a new version of the Eurodac 
database allowing for an increased accessibility to asylum seekers data by 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (European Commission, 
2020f). It also includes health checks consisting of a preliminary medical 
examination “with a view to identifying any needs for immediate care or 
isolation on public health grounds”.
The Pact places EU agencies such as Frontex (European Border and 
Coast Guard) and EASO in the crucial role of operationally assisting 
Member States in the practical implementation of these initiatives. In the 
case of EASO this goes against its current legal mandate that at present 
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does not even foresee any procedure for withdrawing its operations in 
EU Member States not complying with EU law or fundamental rights. 
The increasing involvement of these EU agencies on the ground and their 
inputs in border procedures, however, raises a number of unresolved 
legal dilemmas related to their weak legal accountability and the lack of 
an independent monitoring mechanism of their activities and decisions 
(Carrera and Stefan, 2020). 
To function, the pre-entry screening procedures would presuppose 
that the cognitive resources of the territorially distributed system are 
moved to the EU external borders. It is concerning, though, that EU 
Member States’ border-crossing points are often framed as ‘transit zones’ 
or even as ‘non-territory’ in an unsuccessful attempt or legal fiction to 
reduce or limit their legal responsibilities and side-line constitutional and 
international rule of law.
This provokes the question as to whether a person in a liminal 
situation with a dearth of resources and reduced oversight is owed inter-
national protection and access to justice. The Pact’s model – and its 
suggested ‘principle of integrated policymaking’ – risks blurring the lines 
between international protection and migration management by giving 
preference to the latter and engaging in the securitisation and criminali-
sation of refugees and people seeking international protection. 
Speed is prioritised along with localisation, and comprises and calls 
for swift pre-entry screening of individuals who irregularly cross the 
external border outside designated border points and do not fulfil the con-
ditions of entry. Crucially, pending the results of screening procedures, 
the person is presumed not to have legally entered into Member States’ 
territory. In this way, the proposed policies can be expected to encourage 
de-territorialisation, i.e. EU Member States unlawfully reframing specific 
parts of their borders as ‘non-territory’ in an attempt to escape accounta-
bility and liability in cases of fundamental rights violations.
According to the Pact, “the particular needs of the vulnerable require 
special arrangements, and the border procedure would only apply where 
this is the case.” The Proposal for a Regulation on screening at the external 
borders COM(2020) 612 final (Article 9) foresees the application of “vul-
nerability assessments” and highlights that those considered as vulner-
able “shall receive timely and adequate support in view of their physical 
and mental health. This, however, allows potential for the foreseen 
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screening procedures to impact individuals’ rights and agency. Little or 
no consideration is given to how these very policies, and the blurring 
between asylum and expulsions, actually co-create or are co-constitutive 
of the irregularity of entries and onward mobilities that its proposals seek 
to address (Carrera et al., 2019d).
Despite formalistic statements that these proposals generally comply 
with fundamental rights, border procedures are unquestionably charac-
terised by reduced procedural safeguards leading to arbitrariness and dis-
crimination (ECRE, 2019). They can also be expected to justify the illicit 
use of systematic deprivation of liberty of individuals at the borders or 
in-territory detention facilities. 
Another problematic aspect is that the newly envisaged border 
procedure will deem an asylum claim inadmissible when the applicants 
come from countries with a low recognition rate (20% or lower according 
to a Union-wide average based on Eurostat data) – according to a new 
Article 40 of the Asylum Procedures Regulation. This is in violation 
of the inherently individual nature of any application for international 
protection. It also disregards the persistent major differences among EU 
Member States regarding recognition rates.
The newly amended Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation 
COM(2020) 611 final builds on the results of inter-institutional negotia-
tions on a previously recast Proposal published in 2016 (European Com-
mission, 2016), which aimed to harmonise Member States’ rules on the 
use of controversial safe country notions. While the harmonisation of this 
notion has been abandoned by the Pact, the new proposal still pursues the 
problematic idea to use ‘safe third country’ notions that would require 
Member States to expel legitimate asylum seekers to countries outside the 
EU where their safety and dignified treatment are not guaranteed. A joint 
letter issued by several NGOs on the Pact states that safe-country notions 
carry inherent risks for effective access to international protection and 
“contribute to containment of refugees in other regions and jeopardise 
efforts for a more balanced sharing of responsibility for people who are 
displaced globally” (ECRE, 2020).
The Pact’s focus on localisation, speed and de-territorialisation seems 
to be inspired by current policies and ideas pursued or implemented by 
some EU governments. A key question is the extent to which these ideas 
can realistically be expected to be so easily transferred to Member States 
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holding the EU external land and sea borders in southern and central/
eastern Europe. This is crucial in light of the increasing body of evidence 
of human rights and rule of law violations from governments’ policies 
on pushbacks, hot returns, detention and expedited expulsions (Carrera, 
2020; Carrera and Stefan, 2020)
1.4 A European asylum system à la carte: asymmetric 
solidarity
The word ‘flexibility’ appears in several passages of the Pact. It relates 
to the reform of the EU Dublin Regulation, which currently outlines 
the rules for the sharing of responsibilities between EU Member States 
in assessing asylum applications in the Schengen area. While the Pact 
states that “solidarity is not optional”, it advances a package of proposals 
implementing the concept of ‘mandatory flexible solidarity’ among EU 
Member States in the field of asylum and returns. It proposes reforming 
the EU Dublin Regulation in the shape of a new Asylum and Migration 
Management Regulation COM(2020) 610 final, which introduces a new 
‘solidarity mechanism’ (European Commission, 2020f).
During the 2020 State of the Union debate President von der Leyen 
expressly stated that “We will abolish the Dublin System” (von der Leyen, 
2020). However, the devil is in the details. The reform still keeps as a 
rule the much-debated first irregular entry criterion for determining 
responsibility among EU Member States, which will now also include 
people subject to SAR at sea. Among the envisaged set of criteria for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application (which includes family links and specific provisions for unac-
companied minors), Article 21 still envisages the irregular entry rule. 
This means that the old ‘Dublin rationale’ for distributing responsibility 
remains under the new system.
As Graph 1 below illustrates, the proposed ‘Common Framework’ 
includes a two-layered interstate solidarity model ranging from what the 
Pact calls ‘situations of migration pressures’ to those labelled as ‘crisis sit-
uations’. Both concepts – “migration pressures” and “crisis” - leave ample 
discretion in the hands of the Commission and EU Agencies.
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Graph 1. Two-layered interstate solidarity
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
In situations characterised as “migration pressures” or subject to disem-
barkations at sea, the foreseen solidarity mechanism in Article 45 of the 
Proposal obliges all Member States to participate in ‘solidarity contribu-
tions’. However, Member States are given the choice of how they do this. 
They may freely decide to participate in relocations of applicants for inter-
national protection. These Member States would contribute according 
to a share based on pre-identified criteria (chiefly 50% population and 
50% GDP) as stipulated in Article 54 and Annex III of the Proposal. The 
Proposal also envisages specific provisions related to the setting up of 
‘solidarity pools’ in the context of SAR operations (Article 49).
The Member State could instead decide to contribute with ‘other 
measures to facilitate returns’ of irregular immigrants. These are called 
“return sponsorships” in Article 55 of the Proposal. This would include 
supporting the EU Member State facing ‘migration pressures’ on policy 
dialogues with relevant non-EU governments in the verification of indi-
viduals’ identity and their readmission. The Pact envisages that those 
Member States committing to provide return sponsorships will be 
obliged to relocate individuals concerned to their territories if they are 
not expelled within a period of eight months. Article 56 of the proposal 
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offers a third option for Member States to refuse relocation or return 
sponsorships, but contribute instead through capacity building and oper-
ational support. 
The second type of interstate solidarity model corresponds with cases 
labelled as “crisis situations”, as outlined in the Proposal for a Regulation 
addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration 
and asylum COM(2020) 613 final (European Commission, 2020e), which 
accompanies a Recommendation on an EU mechanism for Preparedness 
and Management of Crises related to Migration (Migration Prepared-
ness and Crisis Blueprint) (European Commission, 2020i). Here the Pact 
envisages mandatory relocation of applicants under international protec-
tion or return sponsorships. In such cases, Member States would not be 
allowed to participate through capacity building and operational support. 
According to the Pact a crisis would not only include “mass arrivals of 
irregular migrants, but also a political crisis or a crisis sparked by force 
majeure such as the pandemic”. It would also include cases where there is 
“an imminent risk of such a situation” (Article 1.2 of the Proposal). One is 
first left to wonder what a “political crisis” actually is, and how “the risk” 
could be objectively examined. 
In cases labelled as “crisis situations” the Commission is proposing 
a “crisis migration management procedure covering both asylum and 
return”, which leaves EU Member States too much room for manoeuvre 
for lowering down or derogating basic international protection and 
human rights standards as follows: first, taking decisions on the merits of 
the application during border procedures; second, extending the length 
of pre-entry border screening and the presumption of non-entry into 
territory (Article 4 of the Proposal); third, further expanding the use of 
detention; fourth, applying a non-automatic suspensive effect of appeals 
of returns; and fifth, carrying out expulsions “to any third country where 
the person has transited, departed or has any other particular tie”. 
The proposal also allows Member States to grant immediate protec-
tion status without the need for examining international protection appli-
cations in Article 10. This provision would apply to “displaced persons 
from third countries who are facing a high degree of risk of being subject 
to indiscriminate violence, in exceptional situations of armed conflict, 
and who are unable to return to their country of origin”, who would be 
granted subsidiary protection.
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In the above-mentioned 2020 State of the Union address, President 
von der Leyen underlined the Commission’s expectation that all Member 
States would step up to their common responsibilities. As explained 
above, however, the Pact promotes differentiation. It pursues a notion of 
solidarity that allows Member States’ ministries of interior to free-ride 
or ‘opt out’ of delivering the fundamental right to seek asylum in the EU. 
Yet, why should it be acceptable that only a handful of Member States 
take responsibility for relocation and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, when others don’t? And why give that option to some EU govern-
ments, such as Hungary and Poland, which are currently under Article 
7 TEU procedures for engaging in systematic threats to the rule of law 
and institutionalised forms of discrimination and xenophobia towards 
refugees and migrants? 
The Pact’s inclusion of expulsions within the EU notion of solidarity 
reveals an interstate or intergovernmental understanding of EU respon-
sibility sharing in the CEAS, where the individual’s protections, rights 
and agency are left at the periphery. It also problematically expands the 
scope of the Lisbon Treaty principle of solidarity and the fair sharing of 
responsibility for expulsions, including third-country cooperation and 
readmission policy (See Section 4 below). 
The Pact’s notion of solidarity pays no attention to solidarity towards 
individuals, including undocumented migrants and applicants for and 
beneficiaries of international protection. It is regrettable that the individ-
uals’ own legitimate reasons to stay or go are not taken into consideration 
in the context of relocation or return sponsorships. This is particularly 
worrying in the context of return sponsorships, where individuals could 
be caught in a game of ‘ping-pong’ and be forced to relocate or involun-
tarily travel to Member States where they don’t want to go. Moreover, the 
Pact should have made it clear that Member States are not free to choose 
or select applicants based on criteria such as nationality, ethnic origin or 
religion, ‘integration potential’ or even recognition rates, as these clearly 
amount to discrimination prohibited under EU law and international 
refugee law (Carrera et al., 2019d).
Flexibility is clearly not a panacea. There are several lessons to be 
learned from the recent experiences of relocation and disembarkation 
arrangements implemented in the Mediterranean during 2018 and 
2019 (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019b). They have left too much room 
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for manoeuvre in the hands of EU Member States, putting the Commis-
sion in a weak coordination and dubious diplomatic role that goes well 
beyond its competences as ‘guarantor of the Treaties’. They also lack any 
meaningful tools to ensure their enforcement and the full compliance 
with existing EU asylum and border legal standards in the various phases 
that comprise their practical implementation, including the involvement 
of Frontex and EASO. 
Flexible solidarity is one expression of intergovernmentalism 
(Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019c). It leads to fragmentation in European 
cooperation on an issue that lies at the very core of the EU’s foundations, 
and where common action is essential. The enjoyment of equal rights and 
benefits stemming from membership in the EU carry similarly equal 
responsibilities for Member States governments. Flexibility can be seen as 
‘less EU’ and it weakens the possibilities for the EU to fully accomplish a 
harmonised immigration and asylum policy that is consistent, ‘common’ 
and integrated.
The Luxembourg Court has provided few hints as to the scope of the 
EU principle of solidarity in asylum policy. In its judgment of 2 April 
2020 (Cases C 715/17, C718/17 and C719/17) European Commission v 
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, the Court found that these gov-
ernments had violated their obligations to implement and participate in 
the Relocation Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601. It also held that any 
practical issues must be resolved in the spirit of cooperation and mutual 
trust between the authorities of the Member States that are beneficiaries 
of relocation and those of the Member State of relocation. The Court 
concluded that the responsibility towards Italy and Greece “…must, in 
principle, be divided between all the other Member States, in accordance 
with the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between 
the Member States, which in accordance with Article 80 TFEU, governs 
the Union’s asylum policy.”
1.5 Externalisation 
When it comes to prioritising expulsions orders, the Pact relies heavily 
on international cooperation instruments focused on ‘externalisation’, i.e. 
placing migration management at the heart of the EU’s external relations. 
These instruments take the shape of what the Pact calls ‘Migration 
Partnerships’, which are non-legally binding arrangements or ‘deals’ 
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(not qualifying as international agreements) with non-EU countries. 
Examples are the EU-Turkey Statement or third country readmission 
arrangements with African countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger or 
Nigeria (Carrera et al., 2019a; Carrera et al., 2019b). They often come 
along with crisis-led funding instruments (e.g. EU trust funds), and give 
clear priority to expulsions, border management, countering human 
smuggling, and the facilitation of readmissions and returns.
Despite the many legal and practical challenges characterising the 
implementation of EU Readmission Agreements (Carrera, 2016), the 
Pact continues with the long-standing EU policy position that “readmis-
sion must be an indispensable element of international partnerships”. 
The importance given to readmission in the Pact is also reflected in 
Article 7 of the Proposal for a new Asylum and Migration Management 
Regulation COM(2020) 610. The focus on readmission means that EU 
Migration Partnerships can be better understood as Insecurity Part-
nerships (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2009). These are premised 
on the Pact’s readmission priority, which is closely interrelated to visa 
facilitation/liberalisation-conditionality, development cooperation, trade 
policies and investments. The Pact expressly foresees the possibility of 
applying restrictive visa measures to nationals of countries not cooper-
ating on readmission.
The Pact confirms the EU’s commitment at the UN Global Refugee 
Forum of December 2019 “to providing life-saving support to millions 
of refugees and displaced people, as well as fostering sustainable develop-
ment-oriented solutions”. However, it then emphasises that development 
cooperation “will continue to be a key feature in EU engagement with 
countries, including on migration issues”. Such an EU-centric approach 
contradicts the UN GCR objective for development assistance to ensure 
a true “spirit of partnership, the primacy of country leadership and 
ownership”. 
Furthermore, and based on examples such as the EU-Jordan Compact 
(Panizzon, 2019), the Pact pursues a ‘root causes approach’ aimed at 
misusing trade and investment policies at the service of containment, or 
as deterrence tools for preventing refugees from reaching the EU. More 
attention needs to be paid to how these initiatives affect or change the dis-
tribution of the overall workload or the tasks involved in implementing 
the cognitive dimensions of the Pact by third countries while upholding 
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human rights, international labour standards and the rule of law in inter-
national relations. 
All this reveals a thematic intersectionality in EU external migration 
policies and a continued focus on migration management as insecurity. 
The Pact gives no consideration to the lessons learned from the inef-
fectiveness of past so-called ‘Partnerships’. It pays no attention to their 
negative impacts on African countries’ regional integration processes 
on free movement and regional human rights’ systems. The attempt to 
transfer and implement EU migration management and crime-control 
concepts and projects often do not match up to local socio-economic 
realities in relevant non-EU countries. They generally lead to harmful 
effects, including the nurturing of insecurity, illiberal agendas, and 
economic inequalities and human rights’ violations. 
The Pact explicitly refers to the UN Global Compact on Refugees 
in its Recommendation on legal pathways to protection in the EU: 
promoting resettlement, humanitarian admission and other comple-
mentary pathways C(2020) 6467 (European Commission, 2020h), which 
names the Global Refugee Forum and UNHCR’s three-year strategy 
(2019-2021) on resettlement and complementary pathways. It calls on 
EU Member States to “take a global leadership role on resettlement” and 
“counter the current trend of a decreasing number of resettling countries 
globally and a sharp drop in resettlement pledges” (UNHCR, 2020). It 
also calls on Member States to participate in the EASO Resettlement and 
Humanitarian Admission Network, which blurs its relationship with the 
global and international protection-based role played by UNHCR in this 
same domain.
In addition to resettlement, the Recommendation includes a call to 
develop “other forms of legal pathways to Europe for vulnerable people 
in need of international protection”, such as “humanitarian admission 
models” (including through study and work-related schemes), “Talent 
Partnerships” and community and private sponsorships. While all these 
instruments are officially presented in the context of ‘mobility’, some of 
these constitute examples of a ‘contained mobility approach’ (Carrera and 
Cortinovis, 2019a). These combine containment aspects, e.g. non-ad-
mission and non-arrival policies, with others on mobility that present 
selective, discriminatory, exclusionary and restrictive features. 
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By way of illustration, key challenges in the design and implemen-
tation of resettlement and other humanitarian admission programmes 
include the obligation to ensure the integrity, certainty and non-discrim-
inatory nature of their selection and eligibility procedures, as well as their 
additionality to access to asylum. According to UNHCR, resettlement is 
“a tool to provide protection and a durable solution to refugees rather than 
a migration management tool”, and it is not “an alternative to providing 
access to territory to asylum seekers” (UNHCR, 2016). However, the 
2016 Commission proposal on a Union Resettlement Framework has 
been criticised for including (among the factors for choosing priority 
countries for resettlement) their cooperation on readmission and their 
use of safe-country notions (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019a). 
1.6 Refugee protection, human rights and the rule of law
The UN GCR is “grounded on the international refugee protection 
regime” and “is guided by relevant international human rights instru-
ments”. The dual understanding of individuals as either ‘non-returnable 
refugees’ or ‘expellable irregular immigrants’ carries major implications 
for refugee protection and human rights more generally. It artificially and 
wrongly relabels people with legitimate claims of international protection 
as irregular immigrants or expellable asylum seekers. The Pact’s prior-
ities of localisation, speed and externalisation lay bare central questions 
of legal responsibility and accountability by state authorities and other 
implementing actors (including EU Agencies like Frontex and EASO) in 
cases of human rights’ violations and/or non-compliance with EU law.
Flexibility does not apply with respect to safeguarding international 
refugee law and human rights. All Member States abide by a commitment 
to effectively respect and protect the fundamental rights of all immi-
grants, irrespective of their administrative status and means of arrival 
(Carrera, Lannoo, Stefan and Vosyliute, 2018). Similarly, non-EU gov-
ernments are subject to the scrutiny of international and regional human 
rights systems and monitoring bodies and courts. The dualistic framing 
of people pursued by the Pact poses challenges to the very essence of 
the rule of law, including the unnegotiable duty to avoid arbitrariness by 
state authorities, and to ensure human dignity and access to justice for 
everyone (Carrera, 2020). 
Moreover, contrary to the de-territorialisation strategy characterising 
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the Pact’s pre-border screening and border procedures, the obligation to 
comply with international refugee law and human rights and EU law is 
not limited to what is legally framed by states as ‘territory’. Responsibility 
and liability for rights violations actually follow any actions or inactions 
by Member States and EU Agencies irrespective of where they happen as 
they are captured by de facto or de jure control notions, and fall within 
the scope of EU legislation or autonomous concepts of EU law such as 
‘detention’ (Carrera et al., 2018).
The Pact’s Proposal for a Regulation on screening at the external 
borders COM(2020) 612 final, in Article 7, provides for the obligation 
by EU Member States to set up “an independent monitoring mechanism”. 
This mechanism aims to safeguard fundamental rights “in relation to the 
screening, as well as the respect of the applicable national rules in the case 
of detention and compliance with the principle of non-refoulement”. The 
Proposal calls on Member States to ensure that individual complaints are 
dealt with “effectively and without undue delay.” 
The proposal for a fundamental rights’ mechanism is most welcome 
in light of the many barriers to effective remedies and justice that individ-
uals face in the context of border management procedures. However, any 
such complaint mechanism can only be meaningful if its effectiveness 
and independence from national authorities and relevant EU agencies 
(e.g. Frontex) is fully guaranteed (Carrera and Stefan, 2018), and if it 
covers the entire range of border procedures, including – and especially 
– in relation to those foreseen in what the Pact calls “crisis situations”.
The proposal correctly emphasises the need to guarantee the inde-
pendence of such a mechanism, and to ensure a key role by the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) to support and provide guidance to 
Member States in its establishment. To this end, such a ‘Border Monitor’ 
should envisage a key role for the European Ombudsman, and its network 
of national ombudspersons as well as national Data Protection Author-
ities (DPAs). It should also make sure that individuals have effective 
access to procedures, chiefly legal aid and civil society actors and human 
rights defenders, which should not be criminalised or policed in any way 
or form in their independent provision of humanitarian assistance and 
SAR activities (European Commission, 2020g), as well as in their role as 
fundamental rights watchdogs and key sources of social trust in demo-
cratic societies (Carrera et al., 2019c).
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1.7 Conclusions
The new Pact on Migration and Asylum ‘sets the tone’ of the European 
Commission’s policy priorities on migration, borders and asylum during 
the EU’s 9th legislature. The Pact gives priority to Member States’ agendas 
in an area where the EU already benefits from legal competence under 
the EU Treaties, where there are solid common EU legal standards, 
and where QMV and the co-legislator role by the European Parliament 
strictly applies. 
The Pact does not pursue a genuine Migration and Asylum Union. 
It runs the risk of pursuing intergovernmentalism, of establishing a 
European asylum system of asymmetric interstate solidarity and legiti-
mising Member States’ policies focused on speed, localisation and exter-
nalisation. EU Member States should be held accountable to their legal 
responsibilities, including under current CEAS and Schengen Borders 
Code standards. Solidarity towards individuals and the upholding of 
everyone’s rights and dignity needs to be placed at the heart of EU policies. 
Inter-institutional negotiations will follow the legislative proposals 
that the Pact comprises. These should focus on initiatives that prioritise 
effective access to effective remedies, independent monitoring and eval-
uation of Member States and EU agencies’ compliance with international 
and EU human rights and rule of law standards, in full compliance with 
the EU Treaties and the UN GCR. These are the essential preconditions 
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2. The Pact and Refugee Resettlement: 
Lessons From Australia and Canada
Adèle Garnier
2.1 Introduction
Most refugees in the European Union (EU) are granted protection 
following an asylum claim on EU territory. Yet the new EU Migration 
and Asylum Pact strongly supports the expansion of refugee resettle-
ment. This Chapter explores whether there are lessons to be learned from 
two countries in which most refugees are admitted through refugee reset-
tlement: Australia and Canada.
The Australian and Canadian experiences show that refugee resettle-
ment is strengthened by inclusive politics and civil society involvement 
in resettlement policies. Still, resettlement remains a marginal contribu-
tion to international protection. Hence, the contribution recommends 
that the EU strongly support inclusive resettlement politics and policies 
while strengthening access to asylum, which should remain the main 
instrument of humanitarian protection in the EU.
2.2 Expansion and increased advocacy for resettlement 
in the EU
Refugee resettlement is the voluntary admission by states of refugees 
from countries in which it is not sustainable for them to stay (Garnier 
et al., 2018). Contrary to asylum, resettlement is not codified in interna-
tional law.
In the last decade, refugee resettlement to European Union (EU) 
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Member States has significantly increased, from 4,050 resettled refugees 
in 2011 to 24,815 in 2018 (European Commission, 2019). Between 
October 2017 and October 2019, EU Member States pledged to resettle 
50,000 refugees, yet resettled 37,520 over this period (Wills, 2019). 14 
Member States (including the United Kingdom) have pledged to resettle 
almost 30,000 refugees in 2020 (European Commission, 2020a). In the 
EU Migration and Asylum Pact, this pledge was made to cover 2020 
and 2021 (European Commission, 2020b: 22) to account for resettle-
ment delays caused by travel bans adopted in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic (Garnier, 2020).
The development of an EU-wide resettlement framework has been 
promoted by the European Commission since 2000 (Garnier 2014). 
EU funding has been made available to support resettlement places in 
Member States as well as multi-stakeholders initiatives promoting reset-
tlement, such as the European resettlement network (European Reset-
tlement Network, n.d). A draft directive aiming to establish an EU joint 
Resettlement Framework has been in the legislative pipeline since 2016, 
yet negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council have 
not progressed since 2018 (European Parliament 2021).
In 2017, then EU Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos 
stated that refugee resettlement ‘should become the preferred way for 
refugees to receive protection’ (European Commission, 2017). The EU 
Migration and Asylum Pact unveiled on 23 September 2020 (European 
Commission, 2020b) demanded that the EU resettlement efforts be 
‘scaled up’, with the recommendation to adopt a Framework Regulation 
on Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission (European Commission, 
2020c).
Yet EU Member States admit far more refugees following an asylum 
claim on EU territory. In 2019, 109,000 persons were granted refugee 
status in the EU (Eurostat, 2021). A further 52,000 were granted sub-
sidiary protection and 45,100 the authorisation to stay for humanitarian 
reasons. The EU Commission argues that refugee resettlement ‘helps 
save lives, reduce irregular migration and counter the business model of 
smuggling networks’ (European Commission, 2020c: 2). The Commis-
sion thus presents resettlement as an alternative to seeking asylum after 
an irregular migration journey.
What about refugee resettlement in countries in which most refugees 
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are admitted through resettlement? Are there lessons to be learned? The 
following highlights Canada’s and Australia’s refugee resettlement expe-
rience with a focus on relations between resettlement and asylum; on 
the role of civil society in resettlement policies; and on contributions to 
international protection, to draw lessons for the EU.
2.3 Canada’s and Australia’s refugee resettlement
2.3.1 Resettlement vs asylum?
Given that refugee resettlement is not based on international law, politics 
can play a considerable role in expanding or contracting refugee resettle-
ment. Most strikingly, the United States of America (US), the traditional 
resettlement leader, have drastically reduced resettlement admissions 
under the former Trump administration (Krogstad, 2019) as part of a 
broader anti-immigration agenda (Pierce and Bolter, 2020).
Canada and Australia have long been in the top 3 of countries reset-
tling the most refugees and in the last decade experienced resettlement 
increases (Cellini, 2018). Yet in Canada, contrary to Australia, resettle-
ment was not framed as an alternative to asylum.
In Canada, the death by drowning of Syrian boy Alan Kurdi in Turkey 
contributed to a strong pro-resettlement mobilisation in the wake of the 
2015 federal election campaign (Parry, 2015). Justin Trudeau’s centre-left 
Liberal Party promised to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees within three 
months if the Liberals won the 2015 federal election. Once on power, 
the Trudeau government delivered on its promise (Associated Press, 
2016), though this timeline was judged too ambitious at the time by some 
immigrant settlement organisations (CBC News, 2015). Canada has since 
slightly increased the country’s annual resettlement intake compared to 
before 2015 and is now the world’s resettlement leader (Radford and 
Connor, 2019). Canada resettled 28,076 refugees in 2018 (Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019).
Canada’s resettlement increase was not related to an increase of 
asylum claims on Canadian territory. Still, asylum claims in Canada have 
considerably increased since 2015. Canada’s political rhetoric on asylum 
is warier than political discourse on resettlement (Canadian Press, 2018), 
28 2. The Pact and Refugee Resettlement: Lessons From Australia and Canada
yet Trudeau has stressed the legitimate nature of asylum claims made 
at its borders, and has increased resources to be able to deal with up to 
50,000 asylum claims by 2021 (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
Canada, 2019).
Australia experienced two resettlement increases in the 2010s, one of 
which was tied to increased restrictiveness towards asylum-seekers. In 
2012, Australia’s resettlement intake increased by 40% to 20,000 places 
under the centre-left Labor government of Julia Gillard (Gillard, 2012). 
Such increase had for years been promoted by refugee advocates (Refugee 
Council of Australia, 2012). Yet it occurred in the context of a very sig-
nificant increase of asylum claims made by people who had arrived in 
Australia by boat (dubbed ‘irregular maritime arrivals’, IMAs). However, 
the resettlement increase, according to the Prime Minister, targeted 
‘those in most need: those vulnerable people offshore, not those getting 
on boats’. IMAs would get ‘no advantage’ in gaining access to humani-
tarian protection in Australia (Gillard, 2012). In fact, at the same time of 
the resettlement increase, Australia reintroduced its earlier policy of pro-
cessing IMAs’ asylum claims in other countries in its region, the so-called 
Pacific Solution (Davidson, 2016).
The centre-left Labor government of Kevin Rudd, in 2013, introduced 
a ban on the grant of permanent protection in Australia to IMAs (Rudd, 
2013). Yet Labor lost the 2013 federal election to the centre-right Liberal/
National Coalition of Tony Abbott. Abbott’s main campaign slogan had 
been ‘stop the boats’ (Rourke, 2013). His government returned the reset-
tlement intake to its pre-2012 level of 13,750, until it was pressured by 
civil society and state governments to increase resettlement in response 
to the Syrian crisis (Yaxley, 2015). This led to the one-off resettlement 
of 12,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees between 2015 and 2017 (Woodley, 
2015), followed by an increase of the country’s annual resettlement intake 
to 18,750. Australia’s refugee politics demonise asylum-seekers. A recent 
government-sponsored review argued such rhetoric had a nefarious 
impact on refugees at large (Shergold et al., 2019). The Australian govern-
ment delayed the release of its findings by several months (Stayner, 2019).
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2.3.2 Civil society involvement in resettlement policies
In Australia and Canada, civil society mobilisation played a key role 
in increasing resettlement. This role is, overall, more institutionally 
entrenched, and more incentivised, in Canada.
One policy step at which Australian civil society appears to play a 
greater role is in consultations ahead of the government’s announcement 
of the annual resettlement intake. The Refugee Council of Australia, the 
peak body representing Australian refugee advocates, releases an annual 
report presenting community views on the country’s refugee intake (see, 
for instance, Refugee Council of Australia, 2018). These views are taken 
in consideration in policy design (UNHCR, 2018: 4). Though dialogue 
between its Canadian equivalent, the Canadian Council for Refugees, 
and the immigration bureaucracy, is sustained, there is no such annual 
report in Canada. Australia’s consultative process is laudable. Yet it is no 
guarantee the government will listen.
Canadian civil society is essential to the country’s private refugee 
sponsorship program (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 
2020). Groups of at least five Canadians, as well as larger organisations, 
can enter agreements with the Canadian government to financially 
support the arrival and settlement of people in refugee and refugee-like 
situations. Private refugee sponsorship was formally established in the 
1970s in the context of the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis and legal scholar 
Audrey Macklin has called it a ‘permanent component of immigration 
policy’ (Macklin, 2018). Today, most resettled refugees in Canada are 
privately sponsored rather than assisted by the government of Canada. In 
2018, 18,156 resettled refugees were privately sponsored and 8,156 were 
government-assisted (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 
2019).
In 2015, when Trudeau announced its electoral promise to resettle 
25,000 Syrian refugees within 3 months, hundreds of local groups 
signalled they were ready to sponsor (CBC News, 2015). The Trudeau 
government supports the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, through 
which Canada public authorities, private organisations and the United 
Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) foster the estab-
lishment of refugee sponsorship programs overseas (Global Refugee 
Sponsorship Initiative, n.d.).
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For decades, Australia has also allowed private individuals to sponsor 
the resettlement of refugees and people in refugee-like situation, yet 
without encouraging sponsors’ direct involvement in refugee settlement 
once in Australia.
Following strong civil society demands for a scheme akin to Canada’s 
private sponsorship, a community sponsorship program was eventually 
piloted in 2013 (Department of Home Affairs, 2018). Its capacity is 1,000 
places yet this quota has never been filled. In 2018/2019, 563 refugees 
were resettled as part of this stream, in contrast to 7,098 whose admission 
was supported by individuals, and 9,451 government-assisted refugees 
(Department of Home Affairs, 2020). Refugee advocacy groups (Refugee 
Council of Australia, 2019) and scholars (Hirsch et al., 2019) have been 
highly critical of the community sponsorship program’s narrow eligibility 
criteria, such as evidence of an employment offer and English proficiency, 
as well as its exorbitant cost. Notably, Australia does not participate in the 
Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative.
2.3.3 Contribution to international protection
Canadian and Australian politicians (Glavin, 2019; ABC News Factcheck, 
2018) insist on their countries’ generosity through their substantial con-
tribution to global refugee resettlement. Yet less than 1% of the world’s 
refugees are resettled each year, whereas more than 80% of the world’s 
26 million refugees reside in developing countries, mostly close to their 
countries of origin (UNHCR, 2020).
For this reason, even resettlement advocates acknowledge that the 
‘protection dividends’ of investments in resettlement programs are con-
siderably smaller than support to refugees in regions of origin, while 
some populations, such as Syrians, have in recent years far more strongly 
benefitted from resettlement than others, particularly African refugees 
(Macklin, 2018).
Strong emphasis on the vulnerability of resettled refugees has 
its ambivalences as it can devaluate refugee agency (Neikirk, 2017). 
Resettled refugees may be perceived as victims who contribute less to 
their countries of admission than other categories of immigrants, rather 
than people able to advocate for themselves through long and complex 
resettlement procedures (Sandvik, 2011) and dealing with considerable 
structural disadvantages in host societies (Jenkinson et al., 2016).
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2.4 Which lessons for the EU?
In contrast with EU Member States, Canada and Australia admit most 
refugees through resettlement rather than following an asylum claim. 
This Chapter recommends against the adoption of resettlement as the 
main mode of refugee admission to the EU because resettlement is not 
based on international law and is highly sensitive to domestic politics. 
Rather, the Chapter recommends emphasising additionality between 
refugee resettlement and asylum and stressing that far more solidarity is 
needed with developing countries, as developing countries host most of 
the world’s refugees.
In the context of an increased focus on global solidarity, the Canadian 
resettlement experience can be a model for EU Member States in terms of 
inclusive politics and civil society involvement. In this respect, the Pact’s 
incentivisation of community sponsorship (Tan, 2020; see Chapter 6) is 
a step in the right direction. More EU Member States should be encour-
aged to take part in the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative supported 
by Canada.
By contrast, the Australian experience shows that pitching reset-
tlement against asylum not only demonises asylum-seekers, but also 
worsens the settlement experience of all refugees. It is to hope that the 
EU will in the future refrain from framing resettlement as an alternative 
to asylum. This framing risks further shrinking EU citizens’ willingness 
to welcome any refugee in addition to reducing the availability of human-
itarian protection.
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3. The New Pact 0n Migration and 
Asylum and The Global Compact on 
Refugees and Solutions
Geoff Gilbert
The United Nations Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) of 2018 is a 
document that tries to embrace all aspects of forcible displacement across 
international borders in the 21st century (UNGA, 2018). This Chapter’s 
review of the new EU Pact will focus principally on how it might facilitate 
solutions for displacement in relation to the GCR, but necessarily there 
first has to be some more general analysis.
3.1 The GCR as framing the argument
The GCR may not be binding in international law (UNGA, 2018: 
paragraph 4), but it still gives rise to commitments for the international 
community as a whole. Its two principal elements pertinent to this dis-
cussion relate to burden- and responsibility-sharing and its focus on 
solutions.
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol, and the 1950 Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) are directed towards protection of refugees in the 
country of asylum, not so much on the inevitable burden that providing 
protection entails, nor the ultimate protection, a durable and sustainable 
solution to their displacement (UNGA, 1950; UNHCR, 1951; UNHCR 
1967). Paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the 1951 Convention did call for 
international co-operation:
CONSIDERING that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy 
burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of 
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a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the inter-
national scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without 
international co-operation.
Nevertheless, it took until the GCR in 2018 to put “flesh” on those 
bare bones. As UNHCR figures show, there are 79.5 million displaced 
persons of concern to UNHCR, of whom 20.4 million are refugees and 
4.2 million are asylum seekers; 73% live in neighbouring countries to 
those that they have fled, often alongside the 45.7 million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) who are also of concern to the organisation.1 
Of the top five hosting states, only Germany is in the global north: 80% 
of displaced persons of concern to UNHCR live in states where there is 
acute food insecurity and malnutrition.
In these circumstances, where the modal average length of a situation 
of displacement is around eighteen years, it is little wonder that the devel-
opment actors play such an important role in the GCR, while UNHCR 
maintains its unique protection mandate for all refugees, including 
asylum seekers and returnees without a durable and sustainable solution.
Some aspects of the new EU Pact have a direct impact on how the 
GCR’s guiding principles and objectives (UNGA, 2018: paragraphs 5 
and 7) are to be achieved – as the new Communication on the new Pact 
(European Commission, 2020a: 18) states, the EU is the “the world’s 
major development donor”.
As regards durable and sustainable solutions, the traditional three are 
voluntary repatriation, resettlement or local integration. The GCR rec-
ognised a fourth means for responding to displacement, complementary 
pathways for admission to third countries (UNGA, 2018: paragraphs 
94-96). There is, however, language in those paragraphs that indicates 
that complementary pathways are not durable and sustainable, with ref-
erences to student scholarships and labour mobility. If the objective is to 
provide the refugee with the sustainable international protection of a state 
rather than that upheld by UNHCR under its mandate, then studentships 
and labour mobility schemes do not offer that guarantee, at least in the 
first instance, although they may facilitate one of the traditional durable 
solutions and provide the refugee with the capacity to resolve their own 
situation.
1  This year’s figures include 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad, alongside the 
93,300 refugees and 794,500 asylum seekers – 4.5 million Venezuelans in total.
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3.2 The new EU Pact and the GCR
It is always worth mentioning that the EU’s approach of joining asylum 
with migration is fundamentally flawed, regardless of how long they have 
persisted with it. Asylum is about protection and immigration is about 
controlling borders (Gilbert, 2004; Carrera, 2020). 
The idea that the new EU Pact’s focus should be “a common 
framework for asylum and migration management at EU level as a key 
contribution to the comprehensive approach and seeks to promote mutual 
trust between the Member States” does undermine the primacy of refugee 
protection as set out in the EU Proposal for a Regulation (European 
Commission, 2020b: 2).
Nevertheless, in the context of solutions, some aspects of the new 
Pact may be facilitative (see European Commission, 2020c: paragraphs 3 
and 6). Equally, those elements relating to prevention, development aid 
and migration as a way to end refugee status and protect the dignity of 
refugees could be helpful (see European Commission, 2020a: §§6.2, 6.3, 
6.5).
3.2.1 Prevention
The cynical view within the 1990s was that there was no such thing as 
post-conflict, just a pause before it was pre-conflict again. Nevertheless, 
the link between development assistance and prevention is well estab-
lished and is even built into the Responsibility to Protect (UNGA, 2005: 
paragraph 139; Gilbert, 1998): 
139 … We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles 
of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
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The new EU Pact takes this further and should be read with para-
graphs 8 and 9 of the GCR (UNGA, 2018):
8 … In the first instance, addressing root causes is the responsi-
bility of countries at the origin of refugee movements. However, 
averting and resolving large refugee situations are also matters 
of serious concern to the international community as a whole, 
requiring early efforts to address their drivers and triggers, as well 
as improved cooperation among political, humanitarian, develop-
ment and peace actors.
In line with the Sustainable Development Goals, the international 
community, including the EU, should provide development assistance 
(UNGA, 2015). The new EU Pact takes a similar line in §6.3 when it 
asserts that (European Commission, 2020a):
Conflict prevention and resolution, as well as peace, security and 
governance, are often the cornerstone of these efforts. Trade and 
investment policies already contribute to addressing root causes 
by creating jobs and perspectives for millions of workers and 
farmers worldwide. Boosting investment through vehicles such as 
the External Investment Plan can make a significant contribution 
to economic development, growth and employment.
On the other hand, while the new Pact has some useful language 
regarding long-term prevention through addressing root causes, there are 
other references that indicate an EU-centric attitude that will not affect 
global fairness and reduced displacement. In the new EU Pact, §2.4 of the 
document talks about how “[the] new Asylum and Migration Manage-
ment Regulation will … improve planning, preparedness and monitoring 
at both national and EU level”, rather than solidarity with the states in 
low- or middle-income countries who host 83% of the world’s refugees 
according to UNHCR (European Commission, 2020a: §2.4; UNHCR, 
2019: 25); as such, the focus once again seems to be on averting another 
2015 European asylum crisis that never was a crisis given the wealth 
of EU Member States and the very limited numbers they were dealing 
with by comparison with many other low- or middle-income countries 
(UNHCR, 2019: 25, Fig.2). 
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3.2.2 Burden- and responsibility-sharing and local integration
Predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing is funda-
mental to all of the GCR (UNGA, 2018: paragraph 3). In this particular 
context, given the protracted nature of most displacement crises and that 
most displaced persons only cross one border according to the World 
Bank (2017: 23), supporting the low- or middle-income countries who 
host most refugees is part of the solution to the crisis. Solutions start from 
the moment of protection, as human rights and the rule of law protect 
refugees in the country of asylum.
The traditional durable and sustainable solutions are the endpoint 
of an international protection framework that is based on resolving the 
issues to which displacement gives rise: denial of access to education, 
employment and healthcare, interference with the guarantees the rule of 
law should offer, and the upholding of human rights. Some of the new 
Pact targets these problems refugees face during their situations of dis-
placement. The new EU Pact states at §6.2 that (European Commission, 
2020a: §6.2):
… [The] EU is determined to maintain its strong commitment to 
providing life-saving support to millions of refugees and displaced 
people, as well as fostering sustainable development-oriented 
solutions.
Nevertheless, this is a perfect example of why the new Pact might 
be evidence of hope triumphing over expectation. Niger has provided 
incredible support to forcibly displaced persons for years,2 but according 
to the UNDP Human Development Index for 2020 (UNDP, 2020), Niger 
came 189th out of 189 countries. The EU should not be ‘solving’ forced 
displacement and providing protection through transfer to one of the 
poorest countries on the planet.
What is also true, however, is that whether formally or not, lots of 
forcibly displaced persons remain for protracted periods in the country 
of asylum and settle there. As will be seen, where voluntary repatriation 
is not possible, refugees have few options other than to make a new life 
in the country giving protection. The generosity of many countries of 
asylum in this regard, though, cannot be abused by the international 
2  For further discussion, see Gilbert and Rüsch, ‘Rule of Law and UN Interoperability’, 
30, International Journal of Refugee Law, 31 at 35 and fn.136, (2018).
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community and, thus, EU initiatives with respect to development, also 
indicated in the new Pact, will inevitably play a large part in solutions. 
According to the new EU Pact §6.3 (European Commission, 2020a: §6.3):
The EU is the world’s largest provider of development assistance. 
This will continue to be a key feature in EU engagement with 
countries, including on migration issues. Work to build stable and 
cohesive societies, to reduce poverty and inequality and promote 
human development, jobs and economic opportunity, to promote 
democracy, good governance, peace and security, and to address 
the challenges of climate change can all help people feel that their 
future lies at home.
It may not be what low- or middle-income countries hoped for during 
the Formal Consultations on the GCR, but without robust engagement 
with the source states, which have predominantly remained the same 
since the 1990s (World Bank, 2017: 23), voluntary repatriation will not 
resolve displacement crises.
3.2.3 Resettlement and complementary pathways
Resettlement is one of the classic durable and sustainable solutions, but 
it is less and less available, such that only for the most vulnerable will it 
provide a means of ending refugeehood. The Commission Recommen-
dation on legal pathways to protection in the EU supports the expansion 
of resettlement programmes within the EU. But even so its impact on 
low- or middle-income countries that host so many refugees would still 
be minimal because the base figure is so low – 107,800 in a mere 26 
countries worldwide in 2019 according to UNHCR figures.
The proposed Commission Recommendation on legal pathways to 
protection in the EU is a positive move by the EU, although the role of the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) alongside UNHCR needs to be 
further developed. Complementary Pathways are an additional solution 
listed in the GCR (UNGA, 2018: paragraphs 94-96), but whether they 
will always be durable and sustainable like the traditional ones is open to 
question. The EU Pact deals with one very specific aspect of this in §6.6, 
the migration control effected through visa requirements for short-term 
mobility.
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The remaining aspects of the proposed Commission Recommenda-
tion on legal pathways to protection in the EU apply equally to reset-
tlement and complementary pathways. The aim of trying to ensure that 
forcibly displaced persons do not have to resort to irregular migration 
or even people smugglers is to be commended (European Commission, 
2020a: §6.6), but unless that reflects effective access rather than simply 
top slicing particular refugees based on limited skill sets that only suit 
EU Member States (European Commission, 2020c: paragraphs 19 and 
21), then no noticeable change will take place. It will also reduce the skill-
base in the country of nationality for when transition towards peace and 
stability can commence.
To start, resettlement is a humanitarian response that benefits 
refugees and the countries of first asylum, usually low- or middle-income 
countries, it is not a means by which to “match people, skills and labour 
market needs through legal migration” (§6.6, EU Pact). That might be 
applicable to complementary pathways, but not resettlement as is clear 
from the Pact’s own description of the Union Resettlement and Human-
itarian Admission Framework Regulation. The Pact also encourages 
broader community engagement with resettlement programmes that 
again reflects positive aspects of the GCR (UNGA, 2018: see paragraph 
91 read in the light of paragraphs 33-44).
3.2.4 Voluntary repatriation
Often spoken of as the most desired solution by refugees and countries 
of asylum, voluntary repatriation relies on restoration of human rights 
and rule of law in the country of nationality, along with substantial devel-
opment initiatives. UNHCR can ensure that voluntary repatriation does 
lead to durable and sustainable solutions for returning refugees through 
monitoring, but the international community as a whole will provide the 
framework.
The EU has a major role to play in peace building and conflict reso-
lution, not only as regards addressing the root causes, not just vis-à-vis 
prevention, but also to encourage voluntary repatriation (European 
Commission, 2020a: §6.3). While there is much in the new Pact on the 
economic initiatives and on return programmes where people do not 
require protection, more on restoring human rights, rule of law and good 
governance would have been welcome.
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Conclusion
The Pact on Migration and Asylum has once again missed the oppor-
tunity to put the EU at the forefront of resolving the global displace-
ment crisis. It focuses on internal EU concerns and aims at pushing the 
problem away, often with a cynical reference to how that will protect 
so many from the dangers they might face in trying to reach Europe. 
When only 17% of persons of concern to UNHCR were in high-income 
countries in 2019, the need to support low- or middle-income countries 
and to offer enhanced protection and assistance to refugees should have 
been the outward-looking drivers for this review. International protec-
tion standards have been sacrificed in the (vain?) hope of achieving a 
compromise within the EU.
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One of Europe’s major gateways since the early 2000s, Greece is, arguably, 
the European Union’s asylum policy laboratory. It has long served as a 
stark reminder of the limits of European asylum solidarity (Karageor-
giou, 2018) and of the shortcomings (den Heijer et al., 2016) of the 
so-called Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as reflected in the 
narrowness (Carrera and Guild, 2010) of the logic of its cornerstone, i.e. 
the Dublin system. This Chapter provides an analysis of the implications 
of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission, 
2020e), hereinafter ‘the Pact’, on countries located at the external borders 
of the EU, with focus on Greece.
The analysis highlights the extent to which measures on procedures, 
detention and expulsions proposed in the Pact, essentially, institution-
alize a number of formal and ad hoc informal measures already carried 
out by Greece, which have made it hard for refugees to access asylum, 
have their claims examined in substance and rely on effective remedies. 
The transformation of these measures, from national practices within 
the context of an alleged temporary emergency situation into mandatory 
rules applicable throughout the EU, raise a number of questions con-
cerning the self-proclaimed role of the EU as human rights guarantor in 
the region, the compatibility of EU law with international standards, and 
the fate of EU refugee policy.
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The analysis proceeds in two parts: the first part provides a brief 
overview of the evolution of asylum policy in Greece. It discusses the 
ways in which the CEAS instruments have informed Greek law and 
policy, and the extent to which Greek policy itself has influenced devel-
opments at EU level (Section 4.2). The second part looks more specifi-
cally at the CEAS reforms suggested in the Pact in relation to procedures, 
detention, and expulsions and what these reforms imply for Greece and 
the EU’s periphery more broadly (Section 4.3).
4.2 Greece and the constant state of ‘crisis’
4.2.1 Phase one: The ‘exceptionality’ of the Greek case
The asylum situation in Greece has been treated as being at a constant 
state of ‘crisis’ since 2010 (UNHCR, 2010). Scarcity of resources and frus-
tration against the inequality of the EU Dublin system has left Greece 
with little incentives to improve its piecemeal approach to asylum. After 
a series of infringement proceedings initiated against it in 2009 and 
2010 concerning the implementation of the EU asylum acquis, Greece 
committed to reform its asylum and migration policy based on a national 
Action Plan (Progress Report Greek Action Plan, 2013).
Although progress has been made especially after the establishment 
of the new Asylum Service, access to asylum and reception conditions for 
international protection seekers remained challenging. European Courts 
have repeatedly condemned Greece for failing to respect the fundamental 
rights of migrants and applicants for international protection: inhumane 
detention conditions (Council of Europe, 2009b), asylum seekers’ des-
titution (Council of Europe, 2011), and lack of procedural guarantees 
(Council of Europe, 2013) during refugee status determination (CJEU, 
2011) and expulsion (Council of Europe, 2016) processes, as reported by 
the Council of Europe (Commissioner for Human Rights Report, 2009), 
the UN (UNHCR, 2010), NGOs (HRW, 2009), and civil society (Greek 
Council for Refugees, 2013).
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4.2.2 Phase two: Syrian refugees and the 2015/2016 EU reception 
and solidarity crisis
As a response to increased asylum demands in peripheral EU countries 
in 2015, the EU adopted in the context of its Agenda on Migration 
(European Commission, 2015a) two solidarity measures: the 2015 
emergency relocation decisions (Council of the EU, 2015a; Council of 
the EU, 2015b) and the 2016 EU-Turkey statement (European Council, 
2016). Arguably, both measures have proved to be inadequate to relieve 
Greece from excessive administrative, procedural, and substantive 
burdens it faced following the arrival of a substantial number of refugees 
on its territory (on relocation, see Guild et al., 2017). Instead, as I have 
argued elsewhere (Karageorgiou, 2020), they have made sure that a new 
set of obligations is imposed on those states within the context of the 
“hotspots approach”.
The amendments introduced by the Greek government to domestic 
legislation in order to render those EU measures immediately oper-
ational have raised serious concerns for access to asylum and human 
rights (ECRE, 2016a). The Greek Law 4375/2016 enabled national 
authorities to adopt exceptional measures at the borders in line with the 
“hotspot approach”, considerably restricting the procedural guarantees 
available to asylum-seekers subject to border procedures contrary to 
European Courts case law (Council of Europe, 2015) and to the recast 
Asylum Procedures (e.g. Art. 35, 43) and Reception Conditions Directive 
(Art. 8). The processing of asylum applications on the Greek islands was 
designed to facilitate the return to Turkey of all “irregular” migrants 
and asylum-seekers arriving from there, broadening the possibilities 
for declaring an asylum application inadmissible, as envisioned in the 
EU-Turkey statement.
4.2.3 Phase three: Dealing with the consequences of the 2015/2016 
crisis
In the aftermath of 2015, Greece remained with thousands of people 
stranded in overcrowded facilities on the Greek islands and in the 
mainland, following the reintroduction of temporary border controls 
applied by other EU Member States (Guild et al., 2015). At the end of 
2019, Greece hosted approximately 186,200 (UNHCR, 2020a) refugees 
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and asylum-seekers, receiving more asylum applications in 2019 (EASO, 
2020) than during the 2015/2016 crisis. Based on recent statistics, Greece 
has currently a backlog of nearly 100,000 asylum applications (Ansa, 
2020).
Containment of refugees and asylum-seekers on the Greek islands 
has been the norm since 2015 (Costello, 2020), despite a ruling by the 
Greek Council of State in the opposite direction (ECRE, 2018). The newly 
introduced Law 4636/2019 on ‘international protection and other provi-
sions’, essentially, crystallizes and advances already existing confinement 
and deterrence practices. Some of the major reforms introduced by the 
new Law have included increasing of the maximum detention time for 
rejected asylum-seekers, speeding up of refugee status determination 
procedures involving one judge, narrowing the definition of vulnerable 
groups by excluding persons suffering from PTSD and lowering the 
standard of protection a third country would have to provide to render an 
asylum seeker’s claim inadmissible in Greece. These have been criticized 
as limiting protection contrary to European and international standards 
(Greek Council for Refugees and OXFAM briefing, 2020).
4.2.4 Current phase: The containment crisis
It is against the background described above that a number of human-
itarian emergencies have been unfolding lately at the Greek-Turkish 
border and on the Greek islands. Following bombings in Idlib, Syria in 
February 2020, Greece violently (Αmnesty Ιnternational, 2020) refused 
entry to Syrians arriving at the Evros land border, following Turkey’s 
decision to open the doors for asylum-seekers and refugees to leave its 
territory for Europe. The measures taken by Greece as a way to avert what 
according to the Greek government spokesman was “an organized, mass, 
illegal attack of violation of its borders” have been fully endorsed by the 
Council of the EU (Council of the EU, 2020).
From being the irresponsible gatekeeper and defector in earlier 
instances, Greece was now praised by the European Commission 
President for being Europe’s aspida (shield) in deterring migrants and 
refugees from entering Europe (Rankin, 2020). On top of that, invoking 
an emergency situation, the Greek government passed a legislative act 
suspending the right to claim asylum for a month (ΦΕΚ Α’45, 2020), 
despite UNHCR’s concerns about possible breaches of international 
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refugee law (UNHCR, March 2020). At the same time, criminal charges 
for those who did manage to enter Greece irregularly (HIAS Greece, 
2020), and cases of extrajudicial detention (Stevis-Gridneff et al., 2020), 
were reported. In the same non-entre mind-set, Greece has been lately 
accused for engaging in clandestine expulsion practices whereby refugees 
confined in camps on Greek islands were forcibly sailed on international 
waters and then abandoned in inflatable life rafts (Human Rights Watch 
et al., 2020).
As regards the reception conditions on the hotspots, the EU hotspot 
in Moria, Lesvos has been described by the head of the EU's Funda-
mental Rights Agency, as “the single most worrying fundamental rights 
issue that we are confronting anywhere in the European Union’ (Nielsen, 
2019). With Covid-19 cases rising on the island, approximately 9,000 
people moved from the burnt down Moria to a newly improvised tent 
camp in Kara Tepe, where living conditions are equally poor (ECRE, 
2020). Despite the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights 
call to urgently move asylum-seekers out of the camps on the Aegean 
islands (Council of Europe, 2019), the Greek government has insisted 
on its earlier plans, to eventually move asylum-seekers into close pre-re-
moval detention centers (Fallon, 2020).
4.3 The new EU Pact and its implications on Greek law 
and policy
The above short chronicle of the extent to which Greece has absorbed 
EU norms on migration and of the way it has unilaterally responded 
to immediate asylum demands illustrates the following point: mere 
financial assistance, ad hoc relocation, and support from EU agencies in 
controlling borders have proved inadequate to ensure a EU migration 
policy that is ‘fair towards third country nationals’ (Art. 67 TFEU), and a 
truly common EU asylum system based on solidarity (Art. 78-80 TFEU).
In the following, the European Commission’s suggestions for CEAS 
reforms on procedures and detention are analysed. Does the EU Pact 
include measures designed to remedy the shortcomings of the CEAS as 
exemplified by the Greek case and to address the persisting challenges for 
solidarity and human rights?
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4.3.1 Procedures
The proposal for a Regulation on external border screening combined 
with the new amendments to the 2016 proposal for an Asylum Procedure 
Regulation, appear to advance an intensification of the “hotspot 
approach” originally meant to facilitate the emergency relocation system. 
This means that Greece is no longer under the provisional obligation to 
accommodate hotspots for as long as it is under particular migratory 
pressure. Rather, it is required to introduce pre-entry procedures con-
sisting of screening and mandatory RSD for certain categories of appli-
cants at designated crossing points.
In practice, this does not alter much for Greece, but rather replicates 
the alarming situation currently witnessed on the Greek islands. Provi-
sions covering asylum procedures at the borders, targeting particularly 
individuals who have transited through third countries, raise important 
questions in relation to access to asylum, discrimination, and availability 
of effective remedial mechanisms to protection seekers in countries 
located at the external borders.
4.3.2 Detention
The Pact envisages the possibility whereby screening procedures might 
require detention of the person in question, in which case the modalities 
of how this is to be applied, are left to domestic law. Given that indi-
viduals undergoing screening procedures are not presumed – according 
to the Pact – to have been authorized entry, detention of refugees who, 
in principle, do not fulfil entry conditions is legitimized. This adminis-
tratively convenient – but highly questionable from an international law 
perspective, presumption of ‘irregularity’ is expected to affect the rights 
of the majority of asylum-seekers and refugees who reach the borders of 
the EU (see Malichudis et al., 2020).
Containment of asylum applicants at border zones is also made 
possible in cases where an application qualifies for an asylum border 
procedure instead of a regular procedure within the Member State’s 
territory. Along the same lines, the right to prolong the screening and 
border procedures is recognized for states confronted with a ‘crisis’. Such 
an approach, allows room for excessive restrictions of movement, nor-
malizing existing practices of detention en masse on the Greek islands 
and close to land borders.
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4.3.3 Expulsions
As stressed in Chapter 1 of this book, the EU Pact blurs protection and 
return. This curtails procedural safeguards such as the issuance of separate 
asylum and return decisions as well as the automatic suspensive effect of 
appeals. Moreover, it allows for blanket application of third country rules 
to “any country where the person has transited departed or has other par-
ticular tie”. This is likely to reinforce recent Greek practice – conducted 
with the support of EU agencies such as the EASO - of summary returns 
to Turkey based on fixated decisions (see ECCHR, 2019). It might mean, 
for instance, that asylum applications by beneficiaries of temporary pro-
tection in a third country can be dismissed as inadmissible even if the 
country does not satisfy the existing criteria of a “safe third country”.
With regard to crisis management, the following remarks are due: 
first, the Pact proposal for a Regulation addressing situations of crisis 
permits Member States under pressure to introduce a number of dero-
gations form the CEAS rules applicable in normal times. For example, 
access to territory and to asylum procedures may be denied for persons 
apprehended in direct connection with irregular border crossings. Also, 
Member States may invoke capacity constraints to limit access to asylum 
at border crossing points for irregular entrants. This seems to legitimize 
measures taken recently by the Greek government, such as the suspen-
sion of the right to lodge an asylum application followed by an immediate 
expulsion decision, or the initiation of criminal action against refugees 
who have irregularly entered the territory.
Member States faced with a ‘crisis’ situation may also derogate from 
regular asylum procedures and grant ‘immediate protection’ status to 
persons who risk being subject to indiscriminate violence in a situation 
of armed conflict upon return. Although this may temporarily prevent 
removals, relocation or responsibility transfers under the new Asylum 
and Migration Management Regulation will still be applicable and should 
be scrutinized. In terms of the content of protection, past experience has 
revealed states’ tendencies to use ‘temporary protection’ as a substitute to 
formal refugee status in order to deter arrivals.
Finally, ‘flexibility’ in the way states shall cope with crisis situations, 
promoted in the Pact, is highly questionable. It seems that wide dis-
cretion is left on national authorities which is why strong monitoring 
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mechanisms need to be established to ensure human rights compliance. 
For example, short time limits for lodging an application or an appeal 
may considerably restrict the procedural guarantees available to asy-
lum-seekers subject to border procedures, increasing the likelihood of 
expulsion (Jones et al., 2020). This flexibility approach might very well be 
seen as the Commissioners’ response to a demand by Greece, Cyprus and 
Bulgaria asking for ‘an emergency and flexibility clause’ to be integrated 
into the new Pact to ‘reinforce the frontline states’ capacity to effectively 
tackle exceptional migration circumstances’ (Cyprus News Agency, 
2020). Does this offset the maintenance and expansion of the first entry 
criterion in the new Asylum and Migration Management (Dublin) Reg-
ulation?
4.4 By way of conclusion
The provisions of the new EU Pact for the processing of asylum applica-
tions at the borders broaden the possibilities for declaring an application 
inadmissible or for rejecting it on the merits in the absence of proper 
individualized fair and effective procedures. Pre-screening procedures 
curtail procedural rights and guarantees enshrined in EU and Council of 
Europe law and may thus result in cases of refoulement, taking the form 
of mass expulsions and readmission. 
The Greek case confirms that an approach to migration and asylum 
with a continued focus on borders and externalization is not sustainable. 
The fragility of safe third country arrangements was very well illustrated 
in February 2020 when the Turkish president deliberately ignored the 
EU-Turkey statement and let migrants and refugees reach the Greek 
border. Confinement in border regions has led to unnecessary human 
suffering contrary to international and European standards and has 
hindered confidence of local populations towards European and national 
institutions to maintain social cohesion. The continuation and normal-
ization of such practices risk undermining the values and principles the 
CEAS is grounded on.
As pointed out by Beirens (2020), the EU Pact is a crash test for the 
fate of refugee protection in the region. Restoring mutual trust between 
EU states requires restoring faith to institutions. Attendance to national 
reception conditions and asylum procedures and addressing the funda-
mental inequalities permeating the European asylum system remain the 
main challenges for the years to come.
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Externalization is a core element of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 
proposed by the European Commission on 23 September 2020, and has 
been key to European policies since 1990. As 2015 has shown, even sus-
taining a limited number of asylum seekers and refugees when compared 
to more seriously affected parts of the world leads to an experienced 
crisis.
Consequently, the Pact focuses on preventing irregular migration, 
and seeking asylum is considered as a subset of irregular migration. In 
addition to proposing reforms of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) aiming at making it more stress resistant, the Pact extensively 
repeats the idea that measures in third countries will prevent refugees 
and migrants from reaching external borders.
The main concepts in this discourse are root causes (especially for 
forced migration); return and readmission; and legal pathways. The Pact 
uses the language of partnership and multilateralism, including funding 
instruments, to achieve externalisation. While the Commission acknowl-
edges that the EU and third countries have different interests, it states 
that comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships can deliver 
mutual benefits (European Commission, 2020: 17). While this could 
be read as a truly multilateral approach, other passages in the Commis-
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sion proposals show that the Commission, as before, proposes to use its 
assumed superior position of political and economic power – so-called 
issue linkage and conditionality (also known as carrots and sticks).
This essentially coercive approach to cooperation (focussing on the 
question of how the EU can make other countries do what is in the 
EU’s interest) ignores the reality that the EU and many third countries 
have conflicting interests and normative perspectives when it comes to 
migration and mobility. This Chapter addresses that assumption.
The regulation of international migration and mobility is funda-
mentally unequal. While there are free movement zones on the global 
South as well as in the global North (Czaika et al., 2018), the legal regime 
between global North and South facilitates the mobility of citizens from 
the global North while subjecting that of citizens from the global South 
to severe restrictions (Mau et al. 2015).
This inequality is evident from a visualization of the Passport Index 
(Figure 1 below), showing in white the nationalities which need an entry 
visa for less than 100 countries, and in black those needing a visa for 
more than 100 countries (Spijkerboer, 2018). The introduction of carrier 
sanctions means that visa requirements are enforced within the black 
countries on the map.
Figure 1 Yussef Al Tamimi on the basis of Passport Index (2017/2021)
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5.2 Diverging interests
This global inequality resulting from the visa policies of the global 
North is a difficult starting point for cooperation between, on the one 
hand, Europe, and Africa and Asia on the other. African and Asian 
countries perceive European external migration policies as an enterprise 
to maintain and reinforce European privilege at the expense of their 
citizens. The language of partnership and multilateralism used by the EU 
sits uneasily with the EU having imposed total control over mobility of 
people from the black countries on the map towards the EU to begin 
with. This outlook does not seem any more promising when we look at 
the three pillars of external migration policy which the Pact repeats: root 
causes, returns and readmission and legal pathways.
5.2.1 Root causes
Root causes is a concept which was originally develop in relation 
to refugees and forced migration. The core idea is that refugees and 
forced migrants are best assisted by addressing those phenomena that 
caused their flight to begin with. Consonant with earlier developments 
linking refugees and irregular migration, the Pact refers to “root causes 
of irregular migration”. Like before, the notion of root causes is related 
primarily to economic development, even though the Commission refers 
to the importance of conflict prevention and peace (European Commis-
sion, 2020: 20).
As B.S. Chimni (2019) has pointed out: it is remarkable that Europe 
as well as other actors in the global North remain silent about the root 
cause that is arguably the largest single contribution to forced migration, 
namely military interventions and proxy wars of the US and EU countries 
such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and the subse-
quent destabilisation of the Sahel. Also, economic development initially 
results in more migration, while in addition development policies have 
notoriously little effect, partly because substantial amounts end up being 
paid to European entities.
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5.2.2 Return and readmission
For decades, European countries have argued that effective return is 
essential to their migration policies. The idea is that, if irregular migrants 
know that they will be deported from Europe, they will realise it makes 
no sense to undertake the trip and won’t come to begin with.
However, many citizens in countries of origin voice protests against 
their governments cooperating with Europe in returning their friends 
and relatives (as happened in Mali and Senegal, for example). Although 
it is regular, and not irregular, migrants that send the most remittances, 
the solidarity of citizens within countries of origin with their friends and 
relatives abroad is an obstacle to cooperation. This is more so in countries 
of origin with functioning electoral systems or with forms of free media 
and civil society.
One of the innovations the Commission proposes in the Pact is to 
codify the possibility to take “any measures” which could be taken against 
a country that “is not cooperating sufficiently on the readmission of 
illegally staying third-country nationals” (European Commission, 2020: 
Article 7). A detail to note is that steps can be taken against countries 
even if they refuse to readmit non-nationals who transited through their 
territory, as is evident from the term ‘third-country nationals’ instead of 
‘their nationals’.
5.2.3 Legal pathways
Directly linked to negotiations on readmission, the EU has said over the 
past 15 years that it is open to discussing legal pathways for migration 
(e.g. European Commission, 2007). The two are to be incorporated into 
Mobility Partnerships and Common Agendas between the EU and third 
countries.
However, in reality it turns out that these instruments promote the 
externalisation of EU migration policy (Brocza and Paulhart, 2015). 
Legal pathways fail to become a reality. The most blatant example of this 
was the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016. While 
Turkey by and large abided by its obligations to prevent the movement of 
refugees towards Europe, talks of visa-free travel to Europe for Turkish 
nationals predictably got stuck in a way that, from the Turkish perspec-
65Thomas Spijkerboer
tive, was a matter of European obstruction. In the Pact, passages on legal 
migration mention extremely limited resettlement of refugees and high 
skilled migration, and in addition remain nebulous and unspecific. Legal 
migration as an alternative to irregular migration is not part of the dis-
cussion.
Of the three main pillars of European external migration policy, 
the interests of the EU and of third countries do not run parallel. An 
important element of EU policy is to try to influence the interests of third 
countries through issue linkage and conditionality: the EU will finance 
things in third countries, give other advantages, or to the contrary take 
punitive measures (including limiting the issuance of visas, or removing a 
country from the list of visa-free countries; European Commission, 2020: 
21-22), depending on whether the third country implements European 
external migration policies. This sometimes works, but comes at a price: 
that of supporting problematic regimes.
In order to implement European external migration policies, third 
country governments need to repress domestic opposition to those 
policies. And if the EU has brokered a migration agreement with the 
government of a third country, it has an interest in preventing regime 
change even if it is democratic, if the new government risks being more 
critical of European migration policy. Supporting problematic regimes 
is not merely an ethical issue. It also undermines a basic assumption of 
European external migration policies: the idea that open and democratic 
societies in third countries will be attractive to their citizenry and will 
lead to less irregular migration.
5.3 Different normative perspectives
As we saw above, third country interests do not necessarily align with 
European interests in the field of migration policy. Partly in relation to 
this, third countries may have different normative ideas about migration 
and international law. By way of example, I will focus here on Africa, 
which is a major target area of European policy.
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5.3.1 Non-reversal
Expressing the doctrine on which European state practice, legal doctrine, 
academic writing and case law is based, the European Court of Human 
Rights consistently begins its reasoning in migration-related judgments 
by promulgating that “as a matter of well-established international law 
and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the 
entry of non-nationals into its territory”.1 
This construction of international law prioritises the right of states to 
control migration over human rights, which has been labelled a “seden-
tarist” position by Daniel Thym (2015), and the “Strasbourg reversal” by 
Marie-Benedicte Dembour (2017).
Case law of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
makes clear that African courts have not necessarily adopted the seden-
tarist legal doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. The Com-
mission labels mass deportations as a violation not only of the prohibi-
tion of collective expulsion, but also of the right to property, to work, 
to education, to family life as well as to an effective remedy, and as dis-
crimination based on origin. Only after establishing this, it remarks that 
the Commission does not call into question the right of states to take 
legal action against illegal immigrants (African Commission of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 1997a; 1997b). Similarly, the Kenyan High Court 
prohibited the refoulement of Somalians and in doing so constructed 
international law as well as the Kenyan Constitution broadly. It refers to 
the number of refugees in Kenya to underline the importance of these 
norms, instead of justifying a restrictive interpretation (High Court of 
Kenya, 2017).
This non-inverted way of relating international law and migration can 
also be seen in the work of African academics such as Abdoulaye Hamadou 
(2018) and Edwin Odhiambo-Abyua (2006). Furthermore, core concepts 
in international migration law (such as irregular migration and transit 
migration, and the concrete meaning given to migrant smuggling) are 
seen as an effect of the exclusion of migrants from human rights pro-
tection imposed on African policy makers by European pressure. In 
1  See the foundational judgments on Article 8 ECHR (family reunion), European Court 
of Human Rights 1985, at 67; on Article 3 ECHR (asylum), European Court of Human 
Rights 1991, at 102; and on Article 5 ECHR (immigration detention), European Court 
of Human Rights 2008, at 64.
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their writing, many African authors do not distinguish strictly between 
migration and mobility; they normalise mobility/migration; and see 
free movement legislation as a codification of pre-existing fundamental 
norms and practices characteristic of pre-colonial normality. African 
social scientists relate this to the specific character of African states and 
state borders, as well as to a tradition of mobility on the continent (see 
among Abebe, 2017; Adepoju, 2002; Dicko, 2018; El Qadim, 2018).
In sum, there exists a distinctly African normative framework that 
includes international legal norms, which sees migration control as 
requiring justification, whereas the European normative perspective 
a priori assumes its legitimacy as being inherent in state sovereignty. It 
would be simplistic to claim that all African actors that are to play a role in 
European external migration policy have the mobility-oriented normative 
framework in mind that has been highlighted here. Many African state 
actors relish the control tools that European external migration policy 
provides (and funds). Nonetheless, this normative framework exists, and 
may be shared by African interlocutors of European policy makers. In 
any case it constitutes a reality in civil society and domestic politics of 
many African countries.
5.3.2 Sovereignty
The European perspective views the right to control migration as inherent 
in state sovereignty, and find it obvious that other states are obliged to 
respect that sovereignty. Such respect may imply that third states prevent 
migration through their territory towards Europe. African states are also 
quite concerned with their sovereignty, but in ways that may be at cross 
purposes with European concerns. A first form of this is the objection 
that, if an African state is to cooperate with European external migration 
policies, it is being instrumentalised by Europe. This has been argued 
to be an infringement of state sovereignty in the Libyan litigation about 
the Memorandum of Understanding with Italy (Achour and Spijkerboer, 
2020). Similar concerns have been raised by Hamadou (2018) and Dicko 
(2018) in relation to Niger and Mali respectively.
A second form which the concern with sovereignty can take is related 
to return and readmission. In cases where the nationality of an indi-
vidual is unclear (as may happen in Africa, with its arbitrary borders 
and incomplete civil registration), European states often assert that a 
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person is Moroccan or Ethiopian. However, establishing nationality is 
the prerogative of the state acknowledging its nationality. Another state 
asserting that a particular person has the nationality of a state that denies 
this is the case does not sit easily with state sovereignty.
The same is true for the relation between a state and its nationals. 
There is an evident right of a national to return to their own state. The 
international law foundation for an obligation of a state to readmit a 
national while both the national and their state do not wish so is weak. 
African states may find that it is to that state, and not to a European state, 
to decide how it will shape its relations with its nationals abroad. Addi-
tionally, African states may consider the idea that they are under an obli-
gation to admit non-nationals who purportedly transited through their 
territory as an affront to their sovereignty.
5.4 A treaty to sign?
To a considerable extent, the European Commission’s Migration and 
Asylum Pact relies on the success of its external migration policies, 
which can be summarised as third countries keeping migrants away from 
European borders. This requires cooperation of third countries.
However, third countries feel the starting position is unfair because 
of the unequal global mobility regime. European and third countries 
have diverging interests and normative outlooks. So far, EU policy has 
tried to bridge the gap of interests and norms by externalising its political 
economic power, by informal arrangements, and increasingly by financial 
instruments (which are then informalised on top of that, see Spijkerboer 
and Steyger, 2019). These arrangements are seen by many in the targeted 
countries as being mildly or less mildly coercive, and as disrespectful of 
African interests and perspectives.
Much is to be said for reconsidering the option of the classical inter-
national law instrument that was developed for bridging the divergent 
interests and positions of states: the treaty. Treaty making allows for 
involving parliaments and civil society, which may help in including 
multiple interests and perspectives in the outcome. In the mid-long term, 
the EU has an interest in cooperation with third countries that is con-
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Community sponsorship is a current darling of the international protec-
tion regime as a potential solution to the dismal global refugee situation. 
Following almost 40 years of operating essentially in isolation in Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have piloted 
or established community sponsorship models since 2015. At the first 
Global Refugee Forum held in December 2019, Brazil, Belgium, Malta 
and Portugal pledged to explore pilot community sponsorship models 
(UNHCR, 2020).
Beyond this quite remarkable recent uptake of community sponsor-
ship, there is significant buzz around the concept at both UN and EU 
level. As explored below, community sponsorship has no settled defi-
nition, but inherent to the model is shared responsibility between civil 
society and the state for the admission and/or integration of refugees 
(Tan, 2021).
This Chapter first seeks to define the ‘umbrella’ concept of community 
sponsorship, before outlining the role of community sponsorship in 
the UN Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the New Asylum and 
Migration Pact, respectively. Finally, I suggest that a number of principles 
to maintain the protective promise of the community sponsorship as a 
solution for refugees.
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6.2. Defining community sponsorship
Community sponsorship has recently been described by UNHCR 
(2019a) as “programmes where individuals or groups of individuals come 
together to provide financial, emotional and practical support toward 
reception and integration’ of refugees”. Indeed, community sponsor-
ship has been ‘rather ill-defined’ and is best understood as an umbrella 
term encompassing several different modalities (European Commission, 
2018).
Three strains of community sponsorship are currently operating. 
First, community sponsorship has historically involved privately-led 
admission and integration of refugees via an autonomous complementary 
pathway. The original Canadian approach of private refugee sponsor-
ship matches this model. Such programmes are firmly separated from 
state-run resettlement as an “initiative by private associations with rec-
ognized expertise in the field to provide for an alternative, legal, and safe 
pathway” (Ricci, 2020).
In its original form in Canada, community sponsorship involved the 
‘naming’ of individual refugees by sponsors and the creation of a pathway 
independent of other channels to admission (UNHCR, 2019a). More 
recently, the Humanitarian Corridors model pioneered in Italy is a good 
example of community sponsorship as complementary pathway.1
Second, more recently community sponsorship has emerged as a 
sponsored resettlement, focused solely on integration support for resettled 
refugees matched with civil society sponsors. Rather than creating a 
pathway to admission, community sponsorship involves integration assis-
tance for resettled refugees. This model of community sponsorship uses 
existing UNHCR and state resettlement channels (including selection, 
referral, health checks etc.) to admit refugees. Civil society involvement 
is largely limited to the provision of support after arrival and focused on 
the successful integration of refugees. Moreover, community sponsorship 
as resettlement generally benefits UNHCR-referred refugees, rather than 
‘named’ individuals, although practice varies between jurisdictions.2 
1  For more on the Humanitarian Corridors model, see: https://www.humanitariancorri-
dor.org/en/homepage/. 
2  New Zealand’s community sponsorship pilot, for example, accepted both civil soci-
ety nominations and UNHCR referrals, though all sponsored refugees had to be rec-
ognised by UNHCR.
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Community sponsorship as a resettlement is reflected in community 
sponsorship schemes in Ireland and the United Kingdom squarely 
focused on the support of resettled refugees, beginning within the state 
resettlement quota with the intention of becoming additional over time.3 
Similarly, the recent German Neustart im Team (NesT) programme is a 
clear example of community sponsorship as a resettlement tool.4
Finally, the most recent – and surely broadest – conception of 
community sponsorship is as a ‘wrap-around’ tool for both resettlement 
and any given complementary pathway “capable of supporting refugees 
referred by UNHCR… as well as refugee students, workers and family 
members arriving through other pathways” (Bond et al., 2020). This defi-
nition does not focus on the pathway or legal status of refugees sponsored, 
but rather on civic engagement embracing refugees.
While open or even competing definitions of community sponsor-
ship provide significant flexibility, it leaves the concept vague and even 
open to co-option.
6.3 Community sponsorship in the Compact
The adoption of the GCR as a global responsibility sharing effort comes 
against a backdrop of the “deterrence paradigm” in traditional asylum 
countries, in which a broad array of measures prevent asylum seekers 
accessing the territory or asylum procedures of destination states (Gam-
meltoft-Hansen and Tan, 2017). Over the past thirty years, lack of legal 
access to asylum for refugees has emerged as “perhaps the single most 
prominent topic in refugee studies” (Costello, 2019), with some authors 
even predicting the end of the right to seek asylum in the Global North 
(Ghezelbash, 2018).
Community sponsorship is closely linked to one of the four GCR 
objectives focused on the expansion of third country solutions through 
3 For more on the community sponsorship program, see: https://www.birmingham.
ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/Misc/CS-UK-IRiS-June-2019.
pdf. 
4  For more on Neustart im Team (NesT), see: https://resettlement.de/en/current-admis-
sions/.
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“resettlement and complementary pathways”.5 More broadly, community 
sponsorship is aligned to the GCR as an example of a whole-of-society 
approach to refugee protection (UNHCR, 2019b).
Against this backdrop, the GCR’s focus on the expansion of third 
country solutions suggests that resettlement and complementary 
pathways should be the primary way to receive international protec-
tion in the Global North. Indeed, such controlled pathways are often 
the preferred modes of protection in destination countries, rather than 
spontaneous asylum (Hashimoto, 2018). Thus, in 2016 the European 
Commission stated that “resettlement should be the preferred avenue to 
international protection in the territory of the Member States” (2016).
6.4 Community sponsorship in the Pact on Migration and 
Asylum
As noted in Chapter 1 of this book, the Pact draws on the GCR in its Rec-
ommendation on legal pathways (European Commission, 2020), which 
refers to the recent Global Refugee Forum and UNHCR’s strategy to scale 
up resettlement and complementary pathways (UNHCR, 2019).
Community sponsorship plays a modest but potentially important 
role in the new Pact. As a part of legal migration efforts, the European 
Commission points out the commitment to support national community 
sponsorship schemes “through funding, capacity building and knowl-
edge-sharing, in cooperation with civil society, with the aim of devel-
oping a European model of community sponsorship”.
The promise of technical assistance from the EU to Member States 
is not new. Indeed, the Commission released a hefty report on the feasi-
bility of community sponsorship in the EU in 20186 and a recent Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) Action Grant funded projects 
launching new or developing existing community sponsorship schemes.7 
5  GCR paras 7 and 95. Complementary pathways identified in the Compact are family 
reunification, private refugee sponsorship, humanitarian visas and labour and educa-
tional opportunities for refugees.
6  The full report is accessible here: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publica-
tion/1dbb0873-d349-11e8-9424-01aa75ed71a1. 
7  For more on the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) community spon-
sorship grant, see: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/amif-2019-funding-
call-integration-through-private-sponsorship-schemes. 
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The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) has already been involved 
in a pilot project promoting community sponsorship in interested EU 
members states (EASO, 2018).
Nevertheless, the concept of a ‘European model’ of community spon-
sorship is novel, and supported by Commission Recommendation to the 
same effect (European Commission, 2020). While implementation of 
community sponsorship remains firmly in the policy – and not legal – 
realm, the call for a European approach to sponsorship points to a sense 
of ownership and uptake that moves beyond Canada (Tan, 2021).
6.5 Toward protection principles
The proliferation of new community sponsorship models since 2015 
bring both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, the rapid growth of 
community sponsorship means policymakers may quickly be informed 
of the various models implemented in multiple jurisdictions. On the 
other hand, the inherent flexibility of the concept may leave it open to 
co-option where, for example, governments use community sponsorship 
to replace resettlement, or discriminate by protecting only particular 
religious groups. To mitigate these risks, priority needs to be given to the 
following six protective standards drawn from refugee and human rights 
law and lessons from recent practice:
First, respecting the right to seek asylum
The introduction and expansion of community sponsorship models 
should not be used by national governments to justify deterrence. In 
other words, community sponsorship should not be instrumentalised to 
distract from deterrence policies. While state resettlement has long been 
used strategically in this way (van Selm, 2004), there is little evidence that 
the strategic use of resettlement has actually driven down spontaneous 
asylum (Durable Solutions Platform, 2020). Given its community-driven 
nature, community sponsorship should be somewhat insulated from 
government interests in this regard.
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Second, additionality
Additionality should remain at the forefront of discussions on community 
sponsorship, to avoid the effective outsourcing of government responsi-
bilities. Of course, community sponsorship should not replace resettle-
ment (Hirsch et al., 2019).
However, the question of additionality is becoming increasingly 
complex. While ideally community sponsorship schemes should be addi-
tional to existing resettlement programmes from the outset, pragmatic 
considerations may require that initial community sponsorship models 
take place within existing resettlement quotas. In such cases, a shift to 
additionality in the short to medium-term must remain a focus – an 
approach that may be termed ‘additionality in principle’.
Moreover, some government may seek to ‘reverse engineer’ addition-
ality when negotiating the state quota in relation to community sponsor-
ship. Finally, the establishment of community sponsorship schemes in 
states with no existing resettlement programme raises further complex 
questions of pragmatic or realistic approaches.
Third, non-discrimination and equal treatment
The principle of non-discrimination flowing from international human 
rights and refugee law should guide state practice on community spon-
sorship.8 As UNHCR (2019a) notes, community sponsorship should be 
“non-discriminatory and not distinguish on the basis of nationality, race, 
gender, religious belief, class or political opinion”.
Learning from previous practice in Eastern Europe, future community 
sponsorship models should avoid discrimination in the selection of 
refugees for sponsorship. Moreover, principles of equal treatment require 
that sponsored refugees not be treated differentially from govern-
ment-resettled refugees during integration, and vice versa. In particular, 
in the case of relationship breakdown, the principle of equal treatment 
requires that the state step in to protect the rights of a sponsored refugee. 
Encouragingly, the Pact and the above-mentioned Commission’s Recom-
mendation on legal pathways calls for “transparent and non-discrimina-
8  For the full text of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, see: https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx. 
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tory selection criteria” when designing community sponsorship schemes 
(European Commission, 2020).
Member States and their partners should define for those in need of 
international protection. From the start of the programme, they should 
ensure that the respective roles and responsibilities of civil society and 
government are clearly defined in the pre-departure and post-arrival 
phase. Member States remain responsible for the security checks and 
admission procedures and need to guarantee that appropriate safeguards 
and safety nets are in place.
Fourth, protection-focused
Notwithstanding its flexibility community sponsorship should remain 
firmly focused on refugee protection. This means, for example, learning 
the lessons from Australia’s Community Support Programme, which 
is as much centred on labour market integration as refugee protection. 
Equally, the use of community sponsorship to facilitate family reunifi-
cation should neither replace the state’s family reunification obligations, 
nor place unreasonable burdens on sponsors.9
Fifth, clarity of legal status
Community sponsorship approaches must provide a clear legal status to 
sponsored refugees. In general, refugees admitted under a community 
sponsorship scheme should be entitled to the full set of rights afforded 
other refugees in the country, in line with the principle of non-dis-
crimination and socio-economic rights set out in the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention (Articles 2-34). Community sponsorship as resettlement 
carries the additional status of providing a durable solution, thus often 
amounting to permanent residence more rapidly than community spon-
sorship as complementary pathway.
Sixth, transparency and accountability
Finally, community sponsorship approaches should be supported by a 
robust policy framework. In particular, any model involving a ‘naming’ 
element should include safeguards to ensure the integrity of the selection 
9  For more on family reunification, see: https://www.unhcr.org/5a8c40ba1.pdf. 
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process and, at a minimum, a requirement that the named individual 
meet the definition of refugee contained in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 UN 
Refugee Convention. Ultimate responsibility for refugees must clearly 
remain with the state, not private actors, as reflected in the Commission’s 
Recommendation on legal pathways (European Commission, 2020).
Conclusions
In the coming years, we are likely to see the emergence of new community 
sponsorship models that challenge the protective core of the concept. 
This Chapter has started the work of setting out principles of general 
application to help ensure that the rise of an EU approach to community 
sponsorship – as outlined in the Pact on Migration and Asylum – does 
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7. Internal Solidarity, External 
Migration Management: The EU Pact 
and Migration Policy Towards Jordan
Lewis Turner
7.1 Introduction
What will the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum offer asylum 
seekers and refugees living outside of the Union? The answer, it would 
seem, is ‘very little’. The Pact discusses the need for dialogue, coopera-
tion and mutual partnerships with relevant third countries. Yet it focuses 
on solidarity among EU Member States, which comes at the expense of 
meaningful solidarity with asylum seekers and refugees inside, outside, 
and at the borders of the EU (see European Commission, 2020).
This Chapter argues that, at a time of unprecedented health and 
economic crises, a new EU Pact should represent an opportunity to 
break from the restrictive and destructive agendas that have long framed 
European migration policy. Drawing on the situation in Jordan – one of 
the EU’s key migration partner countries – the Chapter examines how 
efforts to support refugees’ livelihoods where they currently live have 
been a key element of the EU’s externalisation agenda. It explores the 
successes and failures of these policies, and then the consequences of the 
Covid-19 pandemic for livelihoods policies and programmes. It argues 
that the events of 2020, which have threatened many refugees’ (already 
deeply precarious) livelihoods, demonstrate that – now more than ever – 
a new approach is needed.
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7.2  A Pact framed by ‘crisis’
The Pact is full of worrying signs from the perspective of asylum seekers’ 
and refugees’ rights. It discusses (see European Commission, 2020: 4, 
14, 10) the need for a “swift return procedure” and “reinforced external 
borders”, and it plans to “build on the hotspot approach”, which has led to 
“fundamental rights challenges” where it has been implemented (Danish 
Refugee Council, 2017:4). On all of these counts (and many more) the 
EU ignores the very migration research it funds (Kalir and Cantat, 2020).
Beyond any individual policy, however, what is striking about the Pact 
is the worldview it propagates. It is framed by discussions of crises (past, 
present and future). The EU appears to see migration ‘crises’, or migratory 
‘pressure’ that could lead to another ‘crisis’, around every corner. In par-
ticular, the so-called migration crisis of 2015-2016 looms large over the 
new policy arrangements. It clearly and explicitly shapes the background 
thinking to the Pact, which aims to reinforce Fortress Europe against 
similar numbers of people arriving ‘irregularly’ in the future.
In assessing the new Pact, which aims to place migration even more 
centrally in EU external relations, it is important to consider the range 
of ways that the EU responded to this ‘crisis.’ A key piece in the jigsaw 
through which the EU has attempted to stop asylum seekers and refugees 
from reaching its borders is providing incentives for people to stay where 
they are. The ‘solidarity’ that the Pact demands for EU members is just 
one side of the coin; internal solidarity shares space on the same coin 
with Europe’s external migration management (see Bisong, 2019).
7.3 Livelihoods and the externalization agenda
In the wake of the ‘migration crisis,’ the EU and other partners decided 
that focusing on jobs and livelihoods was one way to reduce the number 
of asylum seekers and refugees attempting to enter the Union. If people 
can work where they are, they reasoned, they’ll have fewer reasons to 
come to Europe. This is still central to the EU’s thinking. As the Pact 
states, “economic opportunity, particularly for young people, is often the 
best way to reduce the pressure for irregular migration” (European Com-
mission, 2020: 18)
Leaving aside the accuracy - or otherwise (see Crawley, 2017) - of 
the logic underpinning this idea, asylum seekers and refugees should of 
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course have the right to work where they live. They should have opportu-
nities to access decent work, which means work that offers (among other 
things) a fair income, security and safety in the workplace, and equality of 
opportunity (see International Labour Organization, n.d.).
In the period during the ‘migration crisis,’ Jordan was at the centre 
of these policy proposals. In February 2016, at the end of the London 
Donors Conference for Syria and the Region, co-hosted by Germany, 
Kuwait, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United Nations, a 
document entitled ‘The Jordan Compact’ was released (Government 
of Jordan, 2016). In it, the Government of Jordan declared that in the 
coming years it would potentially allow as many as 200,000 Syrians to 
obtain work permits in Jordan. It claimed to represent a “new paradigm” 
for refugee responses, by bringing together development and humani-
tarian approaches.
The EU’s role in this Compact was central. It has been one of the main 
donors supporting the implementation of the Compact, and it agreed to 
renegotiate its ‘Rules of Origin’ arrangements with Jordan, in an attempt 
to make it easier for Jordanian companies to export to the EU (Lenner 
and Turner, 2019). All of the annual follow-up conferences on ‘Sup-
porting the Future of Syria and the Region’ have been held in Brussels, 
with the 2018, 2019, and 2020 events co-chaired by the EU and the UN.
The success of the compact has been a subject of debate among 
observers. As I have explored elsewhere together with Katharina Lenner 
(Lenner and Turner, 2018), the Compact encountered numerous chal-
lenges because it failed to take into account the views of key stakeholders 
- most glaringly, those of Syrians themselves. This resulted in a focus on 
work in sectors where very few Syrians wanted to work.
Because the release of donor funds was tied to the number of work 
permits that were being issued, the underlying goal of decent work for 
Syrians appeared to fade into the background. Having a work permit 
does not necessarily equate to having a job, let alone a decent job, but 
work permits appeared to become a goal in themselves. As the Jordan 
International NGO Forum and Jonaf argued (2020: 2), work permits 
“have done little to strengthen decent work protections”.
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge what has been achieved 
through the Jordan Compact, and the many schemes, reforms, and 
projects that have spun off from it in the past five years. Indeed, the 
84 7. Internal Solidarity, External Migration Management: The EU Pact and Migration Policy Towards Jordan
Jordan Compact is notable for the extent to which it has actually been 
implemented, in contrast to the EU’s deals in other contexts, for example 
Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2019). From January 2016 to August 2020, slightly 
over 200,000 work permits were issued to Syrians in Jordan (UNHCR, 
2020a). Syrian unemployment has dropped radically, although to a 
greater degree among men than among women (Tiltnes et al., 2019).
It is important to note, however, that these cumulative work permit 
figures do not tell us how many Syrians hold a currently valid work 
permit (most permits are valid for one year), or how many permits have 
been given to the same people in different time periods. The figure for 
how many permits are valid at any one time is harder to come by than 
the cumulative total, but, for example, was quoted as around 45,000 in 
mid-2019 (Gordon, 2019).
Furthermore, while many Syrians were already working without 
permits in Jordan, many report that having a permit makes them feel 
more secure in their legal status in Jordan, and less under threat of depor-
tation to Syria (International Labour Organization, 2017), which has 
been a widespread practice (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Even with this 
more secure legal status, however, “access to decent, well-paid employ-
ment that gives a feeling of job security is still a distant hope” for most 
Syrians in Jordan (Tiltnes et al., 2019:135).
In an interesting recent research paper, Peter Seeberg (2020) explores, 
through interviews with Jordanian officials, how EU-Jordanian relations 
are seen by actors within the Jordanian government. A running theme of 
the analysis is that, while the EU is the largest donor to Jordan concerning 
Syrian refugees and its largest trading partner, the money donated (by the 
EU and overall) falls very far short of the funds required. In 2020, for 
example, according to the Ministry of Planning and International Coop-
eration, the Jordan Response Plan received $781 million in funding, rep-
resenting only 34.7 percent of the amount required (Jordan Times, 2021). 
The EU does not sufficiently recognise or take into account, Jordanian 
officials argue, the Jordanian context or the range of challenges that the 
country is facing. The EU’s negotiating demands, therefore, are often 
inflexible, and its approach can be counterproductive (Seeberg, 2020).
Meanwhile, even after it was further revised in 2018 to attempt to 
make it more accessible to Jordanian businesses, the much-hailed rene-
gotiated ‘Rules of Origin’ deal between the EU and Jordan appears to 
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have achieved relatively little (Al Nawas, 2019). This is especially the case 
in terms of the number of jobs created and the number of firms exporting 
under the deal.
Its positive effects notwithstanding, it is clear that the Compact has not 
brought about the ‘paradigm shift’ its supporters envisaged. While many 
of those involved in promoting the Jordan Compact hoped that it would 
be the first of many such compacts to provide jobs for refugees living in 
the ‘Global South,’ this has not proved to be the case. To date, arguably 
the only substantively similar ‘jobs compact’ that has been signed is in 
Ethiopia. Implementation of this agreement has been slow - much slower 
than in Jordan – and wages at the factories where refugees were expected 
to work fell well below refugees’ expectations (Gordon, 2019).
7.4 Refugee livelihoods and Covid-19 in Jordan
While new EU arrangements on migration and asylum have long been 
discussed, we cannot ignore the fact that the Pact is coming at a time of 
a pandemic that has devastated so many lives and livelihoods across the 
world. These recent developments make the EU’s approach to migration 
even more regrettable, and its strategies to achieve its restrictive goals 
even less realistic.
The situation for refugee livelihoods in Jordan, for example, has con-
siderably worsened since the beginning of the pandemic. Enacting one of 
the world’s strictest lockdowns in March 2020, Jordan initially managed 
to keep the numbers of Covid-19 very low. A large proportion of the cases 
that were recorded in Jordan were at its border crossings, or in quarantine 
facilities (Ministry of Health, 2021). Yet from August 2020 onwards, case 
numbers in Jordan increased significantly. In early September 2020, the 
first known cases of Covid-19 were recorded in Syrian refugee camps in 
Jordan, and by the end of January 2021, there had been over 1,200 cases 
in Za‘tari Refugee Camp, which has a population of approximately 80,000 
(UNHCR, 2021). 
Jordan’s policies, while initially successful in keeping the number of 
cases very low, came at a cost. Not only to the Jordanian government, 
whose 2021 budget was described by Finance Minister Mohamad 
Al-Ississ as “the most difficult for Jordan ever” (Omari, 2021). Not only to 
the Jordanian economy overall, which contracted by approximately 3% in 
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2020, representing the first year of negative growth in 30 years (Al-Kha-
lidi, 2021). But the consequences of this economic decline, in Jordan as 
across the world, have fallen most heavily on the shoulders of the most 
marginalized sectors of the population, including asylum seekers and 
refugees, and the impacts have also been highly gendered (UN Women, 
2020).
As Reva Dhingra (2020) has detailed, most refugees in Jordan do not 
primarily rely on international assistance for their income. They gain 
their principal income from working in sectors that could not switch 
to remote working, such as agriculture, construction and retail. Syrians 
living in camps faced rising prices in the shops when the lockdown 
commenced in March, and the government has subjected the camp to 
“stringent movement controls” (UNHCR, 2020b:2). Much of the work 
offered by international organizations (through schemes such as ‘incen-
tive-based volunteering’) was also suspended, as many programmes were 
temporarily shut down due to the lockdown. 
According to UNICEF, the number of Syrian and Jordanian house-
holds with a monthly income of less than 100 Jordanian dinars (around 
$140) had doubled by August, compared to prior to the pandemic 
(UNICEF, 2020). The rate of unemployment in Jordan reached 23.9% 
(21.2% among men and 33.6% among women) in the third quarter of 
2020, up almost five percentage points compared to the year before 
(Jordan Times, 2020). The goal of refugee ‘self-reliance’, which is set to 
continue to be central to the EU’s external refugee policies, has long 
been critiqued (Easton-Calabria and Omata, 2018). But Covid-19 should 
prompt a thorough re-evaluation of this goal’s plausibility, and indeed its 
desirability (see Herson, 2012).
Beyond these consequences, the Covid-19 pandemic has placed a 
huge burden on already overstretched humanitarian and governmental 
budgets. Even before the pandemic, the funding for the Syria response 
fell well short of what was needed (Ministry of Planning and Interna-
tional Cooperation, 2020: 1). Compounding these problems, a report 
from the Durable Solutions Platform expressed the fear that “if donors 
redirect their funding away from livelihoods” to focus on Covid-19, there 
may be “further reductions in livelihoods interventions and funding in 
the medium-term” (Durable Solutions Platform, 2020).
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7.5 Conclusion
In this context, will the European Union be willing to contemplate 
increasing its financial contributions to (even close to) the necessary 
levels? Will refugees living in the EU’s so-called migration partner 
countries ever be high enough on its priority list to generate the kind of 
support that is necessary?
The signs are not encouraging. The EU’s attempts to rejuvenate soli-
darity among its Member States through the new Pact are simultaneously 
an entrenchment of the demonstrable lack of solidarity it has shown 
with asylum seekers and refugees within, on, and outside its borders. In 
the context of twin health and economic crises across the globe, a new 
approach must be adopted. For once, solidarity with asylum seekers and 
refugees must be the priority.
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8. The Spanish Borders on The Cusp of 
The New European Pact on Migration 
And Asylum1
Iker Barbero and Ana López-Sala
8.1 Hard times for asylum in Europe
On February 13, 2020, the European Court of Human Rights made public 
its ruling on the case of N.D. and N.T. against Spain, by which it resolved 
the appeal against the previous ruling of October 3, 2017, of the same 
court. In contrast to the ruling handed down at first instance, among 
other relevant issues (such as the fact that, in view of the undefined 
concept of “operational border” (López-Sala, 2020)), the border fence 
must already be considered Spanish territory and therefore subject to the 
jurisdiction of the ECHR), the Grand Chamber ruled in favour of Spain, 
that Article 4 of the Protocol to the Convention is not applicable to this 
case (two African boys who were intercepted trying to jump the border 
fence in Melilla and were immediately returned to Morocco without any 
procedure for expulsion, much less the option of applying for asylum) 
since it was the applicants themselves who placed themselves in an illegal 
situation by not using the means of access established by law, such as 
applying for asylum at an embassy or border post.
This ruling represents a regression in the defence of basic rights by 
conditioning recognition of those rights of situations involving merely 
administrative (non-criminal) conduct. It also reveals a paradigmatic 
1  This text is the result of the work carried out within the UPV-EHU Research Project 
entitled TRANSITEUS: The reception of migrants in transit in the Basque Country/Eus-
kadi: diagnosis and proposals from a guarantee perspective (US19/08) (www.transiteus.
eus). 
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shift in Spanish and European approaches to border control and the fun-
damental rights of migrants and refugees.
Spain, like other countries on the southern border of Europe, 
has been practicing this type of summary expulsion2 for years, in full 
knowledge that Morocco is a country where the violation of the rights 
of migrants is manifestly systematic. In addition, the fact remains that 
certain people cannot materially obtain protection in a consular delega-
tion because Spain has not wanted to by-law develop the process.3 Even 
worse, many report being prevented by Moroccan police from accessing 
the international protection application offices in Ceuta and Melilla for 
no other explainable reason than their origin or skin colour. Forced to 
jump a deadly border fence or venture out on a dangerous sea crossing, 
these acts of desperations are the result of the consolidation of a specific 
model of border control and outsourcing policies. These policies are in 
line with what has been called “a contained mobility approach” (Carrera 
and Cortinovis, 2019), in which an erosion of legal guarantees and the 
protection of migrants and refugees can be observed.
Migration and Asylum policies in Europe are currently at a cross-
roads. How they will be developed will largely be determined by the 
contents of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.4 The content of the 
New Pact reveals some of its fundamental principles:
Firstly, there is an emphasis on external borders as physical and pro-
cedural processing areas (including rapid identification and registration) 
where deportable irregular immigrants would be distinguished from 
refugees.
Secondly, there is a clear commitment to promote “effective” and 
2  Spanish police regularly implement a “push-back” approach to expel migrants from 
Spanish territory (often referred to as devoluciones en caliente in Spanish). This consists 
of immediately turning over people who have been intercepted trying to jump external 
border fences to the Moroccan police or simply abandoning them on Moroccan soil. 
Because the expulsion is immediate, the migrants have no possibility of applying for 
protection or claiming any vulnerable situation, such as being a minor or a victim of 
trafficking. Since 2015, these practices have been regulated by Spain’s Public Safety Law, 
pending the resolution of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of 
these practices.
3  Currently, only the modalities of family extension and reunification are possible (Art. 
38 Asylum Law), which represents 0.67% of the applications according to data provid-
ed by the OAR (Spanish Refugee Office).
4  See https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/migration-and-asylum-package_en. See 
Chapter 1 of this Book by S. Carrera.
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“rapid” mechanisms at the border for the containment, identification and 
return of migrants classified as irregular or those whose applications for 
protection are rejected.
Thirdly (and linked to the previous one), there will be a focus on 
strengthening the agreements with third countries through extended 
and broad-ranging partnerships that incorporate readmission and return 
procedures.
These guidelines suggest that the “borderization” of asylum in the 
EU, along with the widening of externalization, will be the cornerstones 
of a policy whose objective of effective return will be a key element of 
future management. Content aside, most troubling perhaps is that the 
EU, or specifically some of its Member States, seem to be obsessed with 
controlling and immobilizing the “unauthorized secondary movements”. 
There is no doubt that this will guide the new European migration and 
asylum management in future times.
From this starting position, is it possible to articulate the objectives of 
the New Pact as safeguarding the fundamental rights and legal guaran-
tees of migrants in need of protection? Based on an analysis of the most 
recent approaches to migration and asylum management in Spain – in 
which many of the proposals provided for in the Pact are being imple-
mented – this Chapter examines whether contained mobility is already 
the operative paradigm.
8.2 Migration flows and asylum seekers across the 
border
Spain’s response to immigration and asylum has largely been shaped by 
its status as the EU’s southwest border. According to official data, over 
the last twenty years more than 360,000 people have arrived on the 
Spanish coast and in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, with historic highs in 
2006 and 2018, when Spain became the main destination country. Since 
2018, in addition to the arrival of a substantial number of migrants from 
African countries including Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Mali, 
the most significant increase has been observed in proportional terms 
of nationals from Maghreb countries, with Moroccans being the most 
numerous nationality in 2018 and 2019 and Algeria in the first half of 
2020. Nationals from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia accounted for nearly 
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30% of total arrivals in 2018, a percentage that rose to 59% in 2019 and 
fell slightly, although it remained at this high level (54.4%), in the first 
half of 2020, a year during which arrivals held steady despite the health 
crisis and border closures caused by Covid-19.
Moreover, the dynamics of asylum have manifested different patterns 
in the Spanish case. After decades in which the number of applicants was 
far below that of other European receiving countries (between 1998 and 
2014 they did not exceed 1.5% of the EU total), during the last five years 
there has been a major increase, reaching a historic high in 2019 (with 
118,264 applications, accounting for 19% of the European total). That 
year, Spain was the receiving country with the third highest number of 
applications5, behind only Germany and France.
In spite of the staging of actions to contain and deter migration on 
the southern border, which Nicholas de Genova refers to as a “spectacle 
border” (de Genova, 2015), what we have described as a “pattern of terri-
torial deviation of asylum” in the Spanish case is surprising (López-Sala 
and Moreno-Amador, 2020). At present, most applications are submitted 
by nationals of Venezuela, Colombia and Central American countries 
who, after arriving via international airports, make their applications 
mostly within the territory (up to 97% of Venezuelans, Hondurans and 
Nicaraguans and 98% of Colombians). In contrast, in 2019 only 6% of 
asylum applications were made at border posts where Syria stands out as 
the majority nationality. On the other hand, among the people arriving by 
sea, generally clandestinely by boat, nationals of sub-Saharan countries 
apply for asylum when they are already within Spanish territory, and to a 
lesser extent at border posts. However, nationals of Morocco and Algeria, 
are forced to apply for international protection when they are in contain-
ment and expulsion areas such as the Detention Centres (CIE), up to 44% 
and 41% respectively in 2019. The explanation for this anomalous and 
somewhat Kafkaesque situation will be provided below.
8.3 The externalized border
Spain’s main (and indispensable) partners in the control of migratory 
routes to its territory are Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania. In October 
2018, Spain donated to Morocco, 108 vehicles and computer equipment 
5  See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics
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worth 3.2 million euros. Between 2019 and 2020, Morocco received 
30 million euros from Spain, to be paid from the General State Budget 
(Council of Ministers of July 19th, 2019), which were included in the 
147.7 million euros from the European Emergency Fund for Africa, 
as well as 389 million Euros from new cooperation programs of the 
European Commission (December 20th, 2019), to improve and upgrade 
the fleet of vehicles with which to reinforce its border control and thus 
repress irregular migratory flows towards Europe.
In this sense, the control of the maritime border has undergone signif-
icant changes in recent years, especially after the increase in flows in 2018 
and the adoption of new collaboration agreements on migration control 
between the two countries6 after the Socialist party’s return to govern-
ment in June 2018. To begin with, the decrease in arrivals to coasts since 
the beginning of 2019 has been the result of the increased surveillance of 
departures carried out by Morocco on its coasts and in the camps near 
Ceuta and Melilla, where according to reports by human rights organiza-
tions, no violence has been spared (see APDHA, 2020).
In addition, there have been important changes in search and rescue 
(SAR) action protocols and, therefore, in Spanish rescue practices in 
the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea, which reveal the trend to 
outsource rescue operations, with Spain providing maritime resources 
to Morocco, including infrastructure and training. Unfortunately, in 
practice this policy change has led to greater danger and even multiple 
shipwrecks and numerous deaths. In short, it represents an abandonment 
of the guarantee of rights such as international protection and others as 
basic as the right to life.
Thirdly, while previously the management of maritime arrivals at 
the Southern border was carried out by detaining all migrants in the 
various detention centres (CIEs) dispersed throughout Spanish territory, 
or in the Temporary Stay Centres for Immigrants (CETI) in Ceuta and 
Melilla,7 there has been a collapse of these two types of centres. The high 
number of arrivals and the bureaucracy and time involved in decreeing 
6  See https://www.cear.es/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Externalizaci%C3%B3n-fron-
teras-Espa%C3%B1a-Marruecos.pdf
7  The CETIs, created in 1999 (Melilla) and 2000 (Ceuta), are dependent on the Ministry 
of Migration, Labor and Social Security. They were conceived as mechanisms for ini-
tial provisional reception, to provide services and basic social benefits to migrants and 
applicants of international protection who arrived at these cities, while they were being 
identified and provided medical care and before being transferred to the peninsula.
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internment in a CIE or alleviating the overcrowded CETIs has led to 
the de facto creation, that is, without any specific legal regulation, of 
new containment and rapid processing mechanisms called Centres for 
the Temporary Assistance of Foreigners (CATE, in Spanish) in 2018 
(Barbero, 2021).
As with the Hotspots created by the European Commission for Greece 
and Italy, these centres are located in the ports where people rescued or 
intercepted at sea are disembarked directly into fenced enclosures, con-
sisting of prefabricated modules that always show clear signs of being an 
area of detention. They are detained there for a period of 72 hours (the 
maximum legally allowed time) while the Spanish National Police (and 
FRONTEX) identify and register them (in EURODAC).
The “humanitarian border” ingredient is provided by certain organ-
izations that deliver a range of services such as medical care and first 
aid (Red Cross), information on international protection (UNHCR/ 
Spanish Commission for Refugees CEAR) and legal assistance (immigrant 
legal aid services provided by the bar associations). As mentioned earlier 
regarding these centres, it should be noted that the trend has been to 
selectively process arrivals by nationality and to transfer those mainly 
from sub-Saharan countries, while Moroccans and Algerians are either 
expelled immediately or transferred directly from the rescue boat to a 
CIE.
Similarly, with regard to the application for international protection, 
the CATEs are not authorized to formalize the application; however, 
after advising their lawyer (when there is one) that they wish to apply, 
the individual must formalize their application in the territory after they 
are released. This explains why migrants from sub-Saharan countries are 
already applying for asylum in national territory while the Maghrebi are 
forced to do so in the CIEs.
8.4 The reinstatement of internal borders
Although there has never ceased to be some kind of border control 
among EU Member States, in recent years we have witnessed a wide-
spread and permanent reinstatement of police controls at internal borders 
(Barbero, 2018). In the last five years, the northern and central states of 
the EU have invoked the mechanism for re-establishing internal border 
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controls provided for in the Schengen Borders Code four times, more 
than in all previous years since its inclusion in 2006. Leaving aside that 
these movements have been intermittently affected by border closures 
caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the general argument for re-estab-
lishing internal border controls has been what is referred to as “secondary 
movements” of migrants and refugees, with indirect references to security 
and terrorist threats, as in the case of France (Barbero, 2020), although 
recently these movements have also been affected by border closures 
caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.
The fundamental element of this trend towards internal border closure 
is reflected in the interpretation and application of the EU Dublin Regu-
lation regarding the notion of the “first country of entry” being respon-
sible for examining an asylum application. In this regard, it is essential 
to refer not only to the 26,694 applications submitted to Spain mainly by 
France and Germany in 2018 and 2019 (Spanish Ministry of the Interior), 
but also to the bilateral agreements between Spain and France (2002) and 
Germany (2018) for the immediate return (simplification of the proce-
dures and shortening of the time limits relating to transmission and the 
examination of requests). In other words, without enough due process of 
migrants and asylum seekers firstly registered in Spain and later caught 
in transit in those countries, there are obvious implications for the rights 
to individualized processes of international protection.
8.5 Spain’s position on the new Pact
All of the above helps explain why Spain, in contrast to the position 
of Austria and the Visegrád group countries, while accepting certain 
mechanisms of pre-screening border procedures for asylum seekers and 
migrants, has insistently defended the principles of strong solidarity and 
shared responsibility in European asylum policy and the establishment of 
a mandatory system of relocation quotas.
In a joint letter with France, Italy and Germany8 addressed to the 
Commission in April 2020, the Spanish government advocated for the 
establishment of a Search and Rescue Solidarity Mechanism, which 
would also elevate to EU level the distribution of arrivals after sea rescue, 
a decisive issue for migration management given the geography and the 
8  https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2020/apr/eu-ceas-de-es-fr-it-let-
ter-to-com-4-20.pdf
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intensification, again, of arrivals to their coasts (in 2020 especially to the 
coasts of the Canary Islands).
In the same letter, Spain, together with the other signatories, 
also proposed implementing a mandatory pre-screening procedure 
(including registration, identification and security and medical checks) at 
the external borders and advocated the establishment of an updated and 
extended catalogue of clauses for declaring the inadmissibility of applica-
tions. The use of mechanisms for rapid resolution of asylum applications 
at the border has had a certain tradition in Spanish processing proce-
dures, as Spain employed an “inadmissibility procedure” during the first 
decade of this century.
Likewise, the most recent implementation of the above-mentioned 
Centres for Temporary Assistance of Foreigners (CATE) in different 
segments of the maritime border is an instrument aimed at establishing 
infrastructure and procedures for rapid identification-processing and 
channelling of itineraries. This letter also supported the strengthening of 
agreements with third countries as part of the reformulation of asylum 
policy (as alluded to above, Spain has a long tradition of outsourcing 
migration control to third countries) and upheld the need to prevent 
secondary movements as one of the objectives to be addressed. It is not 
insignificant to mention that these secondary movements, with their 
intensification since 2017, have affected the bilateral Spanish-French 
migration agenda.
However, the letter also noted the necessity of creating a fair system 
based on responsibility and solidarity where the disproportionate burden 
of being a migration arrival country should be shared by all Member 
States. It is here where the Pact has probably failed the needs of Spain, but 
also Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus.
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8.6 Conclusion
In conclusion and in light of the facts and policies presented here, if the 
Pact lumps refugees and irregular migrants together, and even equates 
their restriction of mobility rights, we predict that the Spanish migrant 
and asylum system will have no problem assuming and incorporating the 
Pact, because it is precisely the model that has been implemented on the 
Southern border for the last 20 years.
However, if flexible solidarity means internal outsourcing, that is, 
that Northern and Eastern countries may choose to participate in return 
partnerships or capacity/operational support and not fully relocation, 
while Southern countries necessarily have to take charge of the burden 
of the registration and asylum procedures, there is a high risk that places 
such as the Canary Islands or Andalusia (as Lampedusa or Lesbos) may 
become ‘limbo-zones’ where people are contained, and rather inevitably, 
their rights endangered.
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9. Migration Management:  
The Antithesis of Refugee Protection 
– The Case of South Africa1
Fatima Khan and Nandi Rayner
9.1 Introduction
Similarly to the European Union (EU), South Africa is on the verge of 
forming a new deal on migration through its recently adopted White 
Paper on International Migration (2017). The South African Govern-
ment is firmly repositioning its asylum governance system by focussing 
on the security risks of migration through strengthening border controls 
and restricting access to the country. South Africa is thus discounting 
potential risks associated with the blurring of international protection 
and migration management (Panizzon, 2019). The parallels between 
South African policies and those proposed in the new EU Pact on 
Migration and Asylum (2020) can provide practical and legal knowledge 
concerning the potential effects of the Pact in the EU.
1 South Africa is a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (“1951 Refugee Convention”) and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (“1969 OAU Refugee Convention”), 
both are ratified, with no reservations. These Conventions have been domesticated in 
terms of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998.
 South Africa hosts the third-largest asylum and refugee population in southern Africa 
after the Democratic Republic of Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania. The 
Department of Home Affairs records 186 210 documented asylum seekers and 88 694 
documented refugees. Most documented asylum seekers are from Bangladesh, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe whereas documented refugees are from Burundi, 
DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe
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9.2 The persistent narrative of “bogus” asylum claims
South Africa’s policy context has largely been informed by a narrative 
that the asylum system is abused - and collapsing - from illegitimate 
claimants with falsified protection needs who are merely seeking to reg-
ularise their stay (Amit, 2011). Crush and Chikanda (2014) note that 
“the South African government has shown great interest in the notion 
of ‘mixed migration’ for it perfectly buttresses its argument that the 
country’s refugee system is being abused by non-refugees”.
The EU Pact (2020), in the context of solidarity and response, creates 
the connection between the issues of mixed migration and the need for 
solidarity between Member States to address the challenges of irregular 
arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers. The Pact also introduces fast-
tracked asylum applications for applicants deemed to be misleading 
authorities when from ‘safe countries’ and for persons who enter the 
country irregularly. With fast-tracked applications, it concurrently intro-
duces ‘swift’ returns. This is justified in the EU Pact to prevent unauthor-
ised movements and a tool to discourage large amounts of asylum appli-
cants from countries with low rates of refugee recognition. Although not 
as blatant as South Africa, the sentiment and connection has been made 
between migrants using the asylum system to regularise their stay, which 
has informed the EU Pact as seen by the emphasis on the need to manage 
migration.
South Africa’s response to the overwhelmed system was the adoption 
of the above-mentioned White Paper and the recent adoption of the 
Refugees Amendment Act (2017) and the Border Management Act 
(2020), both of which are overly procedural and severely hamper access 
to asylum.
None of these changes are in line with the human rights ethos of the 
UN Global Compact on Refugees (2018) and instead constitute a stark 
shift from the progressive protection laws post-apartheid. The current 
focus on border management in the form of pre-screening practices, the 
establishment of asylum processing centres, as well as the prioritisation 
of an asylum transit visa, have created new problems in asylum manage-
ment (Carciotto and Johnson, 2017). There has been a growing consensus 
that restrictive and exclusionary policies and practices have contributed 
towards the creation of a mass population of hidden and undocumented 
refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa (Khan and Lee, 2018).
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9.3 Access denied – border management and  
pre-screening
No matter whether an asylum seeker enters South Africa through a port 
of entry or not, the instruments at play are the Refugees Act (1998), 
Immigration Act (2002), and more recently the Border Management 
Act (BMA), which creates the Border Enforcement Authority who 
have the power to detain persons for illegal entry. The BMA introduces 
a mandatory, accelerated border procedure that undermines fair and 
effective adjudication of international protection claims. The Border 
Enforcement Authority has wide discretion on whether to arrest and 
detain an illegal foreigner or to deny their entry without referring to the 
possibility of refugee protection.
It is unlikely that all refoulement risks could be properly assessed in 
such a procedure by the Border Enforcement Authority. Refugees ought 
to be protected by Section 2 of the Refugees Act which includes a general 
prohibition of refusal of entry, expulsion, extradition, or return to other 
countries, and it is extended to include not only persons who will face 
serious harm but anyone whose life will be at risk of harm.
Such accelerated border processes envisaged by the BMA are likely to 
violate the principle of non-refoulement and insofar as the BMA reduces 
access to a fair and efficient asylum procedure it should be rejected. 
Currently, Covid-19 has hampered the monitoring of border activities. 
The presentation of border procedures through the BMA as the answer 
to address all ailments of the current asylum system is deceptive; it will 
instead exacerbate many flaws in the implementation of the asylum 
system.
Like the accelerated procedures in South Africa, the EU Pact proposes 
the establishment of accelerated procedures at the border for non-EU 
citizens crossing without authorisation. This accelerated procedure 
consists of the determination of the applicable migration avenue, the 
acceleration of status determinations of asylum seekers, and where 
necessary, swift return. Although the Pact reaffirms the guarantee to 
effective asylum procedures, refugees’ risk being incorrectly referred to 
migration channels, not referred at all, and where referred, face acceler-
ated claims. In each case, the asylum seeker risks swift return and thus 
a greater risk of refoulement. Furthermore, accelerated procedures lack 
procedural safeguards and hamper access to the asylum system.
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9.4 Out of sight, out of mind?: Processing centres
The most drastic repositioning of the asylum system in South Africa 
has been the call to introduce asylum-seeking processing centres on the 
northern borders, where asylum seekers will remain while having their 
claims adjudicated (Immigration White Paper, 2017). From a govern-
ment perspective, asylum seekers will be out of the metropolitan areas 
and unable to steal the jobs of South Africans. However, from a rule of law 
perspective, it will create insurmountable legal and practical problems.
Wherever that ‘processing’ takes place, so does the obligation to 
comply with the rule of law and fundamental human rights of people 
seeking international protection. These processing centres could easily 
result in the creation of refugee ‘camps’ as it currently takes South Africa 
between 5 and 15 years to adjudicate asylum claims (Amit, 2012). A far 
more worrisome fact is the current backlog with the appeals authority 
estimated to take more than 60 years to clear (Auditor General South 
Africa, 2019).
The South African government’s belief that these processing centres 
will be a more efficient asylum system than is currently in place is unreal-
istic. On the contrary, it will create new problems such as large numbers 
of persons stuck in these centres for many years without the right to work 
or freedom of movement, placing their life on hold and rendering them 
powerless.
Although the EU already processes claims at the border, they similarly 
believe that more must be done to manage the external borders in regard 
to the processing of applications for asylum to prevent irregular entry 
and movement in the country. The EU Pact indicates a belief that this will 
create a more efficient asylum system.
In South Africa, not only are the obstacles to the rule of law evident 
but asylum seekers are unable to support themselves and will become 
entirely dependent on others for their survival. The responsibility of 
taking care of these persons will fall squarely on the South African gov-
ernment, creating an additional burden on the state.
The establishment of such processing centres will also unnecessarily 
create practical challenges for asylum adjudication. The ability to have 
enough refugee reception officers, refugee status determination officers, 
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and independent appeal and review bodies on-site to adjudicate claims 
will be challenging to say the least. The areas earmarked for these pro-
cessing centres are in vast swathes of unpopulated land, far from any 
major city (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2020). Furthermore, there 
are no High Courts or legal assistance personnel near these centres.
This type of ‘out of sight’ processing envisaged will instead create 
problems. It will be easily identifiable by the international community 
as centres (‘black spots’) that have failed those seeking international pro-
tection. South Africa is therefore strongly urged by South African and 
international human rights NGOs as well as the UNHCR to abort the 
asylum processing centres plan.
9.5 Asylum transit visas
The Refugees Amendment Act creates an exclusion for an asylum seeker 
who is not in possession of an asylum transit visa on an application for 
asylum and is unable to show just cause for not being in possession of 
the visa. The asylum transit visa is issued in terms of the Immigration 
Act when an asylum seeker states their intention to apply for asylum at a 
designated port of entry and gives them five days to report to a Refugee 
Reception Office. Asylum seekers who do not enter through a port of 
entry are unable to obtain this visa. The exclusion thus seeks to penalise 
illegal entry despite the right to non -penalisation in refugee law.
The EU Pact, with its introduction of accelerated procedures for 
asylum and deportation for persons who enter without authorisation, 
is analogous to South Africa’s procedures to penalise irregular entry of 
asylum seekers and prioritise exclusion in these circumstances. It further 
links the asylum management and migration authorities for a more 
efficient system. Although the exact nature of the procedure, enabling 
law or policy may differ between the EU Pact and South Africa, the effect 
of the policies is inherently similar and has the potential to create similar 
issues.
The Constitutional Court in South Africa in Ruta v the Minister of 
Home Affairs (2018), already ruled on the issue of the interaction between 
the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act holding that the Refugees 
Act and the principle of non-refoulement apply to de facto and de jure 
refugees and thus all asylum seekers are protected by the principle of 
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non-refoulement. Furthermore, it also ruled that such protection applies 
as long as the claim to refugee status has not been finally rejected after 
the proper procedure in terms of the Refugees Act. Asylum seekers who 
do not enter through official ports of entry are not explicitly covered by 
either statute, though the Refugees Act covers them implicitly by the fun-
damental principle of non-refoulement. Thus, the Refugees Act is held to 
prevail over the Immigration Act in the case of asylum seekers who have 
not yet had their claim adjudicated.
The amendment goes against and attempts to circumvent the essence 
of Ruta by tying the criminal act of illegal entry in terms of the Immi-
gration Act to the Refugees Act and piercing the ‘shield of non-refoule-
ment’ which may only be lifted after a proper determination has been 
completed. The exclusion based on not having an asylum transit visa has 
the effect of prioritizing the management of migration over protection 
needs and is incongruent with human rights law in South Africa as it 
prioritises exclusion over inclusion.
9.6 Creating humanitarian corridors
A positive aspect of the White Paper is that it encourages South Africa to 
consider humanitarian assistance through special dispensation projects. 
Currently, South Africa has the Zimbabwean Dispensation Program, the 
Lesotho Dispensation Program, and is considering extending a dispen-
sation to Malawians.
There are no specific laws which allow for a person to legally migrate 
to South Africa for work unless they can assert a scarce or critical skill 
(Immigration Act, 2002). Many low-skilled migrants from neighbouring 
countries enter South Africa with the sole purpose of working; thus, the 
creation of country-specific special dispensations to deal with economic 
migrants was a step in the right direction. When South Africa created 
the special dispensation for Zimbabweans, it provided much-needed 
humanitarian assistance. At the time, Zimbabwe was experiencing both 
political and economic instability and many Zimbabweans who came to 
seek asylum in South Africa felt compelled to transfer on to the Zimba-
bwean Dispensation Program as the permits issued were valid for four 
years as opposed to the asylum seeker permit that was valid for only 
three to six months at a time (Khan and Schreier, 2014). Asylum seekers 
that remained on their permits remained entitled to the full protection 
afforded by the Refugees Act.
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The creation of this humanitarian corridor to protection was necessary 
but it is recommended that it should not be used to relabel refugees with 
ordinary migrants’ status. This cautionary statement is further applicable 
to the EU Pact, which places a strong emphasis on the development of 
legal pathways to Europe and thus should include precautions to prevent 
the relabelling of refugees in other migration categories.
9.7 Key to making asylum work
The comparable policies between South Africa and those proposed in 
the EU Pact allow the EU to gain practical and legal knowledge into 
the effects of such policies. Consequently, the suggested key to making 
asylum work in South Africa can provide insight into improving the 
asylum system in the EU.
The key to making asylum work in South Africa is to increase compli-
ance with existing asylum law and management, rather than introducing 
asylum processing centres which are strongly opposed by civil society and 
the UNHCR. Prominent implementation gaps that need to be addressed 
immediately include: inadequate reception provisions; barriers to regis-
tration; and lack of special procedural guarantees resulting from poor and 
inconsistent decision-making. The UN GCR, in its operationalisation by 
the government, should call on the assistance of stakeholders, including 
the EU, to assist and fix the system already in place. In December 2019 
at the Global Refugee Forum in Geneva, South Africa pledged to step up 
the documentation of refugees in South Africa.
9.8 Conclusions
It is apparent from the above that the border screenings, asylum pro-
cessing centres, and the exclusionary nature of the asylum transit visa is 
not entirely in line with the rule of law and will likely face serious legal 
challenges. It is therefore an inadequate solution to the asylum problem 
in South Africa. In South African law, strong precedents have declared 
unconstitutional anti-protectionist policies such as pre-screening – 
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whether at the border or the refugee reception offices.2 The reasoning of 
these judgements has not only relied on the South African Bill of Rights 
(modelled similarly to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights), but has also been enriched by judgements from 
international law and various judgements of the European Union.
This repositioning of asylum management is a threat to the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers. Much of the work done by civil society and 
the judiciary in protecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers has 
been undone by the most recent amendments and regulations. Unlike 
the human rights ethos that was overwhelmingly present in the approach 
post-apartheid, the new amendments and regulations appear to be 
informed by the widespread xenophobia in the country and the need to 
secure borders and contain refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2020). 
These inconsistencies, in addition to broad discretion given to home 
affairs officials and restrictive regulations, call into question the law-
fulness of the amendments considering the South African democratic 
system and international law. South Africa has moved from an open 
policy of free movement to that of containment. Whether it will be able 
to withstand the progressive approach of the Constitution will once again 
be tested through our courts.
2  See case law against anti protectionist policies:
 Abdi v Minister of Home Affairs (2011) ZASCA 2; Ersumo v Minister of Home Affairs 
2012 (4) SA 581 (SCA); Kiliko v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (4) SA 114 (C); Nbaya 
and Others v Director General of Home Affairs and Others 6534/15; Ruta v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2019 (2) SA 329 (CC); Tantoush V Refugee Appeal Board and Others 2008 
(1) SA 232; Scalabrini v the Minister of Home Affairs 2018 (4) SA 125 (SCA); Tatira v 
Ngozwana (12960/16) ZAGPHC 136 (TPD) 12 December 2006.
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10. A Short Sighted and One Side 
Deal: Why The EU-Turkey Statement 
Should Never Serve As a Blueprint
Meltem Ineli-Ciger and Orçun Ulusoy1 
10.1. Introduction
On 23 September 2020, the EU presented the new Pact on Migration and 
Asylum seeking to overhaul a system no longer working and establish 
a predictable and reliable migration management system. One of the 
key elements presented in the Pact was the promotion of tailor-made 
and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries in the area of 
migration (European Commission, 2020a). Section 6 of the European 
Commission Communication titled “Working With Our International 
Partners” emphasises these mutually beneficial partnerships though it 
only mentions human rights of migrants and refugees once and makes 
no reference at all to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
or the obligations of the EU or Member States towards refugees and 
migrants under international law. In this Communication, the European 
Commission notes “The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement reflected a deeper 
engagement and dialogue with Turkey, including helping its efforts to 
host around 4 million refugees”. Importantly, the Communication or 
any other document presented on 23 September 2020 by the Commis-
sion does not mention the legal problems that the EU-Turkey Statement 
has posed or the serious hurdles it has created for refugees and migrants 
accessing fundamental human rights.
Compatibility of the agreed measures under the EU-Turkey 
1  The authors would like to thank Ozgenur Yigit for her assistance during the editing 
process.
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Statement with international and European refugee law and human 
rights law standards was widely questioned and criticized by academia 
and civil society (Peers and Roman, 2016; Roman, Baird and Radcliffe, 
2016; Amnesty International 2017; Ulusoy and Battjes, 2017; Tometten, 
2018; Moreno-Lax and Giuffré, 2019; Ineli-Ciger, 2019; Öztürk and 
Soykan, 2019; Kaya, 2020). It seems there is a general consensus that the 
EU-Turkey Statement is likely to serve as a blueprint for future European 
cooperation arrangements with North African countries and the new 
Pact does not say anything to the contrary (Tometten, 2018; Lehner, 
2019; Carrera et al., 2019).
In view of these developments, this Chapter seeks to identify 
problems with the Statement and its implementation and detail the 
reasons why the EU-Turkey Statement should not serve as a model for 
future EU-third country cooperation in the field of migration. We argue 
that the EU-Turkey Statement was a reactionary instrument to deal with 
the “so-called” crisis framed by EU policymakers and it included a set of 
short-sighted and one-sided actions in a region where the reality was sig-
nificantly different than the ideas put forward in Brussels. In this Chapter 
we identify what these short-sighted and one-sided actions are and the 
reasons the Statement should never be replicated.
10.2 A brief overview of the EU-Turkey Statement and its 
implementation to date
The EU-Turkey Statement was a reactionary instrument to deal with a 
complex situation namely, the arrival of nearly one million refugees and 
migrants by sea in Europe in 2015 (UNHCR, 2020). In April 2015, after 
a series of tragedies, more than 800 migrants died in the Mediterranean 
and Aegean Seas in just one week (UNHCR, 2020). As the news of the 
deaths appeared on the front pages of newspapers across Europe, Donald 
Tusk, President of the European Council, called the European Council to 
an extraordinary meeting, while Home Affairs and Citizenship Commis-
sioner Avramopoulos was presenting a 10-point emergency action plan 
with a press meeting. One of the points was establishing “a new return 
programme for rapid return of irregular migrants from frontline EU 
Member States [to third countries]” (Ten point action plan on migration, 
2015).
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In October 2015, the European Commission reached an ad referenda 
agreement with Turkey in the form of a Joint Action Plan. The plan 
attempted to address the so called ‘European migration crisis’: “(a) by 
addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (b) 
by supporting Syrians under temporary protection and their host com-
munities in Turkey and (c) by strengthening cooperation to prevent 
irregular migration flows to the EU” (European Commission, 2015). 
However, failing to address several crucial issues, such as not offering any 
solutions for coming from countries other than Syria, the objective of the 
Joint Action Plan to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU was not 
achieved in March 2016 (Ineli-Ciger, 2019).
On 18 March 2016, in a renewed attempt to end irregular migration 
from Turkey to the EU, parties adopted the EU-Turkey Statement. To this 
end, the EU and Turkey agreed that “[a]ll new irregular migrants crossing 
from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned 
to Turkey”. According to the Statement, migrants who do apply for 
asylum or whose applications have been determined unfounded or inad-
missible would be returned to Turkey. As of February 2021, the number 
of persons readmitted by Turkey from Greece under the Statement was 
2,139 (DGMM, 2021a).
The EU-Turkey Statement required Turkey to take any necessary 
measures to prevent the opening of any new sea or land routes for illegal 
migration from Turkey to the EU. Following adoption of the Statement, 
Turkey initially increased its efforts to prevent irregular migration to the 
EU although this drastically changed when in February 2020 Turkish 
President Erdogan declared that he had opened his country’s borders 
for migrants to cross into Europe. In return for Turkey’s efforts to stop 
irregular migration, the EU agreed to allocate €3 (now €6) billion under 
the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (NY Times, 2020). According to 
the EU, as of March 2020, “all operational funds have been committed 
– of the €6 billion, €4.7 billion is already contracted and €3.2 billion 
disbursed” (EU Commission, 2020b).
In the Statement, the EU also agreed that “[f]or every Syrian being 
returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled 
from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria”. 
The Statement noted that priority will be given to those who have not 
previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly. This arrangement 
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is sometimes referred to as ‘the 1:1 resettlement scheme’. According to the 
Directorate General of Migration Management in Turkey (DGMM), as 
of February 2020, 27,825 Syrians had been resettled to 20 Member States 
under the 1:1 resettlement scheme (DGMM, 2021b).
These figures illustrate that the number of readmitted migrants from 
Greece to Turkey and resettled Syrians from Turkey to the EU were 
strikingly low and may even be regarded as a failure of the Statement. 
However, the real ‘success’ of the Statement can be identified as creating 
a legal and political limbo that would be used as a deterrence tool as well 
as a blueprint for future agreements.
10.3 EU-Turkey Statement. A one-sided instrument to 
deal with a complex situation
Both the March 2016 Statement and the Joint Action plan preceding it 
essentially follow the ‘externalisation’ policy of the EU and act as another 
step in the direction of placing migration management at the heart of 
EU’s external relations. Right from the start, the Statement does not take 
the priorities of and difficulties faced by Turkey and Greece in offering 
protection to large number of asylum seekers into consideration (and 
more crucially: migrants themselves) and establishes a plan to curb 
irregular migration to western EU states while turning the Aegean region 
to ‘borderlands’.
10.3.1 Whose Statement is it? The authorship problem
The legal nature and the authorship of the Statement has been much 
contested (Peers and Roman, 2016; Carrera et al., 2017). The Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) dismissed the action seeking annulment of the 
EU-Turkey Statement on the basis that authorship belongs to the Member 
States and Turkey and it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the case 
(Orders of the General Court in Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 
NF, NG and NM v European Council); whereas, the European Court 
of Human Rights identified the Statement as an instrument concluded 
between the Member States and Turkey in JR and Others v Greece.
One might present two perspectives regarding the authorship 
problem. First, one might argue that the ambiguous authorship problem 
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of the Statement arises from the nature of the deal, not from the partici-
pants or technical aspects of it. While the final text of the Statement and 
‘bargaining’ period were carried out by the participants of the deal, the 
idea and framework behind the Statement were long before decided in 
offices in Berlin (ESI, 2015), the Hague (Teffer, 2016) and Brussels (EU 
Commission, 2015). Turkey and Greece, the states that would be directly 
affected by the implementation of the Statement (along with the other 
participating states), were left to discuss the amount of money and some 
minor (domestic) political gains. The author of the Statement was neither 
an actor nor a state. The real authors were the bureaucrats and techni-
cians simply following the externalisation playbook and helping to create 
ambiguity surrounding the responsibility regarding the consequences of 
the Statement.
A second perspective might suggest that the Statement was indeed a 
legal instrument concluded between Turkey and the EU. In view of the 
fact that the Statement was published as a press release on the European 
Council Website and the European Commission publishes progress 
reports and fact sheets relating to the implementation of the Statement, 
it is clear that one of the authors of the Statement was the EU. The EU 
denying the authorship of the Statement and the European Courts con-
firming this denial has two implications: first, that the Statement remains 
outside of checks and balances applicable to EU Law; and second, that 
the EU cannot be held responsible for the breaches of international law 
and human rights principles arising from the implementation of the 
Statement (Carrera et al., 2019).
Whichever perspective you choose, to date three questions remain 
unanswered: it is still not clear whether the Statement is only a soft law 
instrument; who authored the Statement; and who can be held respon-
sible for the violations of human rights under the Statement arrange-
ments?
10.3.2 Ending the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. Is this 
objective realised?
In 2015, over one million refugees and migrants arrived irregularly in 
Europe by sea whereas arrivals to Greece accounted for 80 per cent of this 
one million (UNHCR, 2020). According to UNHCR, in 2015 799 persons 
had died or gone missing at sea while trying to reach the Greek territo-
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ries. Whereas, this number was 174 and 70 in 2018 and 2019, respectively. 
In 2019, 59,726 irregular land arrivals and 14,887 irregular sea arrivals 
to Greece were recorded. UNHCR noted that between 1 January 2020 
and 20 September 2020, there were 12,577 sea arrivals to Greece and 495 
persons had died or gone missing in the Mediterranean. UNHCR figures 
clearly suggest that both the number of irregular arrivals to Greece and 
the lives that have been lost at sea (to a certain degree) have decreased 
since the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement.
Although it is clear that the Statement played a role in this, the extent 
to which it has contributed to the decrease in the number of irregular 
arrivals to Greece is not clear (Spijkerboer, 2016; Reitano and Micallef, 
2016; Van Liempt et al., 2017; Reslow, 2019). For instance, it is argued 
that changing migration routes, increased border controls on the 
Western Balkan route, right to work given to Syrians in Turkey in 2016 
and media campaigns also played a role in the diminishing number of 
new sea arrivals to Greece (Spijkerboer, 2016; Adar et al., 2020; Yıldız, 
2020). Therefore, although one of the most celebrated outcomes of the 
Statement by the European Commission is the decrease on the number 
of irregular sea arrivals to Greece, there is no clear evidence or objective 
study showing that this decrease is a direct result of EU-Turkey Statement.
On the other hand, it is clear that while the arrival of irregular migrants 
to Greece (albeit with a significant decrease) continues, the main benefac-
tors of this Statement were northern and western EU Member States. The 
Statement did not only decrease the irregular migration to the western 
EU members in 2016 but it also guaranteed that these states won’t expe-
rience a similar influx as long as Greece and Turkey continually act as 
‘buffer zones’.
10.3.3 A statement which leaves asylum seekers and migrants in 
limbo
The EU-Turkey Statement foresaw the return of asylum seekers and 
migrants who have arrived to Greece irregularly by sea. Implementation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement together with the hotspot approach estab-
lished by the European Commission in 2015 led to the containment and 
long-term detention of asylum seekers and migrants in the Greek Islands 
in dire conditions.
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The poor reception and detention conditions in the Greek islands are 
well documented and the absence of any measures to address COVID-19 
in the camps makes it even worse (AIDA, 2020). Apart from solidarity 
from the local Greek population and civil society, migrants stuck in the 
islands are left alone without any option to go forward. The fire in the 
Moria camp in Lesvos once again highlighted the problem of “locked and 
forgotten” people in the Greek islands who have no option to go back or 
forward (Cosse, 2020). It is clear that long term detention of migrants 
and asylum seekers in poor conditions in the Greek islands is incompat-
ible with Article 3 and Article 5 of the ECHR in addition to other human 
rights guarantees (Ineli-Ciger, 2019).
However, Greece is not the only actor to be blamed for this: the EU 
which established the hotspot approach and facilitated (if not authored) 
the EU-Turkey Statement is also responsible - in addition to the Member 
States that failed to share the responsibility of Greece and show real sol-
idarity. The new Migration Pact acknowledging this problem proposes 
a new solidarity mechanism moreover, the Commission declared that 
it would establish a dedicated taskforce to improve the situation on the 
Greek islands beginning with Lesvos (EU Commission, 2020c). Yet, 
although improving reception conditions in the Greek islands is on the 
EU agenda, abolishing containment policies is not. On the contrary, the 
new Pact and the proposed regulations expand the possibility to further 
detain asylum seekers and migrants (Peers, 2020).
10.4 EU-Turkey Statement. A short-sighted reaction to a 
complex situation
Drafted and signed in ‘crisis’ mode, the reactionary nature of the 
Statement is de facto short sighted. Primarily aimed at ending large scale 
irregular arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU by sea, the 
Statement did not include any meaningful supervision or accounta-
bility mechanism or any additional safeguards to ensure human rights 
are respected. Moreover, the Statement which, among others, aimed to 
improve the relationship between Turkey and the EU and was a step 
towards energising the accession process of Turkey ended up eroding the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey.
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10.4.1 Absence of a meaningful accountability and supervision 
mechanism
One of the most problematic aspects of the Statement is that there 
is very little data on how it is being implemented. So far the EU has 
published seven reports on the progress made in the implementation of 
the EU-Turkey Statement (e.g. European Commission, 2016; European 
Commission, 2020b). These progress reports were one-sided and had 
a number of shortcomings (Ineli-Ciger, 2017). The last progress report 
was published on 6 September 2017 and from that date on, no indi-
vidual progress report in relation to the EU-Turkey Statement has been 
published by the European Commission. Since 2018, several Progress 
reports on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration 
and fact sheets offer fragmented data and information on the implemen-
tation of the Statement. Turkey does not publish any individual reports 
on how the Statement is being implemented though the website of the 
Turkish DGMM releases data on the number of returns from Greece to 
Turkey and the number of persons resettled under the 1:1 resettlement 
scheme.
The lack of data and confusing information on the implementation 
are not a coincidence since any reporting or monitoring mechanism was 
significantly absent in the text of the Statement. Defining itself as “…a 
temporary and extraordinary measure”, drafters of the Statement avoided 
any instrument that might challenge, slow down or assess the imple-
mentation. Due to the absence of any specific monitoring or supervi-
sion bodies or accountability mechanisms, shortcomings or misconduct 
taking place during the implementation of the Statement cannot be iden-
tified. Furthermore, considering that the Statement has been affecting the 
lives of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers for the last four years 
- reliable and objective supervision and accountability mechanisms are 
needed now more than ever to safeguard fundamental rights and human 
dignity.
10.4.2 Readmission: From temporary and extraordinary to the new 
normal
The EU-Turkey Statement underlined that readmissions from Greece 
to Turkey “will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is 
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necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order”. The 
Statement which was agreed as a temporary measure is in its fourth 
year and readmission of migrants and rejected asylum seekers became a 
central theme in European policies to manage migration. The new Pact 
on Migration and Asylum puts an emphasis on ‘return’ and even proposes 
solidarity in returning people through return sponsorships.
The EU Commission identifies the legal basis of irregular migrants 
being returned from the Greek islands to Turkey as the bilateral readmis-
sion agreement between Greece and Turkey and notes that “from 1 June 
2016, this will be succeeded by the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, 
following the entry into force of the provisions on readmission of third 
country nationals of this agreement.” (EU Commission Press Release, 
2016). It is reported that Turkey unilaterally suspended its readmission 
agreement with Greece in 2018 as a response to a Greek court decision 
to release eight former Turkish soldiers who fled the country a day after 
the July 15, 2016 coup attempt (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). Moreover, 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu declared that 
Turkey suspended the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement in July 2019 
due to the fact that the visa liberalisation process for Turkish citizens 
had not been completed by the EU (Euractive, 2019). If these reports are 
accurate, this means the return of persons from Greece to Turkey under 
the Statement have no legal basis.
10.5. Conclusion
The new Pact on Migration and Asylum includes the proposal of a Reg-
ulation addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of 
migration and asylum which seeks to provide temporary and extraor-
dinary measures needed in the face of a crisis. It is striking that in 
the Explanatory Memorandum section of the proposed Regulation, 
the Greek-Turkish border crisis is mentioned as an example where 
‘temporary and extraordinary measures’ can be applied due to situations 
of force majeure. However, the very reason we witnessed the March 2020 
Greek-Turkish border crisis is the Statement itself and its one-sided and 
short-sighted policies.
There are precious lessons to be learned from the EU-Turkey 
Statement. Replicating the Statement with no amendments will harm the 
rule of law, violate human rights and cause further human suffering. At a 
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minimum, all future EU-third country arrangements should observe the 
following principles so as not to repeat the mistakes of the EU-Turkey 
Statement. First, the EU-third country arrangements should not be in the 
form of soft law and the EU should own these future agreements and take 
responsibility for the agreed measures. Second, objective and reliable 
monitoring, supervision and accountability mechanisms should be intro-
duced to safeguard the fundamental rights of all persons who are subjects 
of these arrangements. Third, readmission agreements, as shown in the 
case of Turkey, can easily be denounced and persuading transit countries 
or countries of origin to take people back is no easy task. Hence, placing 
‘return’ at the centre of supranational migration and asylum laws and 
policies is not viable and makes ‘refugees’ susceptible to be used as chips 
in readmission negotiations. Finally, containment policies which leave 
human beings in legal and actual limbo are not feasible ways to deal with 
a migration situation, crisis or not.
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11. The Global Compact on Refugees 
and the EU’s New Pact on Migration 




What does ‘fair and equitable responsibility- and burden-sharing’ look 
like today, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, a global recession and 
an ongoing climate crisis? One could argue that it has not yet manifested 
as envisioned in the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (UN, 
2018) and is certainly not what the New Pact on Migration and Asylum 
appears to be.
Both the GCR and the new EU Pact have roots in the 2015-2016 
so-called European refugee crisis, yet represent different aspirations 
surrounding migration. The affirmation of the GCR in December 2018 
demonstrated a powerful commitment to refugee protection and coop-
eration in refugee responses by the international community. While the 
new EU Pact overall frames migration positively, it has been criticized as 
being based on border containment (ECRE, 2020), with increased soli-
darity premised on increasing the returns of rejected asylum seekers.
Recent research on the impacts of Covid-19 on the GCR, commis-
sioned by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), shows that the ways 
Europe embraces the GCR - or doesn’t - pose real risks of negative 
domino effects in terms of global responsibility-sharing (DRC, 2020). 
The new EU Pact becomes embedded in this if it ends up promoting the 
rejection rather than the redistribution of asylum seekers, and exercises 
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‘flexible solidarity’ rather than true solidarity. Migration management is 
no substitute for international protection, which in turn should not be 
framed through the lens of EU interests (Carrera, 2020; see Chapter 1). 
When main donors such as the EU continue to reject asylum seekers and 
instead present refugee-hosting as a task for others to undertake – often 
without providing the necessary resources for it to occur sustainably or 
fairly – the GCR and indeed the entire refugee regime is undermined.
11.2 A false perception that the GCR is not ‘relevant’ for 
the EU
Despite the fact that 27 out of the 28 EU Member States at the time 
affirmed the GCR (only Hungary opposed it), many informants 
expressed the reality that it is rarely discussed or implemented within the 
EU. Many had the sense that for European States the GCR is an instru-
ment to ‘implement elsewhere’ or ‘out there’. A local government official 
in Germany engaged in a national programme for the local integration 
and empowerment of refugees (conceivably highly relevant to the GCR) 
put it bluntly: “It is very easy to answer your question, because the Global 
Compact on Refugees is not relevant for our work”.
Others referenced the binding legal standards embodied in the EU 
legal order and the Convention regime, as well as at national levels, which 
are preferred over the GCR when advocating for refugees’ rights and 
States’ responsibilities. As an example, one head of a legal network on 
refugees and asylum seekers explained, “Germany has lightly embraced 
the Compact. Their approach will be to support other countries to 
support standards in the Compact. We would argue that Germany should 
implement all these elements of the Compact, as well”.
11.3 Protection risks in the EU
Limited asylum space and a related waning of interest in responsibili-
ty-sharing during the COVID-19 pandemic were main protection issues 
raised in the research pertaining to the EU and beyond. Lack of political 
will and leadership were discussed as key concerns driving these pro-
tection challenges. These were seen as both short-term and longer-term 
problems, with immediate impacts already apparent, such as asylum 
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seekers being refused entry into potential host countries. As one head 
of a European legal NGO shared regarding protection issues caused by 
Covid-19: 
From our perspective [in Europe] the biggest challenge we have 
is access to territory. This was a challenge before, and Covid-19 
has exacerbated it. Using legal advocacy methods to try to stop 
Covid accelerating is bolstering the EU’s tendency to prevent 
people from actually accessing territory. Currently it is not even 
a question of access to procedure (though that is also a challenge 
but less complicated) - it’s actually physical legal access to territory 
that we’re struggling to obtain.
One issue raised in the research regarding the EU and the GCR was 
how the pandemic might accelerate the EU’s externalisation agenda and 
in fact use the GCR to deflect responsibilities. This fear appears to be 
well-founded, as critics of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum 
point out that it disregards the protection needs of arrivals (and the con-
sequences of doing so), as an ongoing EU strategy of preventing arrivals. 
The focus on externalisation remains, along with borders, detention and 
deportation.
11.4 The domino effect of restricted EU responsibility-
sharing
The limited uptake of the GCR in the EU and the limitations of the new 
Pact on Migration and Asylum do not go unnoticed elsewhere in the 
world. Instead, a lack of fair and equitable responsibility-sharing in the 
European context – and in a context of current policies of externalising 
protection responsibilities – undermines the viability of the GCR as a 
whole.
Informants across sectors are concerned that the current dearth of 
resettlement to EU and other Western countries and ongoing border 
restrictions are setting a new norm of asylum that will have a problematic 
ripple effect. There is a risk of fatigue in hosting countries and an associ-
ated disinterest or disillusionment with the GCR process if GCR commit-
ments are not realized. As one member of the Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework (CRRF) Secretariat in Uganda stated: 
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Countries around the world are turning inwards but this is an 
issue that must be looked at more holistically because we all know 
that refugees are an international obligation – 1.5 million refugees 
are not an obligation for Uganda. More refugees continue to come 
from DRC and South Sudan, but the international community 
has decided to keep quiet and say that Uganda has solutions for 
refugees. But now we are saying that we are confronted with a 
challenge. We are a poor country and it is time for the interna-
tional community to wake up…this is a puzzle for the global 
community to think about. 
A member of an INGO in East Africa further explained: 
I don’t see these essentially Western constructed mechanisms or 
protocols having any practical significance to governments in 
the region. Especially if they’re not funded. While countries have 
signed on to the Compact, what we’re seeing is that at the end of 
the day, they are reverting to focusing internally. I don’t think gov-
ernments in East Africa and the Horn will respond well to Western 
countries telling them to do otherwise when the West itself isn’t…
if that continues, governments here will likely say: Don’t talk to us 
about solidarity when you are not thinking globally yourselves. 
11.5 Need for increased funding – and increased political 
will
Reflecting on the issue of European countries closing their borders 
through often violent means, one NGO informant stated that it is “not an 
accident that this action is taking place now”, citing Covid-19 as providing 
permission for restrictive measures to become even further ingrained. It 
was noted by a researcher on asylum that in addition to combating such 
blatant disregard for the principle of responsibility-sharing, the revitali-
zation of global commitments to serve and protect refugees (what is in 
theory the GCR) must also reimagine how the Global North, including 
the EU, uses the individual process of seeking and granting asylum. 
This unequal employment of responsibility-sharing must be systemi-
cally addressed. It is hard to see how the EU New Pact on Migration and 
Asylum makes great strides in this direction.
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Not only does there appear to be limited uptake of the GCR tenets 
and mechanisms within the EU, but the pandemic has also resulted in 
significant funding shortfalls to address both Covid-19-related and other 
needs (ICVA, 2020) – thereby demonstrating that many donor states are 
not upholding their end of the responsibility-sharing bargain. At the 
time of writing, the 2020 humanitarian appeals are 33.5% funded, with 
the Covid-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan just 39.8% funded by 
the end of 2020 (UNOCHA, 2021). Other long-term solutions-oriented 
responses are markedly lower, such as a 95% shortfall in the funding 
of the 2020 South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan. The lack of 
funding allocated to refugee response plans (RRPs) hinders the progress 
of the GCR as, “In the spirit of the GCR, the 2020 RRPs seek to integrate 
a solutions approach placing greater emphasis on self-reliance and resil-
ience and aligning the refugee response with other humanitarian and 
development country programmes”. Plans left unfunded also do nothing 
to support those forcibly displaced people remaining in or returning 
to their region of origin – arguably a key end goal of the new EU Pact 
(Reidy, 2020).
11.6 Where does the GCR fit in?
While the EU Pact does make note of the 2019 Global Refugee Forum 
(broadly seen as a key means to further the implementation of the GCR) 
and calls on Member States to support the implementation of UNHCR’s 
three-year strategy (2019-2021) on resettlement and complementary 
pathways, as laid out in the GCR (para. 91), several informants voiced 
the need for a clearer implementation of the GCR – including within the 
EU. One member of an international humanitarian agency stated: 
Of course we have more tools if it [the GCR] is binding, but most 
important at this point is that the GCR gets anchored in what 
countries do, in national legislation, inter-ministerial operations, 
and internal UNHCR uptake. This work is the most critical: like 
the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals], how do we get it 
mainstreamed at the country level… 
Even in the lead-up to the affirmation of the GCR, the importance 
of implementing it within the EU was recognised by the EU Parlia-
ment, which in April 2018 stated, “the need to reinforce the follow-up 
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dimension of the implementation of both Global Compacts in the near 
future, particularly on account of their non-binding nature, in order to 
avoid à la carte approaches by the different states involved” (EU Par-
liament, 2018). Concrete suggestions included the establishment of 
benchmarks and indicators to enable close monitoring of implementa-
tion, and the provision of resources to the UN and its relevant agencies 
to enable the implementation and follow-up of both the GCR and the 
Global Compact on Migration. However, even before the formal affirma-
tion of the GCR there were fears that “the EU’s commitment to the GCR 
is undermined by the different measures currently used or proposed to 
shirk rather than share responsibility for refugees” (ECRE, 2018). Unfor-
tunately, this statement remains relevant today.
At the same time, some research informants saw value in invoking 
the GCR in advocacy surrounding asylum seekers’ access to EU territory. 
This is sorely needed today, particularly given that the EU Pact does not 
present a roadmap for legal migration. One informant stated:
The GCR could be useful in this. In general what we need is a 
strong statement and strong work from UNHCR and IOM, and 
then also from the European Commission, the courts, anybody 
with any power to not allow states to use Covid to limit access 
to territory with impunity. To either insist, put pressure, use 
whatever tool available to remove the barriers to access – and also 
make it so problematic that States decide not to continue it. 
Indeed, it could be argued that one of the most significant contribu-
tions the EU could make to implementing, and indeed upholding, the 
GCR is through expanding safe and legal routes to the EU. One of the 
tensions apparent between the EU Pact and the GCR in this regard is that 
‘migration management’ risks becoming a means to offer substitutes to 
asylum through dangerous third country arrangements rather than truly 
creating access to it.
While it has been posited that with the new EU Pact “Commission 
officials have put forward a bold strategy that responds to the political 
demands and constraints of the present day” (Beirens, 2020), it is hard 
to not also perceive the shift from the so-called harmonization of the 
Bloc to the differentiation of it as representing troubling advances in iso-




At the end of the day, an affirmation of the GCR should translate into a 
commitment to and respect for the underlying principles of more pre-
dictable and equitable responsibility-sharing in policies and practices, 
including those in the EU. It thus follows that the New Pact on Migration 
and Asylum should uphold the tenets of global responsibility-sharing 
and respect such fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter as the 
right to asylum (Article 18) (EUFRA, 2007) – and the EU should also 
remain deeply cognizant of the importance of its role within the global 
protection regime.
Ultimately the GCR is one tool out of many to advocate for refugee 
protection and responsibility-sharing, but not one that should be disre-
garded within the EU or within the EU’s New Pact on Migration and 
Asylum. Today, in the face of rising border restrictions, disappointing 
political outcomes and ongoing xenophobia, we need to make use of all 
the tools we have.
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12. South American De Jure and De 
Facto Refugee Protection: Lessons 
From The South
Leiza Brumat and Luisa Feline Freier
12.1. Introduction
This Chapter discusses the characteristics of refugee protection in South 
America, including de facto protection stemming from the region’s 
mobility regime. In light of the recently released European Union (EU) 
Pact on Migration and Asylum, which adopts a sharp distinction between 
‘refugees’ and ‘irregular migrants,’ the former referring to individuals who 
deserve protection and the latter to those who should be detained and 
returned (Carrera, 2020; see Chapter 1), we suggest that South America 
presents an interesting case of a dual regional regime for mobility and 
refugee protection. This regime makes the distinction between irregular 
entry and stay, on the one hand, and asylum seekers and refugees, on 
the other, almost irrelevant in practice, as irregular migrants have access 
to basic rights and legal residence, in many cases. The region further 
combines this dual human rights-focused regime with an informal 
regime based on policy practice, which allows people to move - and find 
protection - across borders.
More specifically, we focus on Venezuelan forced displacement - the 
largest displacement crisis the region has ever faced. We further ground 
our analysis in South America, as the region has developed a human 
mobility regime (Brumat, 2020) that, as we argue, offers an alternative 
de facto form of protection. Since 2015, more than 5 million Venezuelans 
have moved to neighbouring countries, and over 90% of them moved 
within South America (Comité Español de ACNUR, 2020). In mid-2020, 
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close to 1.8 million Venezuelans were officially living in Colombia; 
830,000 in Peru; 455,000 in Chile; 365,000 in Ecuador; and 265,000 in 
Brazil (UNHCR and IOM, 2020). Between 2017 and early 2020, before 
the Covid-19 pandemic, 5,000 Venezuelans fled their country every day 
(Watson, 2018) as the borders of South American countries remained 
largely open.
These numbers are far higher than the number of asylum seekers 
most European countries received during the Mediterranean refugee 
crisis. While the EU, with a total population of around 450 million 
persons (World Bank Group, 2021), received 1.5 million Syrians at the 
height of the crisis (Medecins Sans Frontiers, 2015), South American 
countries, with a similar population (430 million, Statista, 2021), received 
over 4.5 million Venezuelans in the last four years. Although the Vene-
zuelan exodus slowed down due to the pandemic, it never ceased and 
experts expect the outflow to significantly increase once borders across 
the region fully reopen (Luzes and Freier, 2020).
12.2. Latin America’s formal refugee protection regime
Freier (2015) identifies fives phases of Latin American refugee policy lib-
eralization since the mid-20th century: (1) the ratification of the 1951 
Convention in the 1960s; (2) the ratification of its 1961 Protocol in the 
1970s; (3) the adoption of a constitutional right to asylum; (4) the incor-
poration of the Cartagena refugee definition since the 1980s; and (5) 
reforms of domestic refugee laws since the 2000s.
The Cartagena Declaration is the flagship instrument of this liberal-
ization of Latin American asylum governance. In 1984, state represent-
atives met in Cartagena, Colombia, to discuss workable solutions to the 
contemporary Central American refugee crisis. The Cartagena refugee 
definition, formulated as a result of that meeting, extended protection 
to “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or 
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggres-
sion, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other cir-
cumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. Regional 
action plans and declarations further supplemented these developments: 
the 1994 San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons, the 
2004 Mexico Plan of Action, and the 2010 Brasilia Declaration on the 
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in the Americas. To this day, 
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most South American countries have included the expanded definition 
of refugee from the Cartagena Declaration into their national laws (Mar-
cogliese, 2019), alongside a human rights-centred approach to refugee 
protection.
Recently, Freier and Gauci (2020) have compared Latin American 
refugee laws to EU protection standards, based on the legislative good 
practices that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) identified in Latin America. They found that six Latin 
American countries - Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
and Mexico - surpass EU protection standards. Overall, Latin American 
laws are especially progressive regarding the scope of protection and the 
socio-economic integration of both asylum seekers and refugees. In South 
America, Brazil and Argentina offer interesting cases, as the constitutions 
of both countries include the right to asylum (Marcogliese, 2019). Brazil 
was the first South American country to adopt a ‘progressive’ approach to 
refugee protection in 1997, via Law No. 9,474. Argentina approved Law 
No. 26,165 in 2006.
Both of these laws not only adopt the ‘expanded’ refugee definition of 
Cartagena, but also extend the same rights of nationals to refugees, except 
the right to vote in national elections (Marcogliese, 2019). Furthermore, 
the Argentinian law is exceptional (Freier and Gauci, 2020) in that it stip-
ulates a) that asylum-seekers are protected by the principle of non-re-
foulement from the moment they are subject to the country’s authority, 
even outside its territory, b) group determination of refugee status in case 
of a mass influx of asylum-seekers, and c) that authorities will take into 
account the needs and the cultural values of the applicant when consid-
ering requests for family reunification. Both countries provide the possi-
bility to grant humanitarian visas, as well as pathways to legal status, for 
victims of environmental disasters (Freier and Gauci, 2020). They also 
grant both refugees and asylum seekers the right to work, call for a swift 
accreditation of foreign degrees, and offer full access to public healthcare 
and education.
Freier and Gauci (2020) suggest that the EU should look to Latin 
America regarding the expanded Cartagena definition of refugee, the 
principle of non-refoulement, and strengthening socio-economic and 
political integration of asylum seekers and refugees. In both regions, 
recent ‘migration’ or ‘refugee’ crises have challenged each country’s 
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capacity to deal with larger inflows of asylum seekers and migrants in 
need of protection. Indeed, Venezuelan forced displacement has posed 
the first real test to Latin America’s progressive refugee legislation.
12.3. De facto protection through the regional mobility 
regime
Since 2017, when emigration from Venezuela increased dramatically, 
South American countries started to debate the adequacy of governance 
tools to manage these flows. Two contentious issues emerged. The first 
was the question of whether Venezuelans should be considered migrants 
or refugees, as there was no regional consensus on whether or not to 
extend refugee status prima facie to them based on the Cartagena defini-
tion of refugee. Both academics and UNHCR called for the recognition 
of the majority of Venezuelans as refugees (Freier, 2018; UNHCR, 2019), 
and the applicability of Cartagena recognized by many policy-makers 
in private conversations (Freier, 2018). Thus far, only Brazil and Mexico 
have applied the Cartagena refugee definition to a significant number of 
Venezuelan asylum seekers (Blouin et al., 2020).
The second issue was that Venezuela was the only country that had 
not ratified the Residence Agreement (RAM) of the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) (Acuerdo Sobre Residencia Para Nacionales de Los 
Estados Partes Del Mercosur, Bolivia y Chile, 2002), which could poten-
tially give legal migratory status to most Venezuelans living in other 
South American countries. Even though the legal status of Venezue-
lans and the protection of their basic rights had been discussed in many 
regional meetings since 2017 (Freier and Parent, 2019), South American 
countries could not agree on the application of a common approach to 
deal with this crisis. Most South American countries decided to adopt 
diverse ad hoc measures, such as temporary visas and border mobility 
cards (Acosta et al., 2019). Only Argentina and Uruguay decided to uni-
laterally apply the RAM to Venezuelans.
The RAM was signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2009. All 
South American countries, except for Venezuela, have ratified it. The 
RAM is regarded as a milestone in regional migration governance in 
South America, as it is a central part of the regional regime that facili-
tates the movement of persons within South America, promoted by the 
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two main regional organizations: the Andean Community (CAN) and 
MERCOSUR (Brumat, 2020). The RAM creates a free residence regime 
that focuses on equal treatment, socio-economic inclusion and regulari-
sation. The RAM provides the right of residence for up to two years, after 
which migrants can apply for permanent residence after proving a ‘lawful 
source of livelihood’ (Article 5 of the RAM), independent of the legal 
status and economic situation of the person and whether migration was 
‘voluntary’ or ‘forced.’ Thus, the regular vs. irregular status of migrants 
is not paramount for migrants’ access to rights and regularisation. This 
constitutes a fundamental difference with the EU Pact, which is centred 
on the ‘control’ and ‘return’ of irregular migrants (European Commis-
sion, 2020).
Both temporary and permanent residence permits guarantee a wide 
set of rights that could work as de facto protection. These rights include 
treatment equal to that of nationals, civil rights equality, family reunifi-
cation, the right to send remittances, and special rights for children born 
in one of the Member States (including access to education) (Articles 7 
and 9 of the RAM). This means that the RAM can be used for granting 
residence rights to refugees as an alternative to formal refugee protection. 
As the Argentine example shows, more than 200,000 Venezuelans have 
already obtained the right to residence in Argentina though the RAM in 
the last four years (UNHCR and IOM, 2020).
In addition, the human rights approach to migration adopted by the 
South American Conference on Migration (SACM) needs to be high-
lighted. Countries across the region have committed themselves to 
avoid deportations of nationals of other Member States (X Conferencia 
Sudamericana Sobre Migraciones. “Avanzando Hacia Una Ciudadanía 
Sudamericana”. Acta de Acuerdos y Compromisos Asumidos, 2010), 
alongside relatively easily accessible bureaucratic procedures and docu-
mentation for obtaining legal residence (Brumat, 2020). The underlying 
logic of this mobility regime is that, as migration is an ‘inevitable’ phe-
nomenon, people will keep crossing borders (Brumat and Acosta, 2019). 
Consequently, the solution to irregularity is regularisation, not depor-
tation. While scholars have pointed out structural implementation gaps 
between South American rights-based migration and refugee legislation 
(Cantor et al., 2015), and protection gaps for extra-regional nationals 
(Acosta and Freier, 2015), the mobility regime offers room for creative 
alternative approaches to protection, and allows civil society across the 
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region to insist on its implementation and the protection for all.
12.4. Conclusion: Lessons from the South
South America presents an interesting case that could offer some lessons 
for other world regions. Unlike Europe, its regional refugee regime does 
not create ‘external borders’, so there is no need to enforce them, in sharp 
contrast with the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. At the same 
time, the South American intra-regional regime works in at least two 
different, and sometimes contradictory, ways. On the one hand, legisla-
tion - the formal dual regime - is exceptionally progressive with a view 
to the expanded refugee definition of Cartagena and the socio-economic 
integration of both asylum-seekers and refugees, but also of intra-re-
gional migrants. For example, across the region, Venezuelans can work 
as soon as they arrive in most host countries, regardless of their status 
as economic migrants, asylum seekers or refugees (Freier, 2019). Given 
the largely informal character of South American labour markets, even 
irregular migrants start working as soon as they arrive in their destina-
tion country, and in some countries such as Argentina, their labour rights 
are protected.
On the other hand, formal refugee legislation coexists with different 
policy practices, some of which are restrictive and violate the interna-
tional obligations that these countries have, while others offer alternative 
protection for refugees. For example, most South American borders have 
remained open to legal Venezuelan immigration despite the large scale 
of this displacement. Other countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, have 
limited legal entry for domestic political reasons (Freier and Castillo Jara, 
2020). In either case, there is regional awareness that borders are porous 
and that it is not possible to stop people from migrating (Brumat, 2020). 
Following this logic, even for countries that have seen recent restrictive 
policy shifts towards Venezuelan immigration, the solution to irregular 
arrivals is not deportation, but regularisation.
South American countries have opted for migrant regularisation, not 
only because of an ideological paradigm shift, which led States to increas-
ingly follow a human, or migrant’ rights- based approach in the past 20 
years (Cantor et al., 2015), but also because of pragmatic reasons (Brumat, 
2020). A regularised migrant population is easier to integrate into society 
and the formal economy, which benefits the state, especially in the case 
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of highly skilled migrants. Migrant regularisation is also paramount from 
a public health approach, especially in times of Covid-19 (Freier, 2020). 
Although there are significant intra-regional differences and increasing 
resistance to regularisation due to the large scale of Venezuelan displace-
ment in some countries, overall this stands in opposition to the logic that 
prevails in the EU. As seen in the recent Pact, its underlying logic is set on 
blocking the arrival of those who seek protection (Carrera, 2020).
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13. Building Resilience in Strained 
Refugee-Hosting States? The EU in 
The Face of Lebanon’s Cumulative 
Crises
Tamirace Fakhoury
13.1 Introduction: Setting the context
The European Union’s Southern Neighbourhood has gone through major 
upheavals in recent years. Revolutionary episodes and their spillovers 
have instigated a heated debate about the EU’s ability to find solutions for 
the regional root causes of conflict and dispossession (Huber, 2020). Dis-
placement from Syria has emerged as “one of the largest, most complex 
and protracted humanitarian emergencies today” (Knudsen, 2020). 
Syria’s neighbouring polities (namely Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey) have 
taken in more than six million displaced Syrians. In this context, they 
have evolved into key hosting states in the international refugee regime 
even though they officially declare themselves to be no-asylum countries.
Within this climate, the EU’s refugee diplomacy has consisted of 
boosting these countries’ abilities to host refugees while governing the 
challenge of displacement from a distance (Fakhoury, 2019b). To this 
end, it has provided regional host states with financial incentives and 
partnerships that would prompt them to host refugees while equipping 
them with protection tools. Under the motto of resilience-building, the 
EU’s approach has emphasized the need to synchronize cooperation and 
migration management with development (Fakhoury, 2019a). In this 
vein, the refugee challenge would evolve into a development opportunity 
for both host and refugee communities. The EU’s key policy instruments, 
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ranging from the European Neighbourhood Policy to more tailored 
instruments such as the Compacts, stress the importance of reinforcing 
the ability of both refugee and host communities to bounce back in 
the context of adversities and shocks (European Commission, 2015; 
European Economic and Social Committee, 2016). At the same time, in 
light of divisions over burden-sharing and given the limited resettlement 
opportunities that refugees have had, the EU has sought to embed resil-
ience-building in the countries of first arrival within a broader politics of 
regional containment (Anholt and Sinatti, 2019).
13.2 The EU’s regional approach in the context of 
displacement from Syria
Insofar as the EU’s Southern neighbourhood is concerned, the EU’s New 
Pact on Migration and Mobility offers no novel perspective (European 
Commission, 2020). It is to be read in the context of the EU’s approach 
of consolidating regional stabilization and resilience while governing 
migration from afar. In this light, the New Pact builds on the EU’s reper-
toire of policy tools that turn migration management into a key pillar for 
shaping neighbouring regions (Bialasiewicz et al., 2013). With the arrival 
of more than one million Syrians to Europe by 2015, the EU devised new 
partnership frameworks with third countries on migration, including 
Syria’s neighbouring host states. One of these partnership pillars is to 
design ‘comprehensive partnerships’ that leverage the EU’s funding power 
in sectors such as development and trade (European Economic and 
Social Committee, 2016). ‘Positive incentives’ revolve around providing 
financial arrangements, equipping host states with a toolbox of capaci-
ty-building programs, and devising trade facilitation schemes (European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2016). In return, host states would be 
encouraged to improve the integration of refugees into their societies 
and labour markets (European Economic and Social Committee, 2016). 
The EU-Turkey refugee deal and the EU-Jordan compact are cases in 
point (Corrao, 2019; European Commission, 2016a). According to the 
EU, these policy instruments twin development, refugee protection and 
stabilization. In other words, they aim to strengthen the capacity of local 
refugee protection regimes while fostering the resilience of refugees and 
providing them with solutions close to their countries of origin.
Still, as many analysts argue, this approach has yielded complex conse-
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quences. First, these partnership tools cater to the EU’s logic of externali-
sation. In line with the logic of containing migration, they offer avenues to 
discourage the departure of potential asylum seekers to Europe. Secondly, 
by devising package instruments that cater to the mutual interests of the 
EU and partner governments in areas such as trade or border manage-
ment, they turn refugee hosting states into co-partners in migration 
management. Not surprisingly, these policy scripts have various backlash 
effects. Through this policy lens, the EU seeks to ‘construct’ Syria’s neigh-
bours into first asylum countries although they have always been transit 
countries that have refused to provide durable solutions to the displaced. 
Historically, such countries have looked at refugeeness through the 
lens of temporary hospitality and guesthood. In key junctures of displace-
ment, they have opened their borders only to close them as displacement 
evolved into a protracted refugee challenge (Yayha and Muasher, 2019; 
Fakhoury, 2018). They have furthermore buttressed ‘local closures’ in the 
face of displaced individuals such as curfews, mobility restrictions and 
confinement in settlements and camps, affirming and reaffirming the 
narrative that they are no destination for those seeking refuge (Mourad 
2020). 
Lebanon provides a key case for understanding how the EU’s regional 
refugee approach has led to contestation and incoherence (Del Sarto 
and Tholens, 2020). Seen in this light, the EU’s goal of reconciling resil-
ience-building has had an uneasy relationship with the pragmatic goal of 
deterring asylum. It has also encroached on rights-based refugee human-
itarianism (Lavenex and Fakhoury, n.d.).
13.3 Lebanon and the EU: Clashing logics?
Lebanon has been a key site for widespread displacement from Syria since 
2011, and the EU has been the main funding power that has provided 
refugee aid since then. The country is not a signatory to the 1951 Con-
vention. Still, since 2011, in a context of divided bureaucracies and elite 
cartels, it has hosted more than one million Syrian refugees (Fakhoury, 
2020). At the beginning of the conflict, the Lebanese government adopted 
a loose policy of border regulation. Soon, however, a securitized politics 
of refugee containment superseded the open-border approach. In 2015, 
the government ordered the borders to be shut down except for human-
itarian cases. It also asked the UN Refugee Agency to stop registering 
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refugees. 
In the last years, Lebanon has witnessed an acute securitization of 
the refugee question. Politicians have portrayed refugees as security and 
economic threats, and mostly as threats to Lebanon’s sectarian pow-
er-sharing arrangement which rests on safeguarding the balance of power 
between Christians and Muslims. As soon as the Syrian regime re-estab-
lished its authority on Syrian soil, various political parties began con-
tinually lobbying the international community for Syrian refugee return, 
stressing Lebanon’s overstretched capacity. Municipalities and security 
forces have enforced practices that have significantly restricted Syrians’ 
access to legal residency, employment and housing and have reduced 
their livelihood opportunities (Medina, 2020). 
Municipalities have enforced illegal curfews that have limited refugee 
mobility especially in times of Covid-19 (Chehayeb and Sewell, 2020). 
Armed forces have also demolished refugee shelters in the name of envi-
ronmental violations even though displaced individuals have increasingly 
been unable to afford decent housing (Human Rights Watch, 2019a). 
Moreover, security forces have intensified their crackdowns on Syrians 
who have worked in the informal labour market. This has occurred 
although the Lebanese government has made it almost impossible for 
Syrians to obtain legal labour permits. In parallel, the political elite have 
scaled up calls for refugee repatriation (Fakhoury and Ozkul, 2019). In 
coordination with Syrian authorities, the government has moreover been 
processing applications for return. 
In a nutshell, Lebanon’s asylum policy has increasingly consisted of 
making it unbearable for refugees to stay. Lebanese General Security has 
reported that about 170,000 Syrians have voluntarily returned to Syria – 
although the numbers are contested (Human Rights Watch 2019b). Still, 
researchers have cautioned against these so-called voluntary returns. 
Push factors such as recurrent evictions, denial of rights and margin-
alization from access to services have coerced Syrians into searching for 
alternative options (Mhaissen and Hodges, 2019).
Against this background, Lebanon’s realities have been at odds 
with the EU’s proclaimed resilience-building approach. Since the onset 
of refugee flight from Syria, the EU has upscaled its cooperation with 
Lebanon, framed in the EU’s key policy instruments as a prioritized host 
country. It has also embarked on a series of cooperative dialogues with 
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Lebanon’s successive governments in the search for mutual benefits as 
to how Lebanon and the EU could benefit from regional refugee coop-
eration. The EU and Lebanon’s governing powers have thus discussed 
support to security reform, governance, development and trade in the 
context of the refugee challenge. In 2016, in the framework of the London 
Conference for Supporting Syria and the Region, the EU and Lebanon 
signed the so-called Lebanon Compact (European Commission, 2016b).
Vague and less ambitious than the EU-Jordan compact, the compact 
promises to explore avenues for facilitating the temporary inclusion of 
Syrian refugees and their integration into the job market (Howden et al., 
2017; EU-Lebanon Association Council, 2016). Nonetheless, it affirms the 
primacy of Lebanon’s sovereignty and labour laws (EU-Lebanon Associ-
ation Council, 2016). In the context of the four Brussels conferences that 
the EU has co-hosted since 2017, Lebanon and the EU have spelled out 
respective commitments in view of boosting refugee inclusion. Objectives 
such as facilitating refugee documentation procedures, allowing refugees 
to work in restricted sectors and facilitating their access to education and 
health as well as registering Syrian children born on Lebanese soil arise 
as key projected outcomes of this cooperation.
Cooperation has however been a bumpy ride and spelled out com-
mitments on the part of the Lebanese government have turned out to be 
aspirational. In practice, despite the EU’s funding power and its palette 
of positive incentives, Lebanon has increasingly securitized its approach 
towards refugees, and turned a blind eye to the EU’s rhetoric of resil-
ience-building. Today, according to UNHCR, more than 70% of surveyed 
Syrians do not hold a legal permit (UNHCR, 2019). Furthermore, the 
number of job permits for Syrians that have been issued have remained 
extremely limited (Howden et al., 2017). Soon enough it has become 
clear that the EU’s search for refugee solutions on Lebanese soil and its 
quest for building resilience for both host and refugee communities hold 
no achievable outcomes. Here, several factors come into play.
The EU’s refugee approach which seeks to entice Lebanon to facili-
tate refugee inclusion and to foster refugee resilience, has been at odds 
with Lebanon’s geopolitics of asylum (Fakhoury, 2020). It is true that the 
EU was able to inspire a conversation on improving refugee inclusion in 
policy spheres. As underscored, with the adoption of the 2016 Compact 
which promised funding in return for the Lebanese government relaxing 
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measures vis-à-vis Syrians’ temporary stay, the government pledged to 
deliver on some reforms. In 2017, it announced its decision to waive the 
USD 200 refugee residency fee enabling Syrian refugees to renew their 
legal stay. These commitments turned out to be fleeting rhetoric. 
In the last years, soft conflicts between Lebanese officials and their 
EU counterparts have increased. Some Lebanese politicians have started 
calling on the EU to divert funds from Lebanon to Syria in the hope of 
incentivizing refugees to go home. Still the EU has renewed its willing-
ness to support Lebanon’s recovery in the context of the refugee challenge. 
Also, as Lebanese officials started lobbying for rash refugee repatriation, 
the EU has reiterated on various occasions that conditions for return 
are still not favourable, and that it proposes instead as a temporary 
solution “resilience-building” through humanitarian and development 
aid (Fleyhane, 2017). In return, key governing powers have insisted 
that Lebanon is no country of asylum and that the massive strains that 
Lebanon is exposed to will most likely backfire on Lebanon and the EU 
(Hall, 2019). More precisely, they will trigger refugee waves to Europe 
and destabilize the polity reeling from the weight of so many burdens. 
In this light, various Lebanese politicians have criticized the EU’s 
so-called politics of resilience-building where refugees are, framing it 
instead as a politics of deterrence (Fakhoury, 2018). They have also crit-
icized unbalanced burden-sharing in the international refugee regime. 
These clashes have not remained pure rhetorical divergences. They have 
had consequences for refugees’ lived realities and rights. As the EU and 
Lebanon have diverged on their search for refugee solutions, a logic of 
crisis governance has prevailed (Fine et al., 2020). This logic has privi-
leged quick fixes that remained disconnected from local perceptions and 
practices.
From yet another complex perspective, the EU’s refugee diplomacy 
in Lebanon has remained detached from an engagement with Lebanon’s 
divided allegiances vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict and the domestic polar-
ities that the issue of displacement has brought along (Fakhoury, 2020). 
Ever since Syria’s lethal conflict erupted, Lebanese governing powers 
have held divergent positions vis-à-vis Syria’s war and the refugee issue. 
In the context of Syria’s war, some Lebanese factions have backed the 
Syrian regime in the face of its rivals. Others have viewed the conflict 
as an opportunity to weaken Syria’s control in Lebanon. Amid domestic 
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tensions, most political factions have started portraying the extended 
stay of Syrian refugees, who are mostly Sunni, as a threat to Lebanon’s 
system of sectarian power-sharing. 
In this setting, the issue of Syrian refugee stay and return has become 
tightly enmeshed with Lebanese politicians’ geostrategic interests 
(Fakhoury, 2020). Some political executives who are staunch allies of 
the Syrian regime hoped that, by advocating for Syrian refugee return, 
they would contribute to restoring the legitimacy of Bashar-al-Assad’s 
rule. Within this climate, the EU’s ‘resilience-building’ approach has been 
moulded by the complex geopolitics of Lebanese Syrian relations, and its 
policy pleas for improving refugee inclusion have remained mere ink on 
paper (Lavenex and Fakhoury, forthcoming).
13.4 Overlapping crises
In October 2019, a massive protest wave broke out in Lebanon. The protest 
wave which started in the wake of a proposed WhatsApp tax, called for 
overthrowing Lebanon’s political leaders and changing the country’s 
sectarian-based model of politics which promotes patronage, corrup-
tion, and inept governance. The protests, which happened on the heels 
of a worsening financial crash where both refugees and host communi-
ties found themselves on the verge of destitution, have called the EU to 
rethink its politics of resilience-building. Since then, the Lebanese pound 
has lost 80% percent of its value, and about 50% of Lebanese citizens have 
been classified as poor by the Ministry of Social Affairs. UNHCR has 
recently announced as well that because of Lebanon’s economic crisis - 
further compounded by the global pandemic - more than 75% of Syrian 
refugees have fallen below the poverty line in contrast to 50% in 2019 
(Khoder, 2020). 
Here, it is no exaggeration to say that the rhetoric of resilience-building 
has not been backed by facts. It is also necessary to question the extent 
to which it has been beneficiary-led and to explore what factors have 
thwarted its proclaimed objectives. In this context, refugees have been 
thrown into more precarity, and signs of dissatisfaction and despair 
amongst them have become strikingly visible in the last months. Back 
in December 2019, some refugees started staging a sit-in at the UNHCR 
in Tripoli, protesting shrinking funds and precarious trajectories 
(Sewell, 2020). In the wake of the Beirut Blasts on 4 August 2020, Syrian 
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refugees began embarking on dangerous journeys in the Mediterranean 
(AlBawaba, 2020).
13.5 Concluding remarks and the way forward: 
Resilience-building as a cautionary tale?
Against this backdrop of cumulative crises, the gap between the EU’s 
“resilience-building” rhetoric and policy outcomes on the ground has 
widened by the day. Following the state’s recent failings, the EU has vowed 
to rethink its politics of cooperation with Lebanon’s authorities (Apelblat, 
2020). It has multiplied its calls for reforms and announced that an inter-
nationally backed economic rescue plan will be tied to conditionalities 
necessitating the Lebanese government begin imminent reforms. Still, 
the EU finds itself grappling with various dilemmas in the wake of both a 
grassroots movement of contestation and a massive blast that have com-
pletely discredited the political establishment. One important dilemma 
is cooperation with Lebanon’s governing powers over Syria’s protracted 
refugee challenge. 
In the last years, the EU has developed an approach of principled 
pragmatism, favouring stabilization, and dialogue with Middle East and 
North African (MENA) governments despite their questionable track 
record on human rights. It has thus sought close cooperation with the 
Lebanese government notwithstanding the government’s complex record 
on refugee rights. Still, with the latest episode of collapse, civil society 
organizations and activists have called for tracking international and EU 
aid and their outputs:1 They have also called on the EU and its Member 
States to halt its cooperation with governing powers and to reconfigure 
its architecture of aid in the small state. In this regard, the EU’s pragmatic 
refugee diplomacy with Lebanon’s government - despite its bad record 
of public services, rule of law and accountability - has come under fierce 
criticism.
Against this background, the implosion of Lebanon’s social contract 
and the deterioration of refugee rights spell out colossal challenges for 
the EU’s external policy. Firstly, how can the EU build on Lebanon’s 
overlapping crises to develop an external policy that is more attuned to 
people’s and refugees’ aspirations? And how can its funding power have 
1  Authors’ conversations with activists 2019-2020.
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more tangible effects on improving the livelihoods and rights of both 
refugee and host communities? Finally, what are the implications and 
risks of cooperating with host governments and economies in which 
social contracts are imploding?
In Lebanon, the current social contract between the government and 
its citizens as well as its non-citizens does not hold anymore (Collard, 
2020). As it falls apart, refugees are mired in a complex struggle (El-Taliawi 
and Fakhoury, 2020). A resilience-building approach built on compre-
hensive policy partnerships is more likely to produce severe backlash 
effects as far as vulnerable communities are concerned, when the roots of 
vulnerability are not duly tackled, and when ‘resilience-building’ remains 
disconnected from an underlying protection environment. Lebanon’s 
successive crises, ranging from the financial crash to the Beirut Blasts, 
have broader insights to convey. It cautions the EU against the perils 
of cooperation, and mutual partnerships with third countries when an 
underlying ‘rights-based environment’ and legal remedies for refugees 
remain absent. It also cautions against glorifying resiliency humanitari-
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14. South America and The Cartagena 
Regime: A Comprehensive Approach 
to Forced Migration Responses
Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues
14.1 Introduction 
Latin America has developed a specific regional regime for refugees. 
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (UNHCR, 1984) had set 
a landmark recommendation to all countries in the region: the need to 
amplify the Geneva Convention of 1951’s refugee definition to incorporate 
human rights mass violations as the “sixth reason” for the refugee deter-
mination process. Starting from this bedrock conceptual framework, the 
Cartagena Regime evolved and included other innovative ways regarding 
protection and solutions for refugees in the last 35 years. Particularly 
in South America, there has been a comprehensive approach to forced 
migration responses with lessons learned that could be useful for com-
parative studies and policy debates, including those regarding the new 
European Union 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum (European 
Commission, 2020).
14.2 The cartagena regime
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is a non-governmental 
document approved by academics and UNHCR officials in a Colloquium 
held in Cartagena de las Indias, Colombia, in November 1984. The 
document addressed a refugee crisis within a critical situation in Latin 
America at that point. Civil wars, international interventions and massive 
human rights violations in Central America were producing hundreds of 
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thousands of refugees. Neighbourhood host countries had no legal pro-
visions to recognize those people under the 1951 Refugee Convention’ 
standards.
Gradually, with UNHCR regional support as well as NGO actions, 
Latin American countries began introducing the ‘massive violations of 
human rights’ clause (which may encompass situations such as author-
itarian regimes, humanitarian crises and civil wars) in their national 
legislations. The new conceptual framework enlarging the Geneva Con-
vention of 1951 definition was adopted voluntarily by each country thus 
transforming the 1984 Cartagena Declaration into an affective regional 
soft law. The Cartagena Regime (Jubilut, Espinoza, Mezzanotti, 2020) 
became much more complex and comprehensive than its starting point, 
including protection and durable solutions’ regional mechanisms that 
have been developed in its 35 years of existence.
A political commitment by the majority of the countries in the 
Americas, in partnership with UNHCR, has defined a political agreement 
to organize a summit every ten years in order to evaluate and update 
the Cartagena Regime (Cartagena +). Thus, it has now four declarations 
(1984, 1994, 2004 and 2014) and two plans of actions (2004 and 2014) 
comprising the content of the regional regime, 1 which includes protec-
tion and durable solutions mechanisms, some of them unique (UNHCR, 
2014).
14.3 The cartagena regime and the global compact on 
refugees
The importance of regional and subregional approaches was valued by the 
Global Compact on Refugees (UN, 2018) in its item 2.3, where it states 
that “Comprehensive responses will also build on existing regional and 
subregional initiatives for refugee protection and durable solutions where 
available and appropriate, including regional and subregional resettle-
ment initiatives…”. This is exactly what the Cartagena Regime, in its 35 
years of existence, represents, encompassing a broad policy framework 
(not binding, as explained above) that includes protection and durable 
solutions for intra-regional and extra-regional situations.
1  For reference by year, see: 1984, https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_
on_refugees.pdf; 1994, https://www.refworld.org/publisher,RRI,,,4a54bc3fd,0.html; 
2004, https://www.refworld.org/publisher,RRI,,,424bf6914,0.html; 2014, https://www.
unhcr.org/brazil-declaration.html. 
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14.4 Contemporary refugee and migration laws in South 
America
South American countries have embraced the international refugee 
regime through their recognition of the 1951 Geneva Convention and 
1967 Protocol. As part of their national regulatory process, refugee laws 
were approved based on the general International Refugee Law but also 
based on the Cartagena Regime. Table 1 shows Mercosur countries 
regarding their status to both international and domestic norms.
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Refugee laws are necessarily connected to general migration laws, 
which regulates the status of migrants vis-à-vis their rights, including 
residence, acquisition of nationality and other important issues regarding 
human rights of migrants. Table 2 shows how migration laws in Mercosur 
countries evolved from a national security focus to a human rights focus 
over the last twenty years.
Table 2 – Mercosur countries’ migrations laws – general focus
Mercosur 
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Adapted by Rodrigues and Silva, 2018
The intersection between refugee laws and migration laws in South 
America (particularly in Mercosur countries) allows asylum seekers to 
apply for other alternatives for provisional or permanent residence when 
they have their asylum applications refused by national authorities. 
However, those complementary protection instruments are relatively 
new and their implementation has been affected by a high level of discre-
tionary power and also by restrictions imposed by regressive administra-
tive regulations which in many cases have reduced the ground of human 
rights protection granted by the law as well as by the Cartagena Regime.
Yet, it should be made clear that since 2017 new right and far-
right-wing governments in South America have managed migration 
issues with a security, nationalist approach, which has led to violations 
of Refugee Law (Jubilut et al., 2019). Through executive decrees and/
or ordinances either Argentina (Macri’s government, 2017-2020) and 
Brazil (Bolsonaro’s government, 2019-present), to mention two major 
Mercosur countries, have tried to control borders, criminalize migrants 
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and downplay human rights standards of their laws regarding refugees 
and migrants. But in many cases courts have been provoked to intervene 
and suspend those illegal acts, such as the Brazil’s Ministry of Justice 
ordinance n. 666 (Alarcón, Rodrigues, 2019), which illegality was recog-
nized even by an atypical Brazil’s UNHCR Office declaration (Brasil247, 
2019), and was contested in the Supreme Federal Court (STF, 2019).
14.5 The context of forced migration in the region
It is important to contextualize the forced migration challenges that Latin 
America and the Caribbean region have faced in the last twenty years. 
The Colombian war and violence committed by the Colombian Army, 
paramilitary forces and guerrillas are still ongoing, despite the 2016 Peace 
Agreement between Colombia Government and the Colombian Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces (FARC), a process that led the Nobel Committee 
to award Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos with the 2016 Nobel 
Peace Prize (The Nobel Prize, 2016).
In Central America, the North Triangle composed of El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras has confronted long-term structural violence, 
aggravated by civil wars and the emergence of Maras, violent urban 
gangs. Those problems have produced long-term massive waves of forced 
displacement in the region.
In the Caribbean, Haiti became a top international security priority 
followed by the approval of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (2004–2017),2 which was mainly coordinated by South American 
countries, particularly Brazil, Chile and Argentina. In 2010, a huge earth-
quake partially devastated the island and produced a massive flux of 
forced migrants mainly to South America.
Finally, the political, economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela 
(Rodrigues, 2018) has produced a massive migration flux since 2016 
with a huge impact on South American countries, especially Colombia 
and Brazil. According to 2020 UNHCR figures, Venezuela is the second 
highest country source with 3.7 million (refugees + displaced abroad).3
From outside the region, despite its distance, the Syrian war has 
2  For more on the United Nations Stabilization Missions, see: https://peacekeeping.un-
.org/en/mission/minustah. 
3  For more data, see: https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html. 
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also impacted the region, as the Syrian community is strong in many 
South American countries, which favoured reception and governmental 
policies to receive them in a timely manner.
14.6 Open borders as a regional policy in South America
South America had a traumatic experience with borders of confronta-
tion during the Cold War, in which national security doctrines played a 
central role in shaping international mobility as a national security issue. 
Military regimes agreed to cooperate in controlling their borders against 
the so-called subversives (those persecuted for political reasons), and also 
secretly exchange detainees who were then victims of forced disappear-
ances through the horrible Operation Condor (Tremlett, 2020).
The re-democratization process in the 1980s brought a new era of 
human rights protection and border management in South America. 
New cooperation between Argentina and Brazil led to bilateral com-
mitments in the late 1980s and soon after that to Mercosur in 1991 
(Mercosur, 2020), built under borders of cooperation frameworks. Even 
policies of combating organized crime (especially narcotraffic) and its 
re-securitization measures adopted by many countries beginning in the 
1990s - also deepened by 9/11 antiterrorist security outcomes - were 
not determinant in changing the pattern of open borders for receiving 
forced migrants. The 2004 Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action estab-
lished the concept of solidarity borders, calling governments to keep their 
borders open to receive forced migrants. This was particularly important 
in South America with the Colombian conflict (Ecuador and Venezuela’s 
borders with Colombia); and more recently with the Venezuelan conflict 
(Colombia and Brazil’s borders with Venezuela). However, the Covid-19 
pandemic has changed border control due to emergency sanitation norms 
restricting entry to foreigners without permanent residence permission.
14.7 Non-refoulement principle and legal limits to 
deportation
Non-refoulement is a bedrock principle of International Refugee Law 
entrenched in all national refugee laws in South America. This principle 
goes beyond refugee laws themselves and links migration laws limiting 
163Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues
the possibility of deportations of non- recognized refugees who could be 
in danger if deported. Table 3 shows how Mercosur migration laws deal 
with this issue.
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14.8 Humanitarian visas and qualifications: their role and 
limits
Humanitarian visas are a complementary form of protection, which 
“grant legal status to people who are not recognized as refugees under the 
Geneva Refugee Convention, or the Cartagena Declaration, but whose 
return is contrary to States’ obligations to the principle of non-refoule-
ment” (Freier and Gauci, 2020).
In 2012, they were applied to Haitians as part of an accommodation 
process regarding Brazil’s CONARE decision which did not recognize 
them as refugees. Assuming their vulnerable condition and the impossi-
bility to repatriate them to Haiti (due to the critical situation the country 
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has confronted since its 2010 earthquake), Brazil’s National Immigration 
Council (CNIg) conferred Haitians humanitarian visas, recognizing their 
vulnerable situation, allowing them provisional residence permission, 
which was later converted to a permanent one for most of them under 
some conditions.
After the humanitarian visa solution for Haitians, Brazil’s government 
applied a similar measure for Syrians in 2013. The aim was to accelerate 
the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) for Syrians settled in a first 
host country. Through a fast track procedure visas and qualifications for 
Syrians (Rodrigues et al., 2017) were, in fact, part of Brazil’s commitment 
to contribute to share the burden of the Syrian crisis that had begun in 
2011.
UNHCR celebrated the legal alternative of humanitarian visas as a 
complementary protection in line with UNHCR standards. The 2014 
Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action stressed that possibility. Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela migration laws included provisions 
related to that, either for entry or residence permissions. Nevertheless, 
some experts, such as Laura Madrid Sartoretto and Diego Arcarazo 
(2020), Giuliana Redin (2020), and myself as well, see this kind of com-
plementary protection as a possible lack of political will to support 
Refugee Status Determination (RSD) based on the broad Cartagena defi-
nition, due to less responsibilities the state assumes with those humani-
tarian migrants.
14.9 South-South cooperation and extra-regional 
resettlement
Extra-regional and intra-regional resettlement was part of the South-
South cooperation South America countries implemented since 2005 
and based on the resettlement in solidarity of the 2004 Mexico Decla-
ration and Plan of Action (also included in the 2014 Brazil Declaration 
and Plan of Action). In this regard, Palestinians were resettled (Espinoza, 
2017), but in a limited way. The same happened with Syrians, who could 
have benefited from assistance from Syrian communities in many South 
American countries, yet were limited due to the distance from their 
origin.
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Intra-regional resettlement was implemented in Latin America 
in 2005, based on the Solidarity Resettlement Program, which was 
“designed as a protection tool and a durable solution for Latin American 
refugees (primarily of Colombian origin) who faced risks in neigh-
bouring countries”. The Program was also “a mechanism for international 
solidarity and responsibility sharing among the region’s states, seeking to 
bring relief to those countries hosting the greatest number of refugees” 
(Marcogliese, 2017). Between 2005 and 2014, around 1.151 refugees, 
mainly Colombians, who were settled in Ecuador and Costa Rica were 
resettled to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.
14.10 Venezuelans and prima facie RDS by Brazil’s 
CONARE
Another important protection measure that was provided for the first time 
in Latin America was Brazil’s decision to recognize prima facie thousands 
of Venezuelans (ACNUR, 2020), based on the “human rights massive 
violations” clause therefore eliminating interviews and other procedures 
for the RDS. This decision made by Brazil’s CONARE in December 2019 
(followed by other similar decisions in 2020) is considered by UNHCR 
and many experts one of the most relevant ones regarding protection of 
refugees applied in the region.
Yet criticism on this decision came from many experts, NGOs and 
communities of refugees that saw a political bias in Brazil’s government 
towards President Maduro’s regime. The decision applied to Venezuelans 
could potentially be applied to refugees from other nationalities, but few 
think it will be.
14.11 The Inter-American Human Rights System and the 
Cartagena Regime
The Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) is comprised 
of three bodies: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court H.R.) 
and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IAIHR) (OAS, 2020). 
The first is legally binding for all 34 Organization of America States 
(OAS) members, while the second is binding only for those recognizing 
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its jurisdiction – that means 20 states (including all Mercosur members, 
excepting Venezuela, and the other South American countries – Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). 
The IAHRS has also played an important role in migration and 
human rights in cases regarding arbitrary detention of migrants, violation 
of nationality of migrants, extradition, deportation and expulsion of 
migrants, among others. Due to the fact that almost all South American 
countries recognize the I/A Court H.R, its subsidiary role in connec-
tion to the Cartagena Regime also empowers the intersection between 
migration and human rights in those countries. The I/A Court H.R. 
Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 on “Rights and guarantees of children in 
the context of migration and/or in need of international protection” (I/A 
Court H.R., 2014) is an important example of that.
14.12 Conclusions
The Cartagena Regime has contributed to a comprehensive response 
to forced migration challenges in Latin America in line with the GCR. 
In South America, the 2004 Mexico Declaration concepts of solidarity 
borders, solidarity cities and solidarity resettlement have been applied. 
Complementary protection in the form of humanitarian visas and quali-
fications have been also applied in South America with relative success in 
cases in which the RSD did not recognize forced migrants, although there 
have been limits to their implementation. New right- and far-right wing 
governments have contributed to regressive policies regarding migration 
and a human rights-based approach. The Covid-19 pandemic has affected 
the regular status of open borders and the normalcy of migration law reg-
ulations.
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15. Admissibility, Border Procedures 
and Safe Country Notions
Jens Vedsted-Hansen
15.1 The different meanings of ‘safe country’
Although only mentioned in a couple of places in the New Pact on 
Migration and Asylum issued by the European Commission in September 
2020 (European Commission, 2020a), the perception of certain countries 
as safe for asylum seekers and refugees seems to become increasingly 
important in EU asylum law and policy as the legislative proposals 
accompanying the EU Pact attribute significant weight to ‘safe country’ 
notions in various connections. From these texts it seems clear that the 
notion of safety will become ever more relevant in both of its traditional 
meanings: as a reference to the applicant’s country of origin and as a term 
referring to non-EU countries through which the applicant has transited 
or previously stayed en route to the external border of the European 
Union.
The legal contents and implications of the ‘safe country’ notion differ 
quite significantly between the various legislative instruments, yet its 
cognitive aspects may appear to be far less different. In reality, the notion 
of safety is given meaning through its actual usage in specific procedural 
contexts that may well allude to similar preunderstanding of the notion. 
The following analysis shall illustrate this with a particular focus on 
border procedures and admissibility under the EU Pact and its legislative 
proposals.
The concept safe country of origin relates to the various procedural 
channels through which asylum applications are being examined on 
the merits. Historically, this aspect of the ‘safe country’ notion has been 
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linked to the special procedures for ‘manifestly unfounded applications’ 
or other types of accelerated asylum procedures. Such procedures were 
gradually introduced during the 1980s and 1990s, first with reference 
to the UNHCR Executive Committee (UNHCR, 1983) and later by the 
pre-Maastricht ‘London Resolution’ on Manifestly Unfounded Applica-
tions for Asylum (EC, 1992a) that linked the acceleration of examination 
procedures to the concept ‘safe country of origin’ through the accompa-
nying Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious 
Risk of Persecution (EC, 1992b). The past decades have added to the ‘safe 
country of origin’ standards as well as to the actual implementation of 
these standards.
As opposed to the substantive application of ‘safe countries of 
origin’, the concept safe third country has been increasingly used as an 
admissibility criterion. This was, and still is, the crucial requirement to 
be fulfilled in the implementation of pre-procedure returns of asylum 
seekers from Greek islands to Turkey under the EU-Turkey arrangement 
of March 2016 (European Council, 2016) that is often considered as a 
blueprint (Ineli-Ciger and Ulusoy, 2020) for the ‘protection elsewhere’ 
policies now underway as a more general and far-reaching element in the 
revised CEAS to follow from the EU Pact.
As yet another kind of ‘safe third country’ device employed among 
EU Member States, the principle of ‘mutual trust’ is being systematically 
used as a legal basis for presuming the safety of asylum seekers in other 
Member States, as reflected in the various CEAS instruments and oper-
ationalised in the Dublin Regulation (EU, 2013a). This intra-EU usage 
of the ‘safe country’ notion is not going to be discussed any further here.
15.2 Pre-entry screening at external borders: asylum 
procedure ‘light’?
An overall rationale of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum is the 
need to tackle the changing nature of the migration challenge that pur-
portedly results from the tendency towards mixed migration flows. The 
EU Pact itself posits that mixed flows of refugees and migrants have 
meant ‘increased complexity and an intensified need for coordination 
and solidarity mechanisms’ (p. 3). The Commission elaborates on this 
in the Proposal for a Screening Regulation (European Commission, 
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2020b) by stating that available data demonstrate that the arrival of third-
country nationals with clear international protection needs as observed 
in 2015-2016 has been ‘partly replaced by mixed arrivals of persons’. It is 
therefore, in the Commission’s view, important to develop a new effective 
process allowing for better management of mixed migration flows. In 
particular, it is ‘important to create a tool allowing for the identification, 
at the earliest stage possible, of persons who are unlikely to receive pro-
tection in the EU’ (p. 1).
The proposed Screening Regulation does not include any specific tool 
for that purpose, however. While the pre-entry screening aims to ensure 
swift handling of third-country nationals who request international pro-
tection at border crossing points (recital 7), it seems unclear whether and 
how the outcome of the screening will actually contribute to that aim. 
It therefore has to be analysed in connection with the other legislative 
proposals.
According to Article 14(2) of the Proposal, the authorities conducting 
the screening shall, in the de-briefing form provided for by the Regula-
tion, point to ‘any elements which seem at first sight to be relevant to refer 
the third-country nationals concerned into the accelerated examination 
procedure or the border procedure’ stipulated by the Amended Proposal 
for an Asylum Procedure Regulation (European Commission, 2020c). 
In other words, ‘swift handling’ implies that the pre-entry screening will 
simply be aimed at identifying cases that can be referred to the acceler-
ated or/and border procedures and hence be exempt from the ordinary 
asylum procedure. The latter is supposed to become accessible only for 
those applicants with well-founded claims, as explained in the EU Pact 
(p. 4).
Neither the proposed Screening Regulation nor the annexed standard 
de-briefing form specifies which types of information should be consid-
ered relevant ‘at first sight’ for referral into the various asylum procedures, 
nor is there any stipulation as to how such information is to be collected 
and verified. Against this background it is hard to avoid the impression 
that information may be sought, collected and reported during the pre-
screening at external borders that will de facto become decisive to the 
examination of applicants’ need for protection despite the absence of 
such legal clarity and procedural safeguards.
The mandatory elements of the proposed pre-screening will be health 
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and vulnerability check, identification, security check and registration of 
biometric data as well as filling out of a de-briefing form and ‘referral 
to the appropriate procedure’, i.e. return procedure, accelerated asylum 
procedure or border asylum procedure (Article 6(6), cf. Article 14). 
Accordingly, the standard de-briefing form will include information per-
taining to irregular entry and itinerary such as countries and places of 
previous residence, third countries of transit, modalities of transit and 
assistance provided by facilitators in relation to irregular border crossing 
(Article 13 and Annex).
Some of this information may be indirectly relevant to the substan-
tive examination of the applicants’ need for protection and thus for chan-
nelling cases into accelerated procedures based on their assumed ‘safe 
country of origin’. Nonetheless, it seems safe to assume that the pre-entry 
screening will primarily address issues and facts that may provide the 
basis for considering applications inadmissible on ‘safe third country’ 
grounds. If implemented in close connection with border procedures 
on asylum and return, as foreseen by the EU Pact (p. 4), the pre-entry 
screening seems likely to serve as a device for summary decisions con-
cerning pre-examination return based on inadmissibility grounds as well 
as for the cursory examination and allocation of cases to normal or accel-
erated and/or border asylum procedures.
15.3 Inadmissibility on ‘safe third country’ grounds: 
second layer of border procedures?
While the proposed Screening Regulation can be considered as purely 
procedural and organisational, the 2016 Proposal for an Asylum 
Procedure Regulation (European Commission, 2016) and the Amended 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedure Regulation (European Commission, 
2020c) launched with the EU Pact contain procedural standards based on 
criteria with a certain degree of substantive content. The operation of these 
criteria in the context of border control, however, will depend crucially 
on the organisational arrangements conditioning the implementation of 
the relevant procedures. There is ample evidence that CEAS standards do 
not in reality prevent Member States from acting at variance with EU law 
when exercising border control. Importantly, monitoring and enforce-
ment by the Commission have so far proven insufficient to effectively 
prevent the infringements, as implicitly recognised by the Commission 
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itself in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration (European Commis-
sion, 2015: 12) and in the EU Pact (European Commission, 2020a: 6).
This is to be borne in mind when forecasting the effects on the ground 
of the procedural standards proposed along with the EU Pact. The border 
procedure that will be applicable for the examination of asylum applica-
tions as well as for carrying out return decisions according to the Asylum 
Procedure Regulation (Articles 41 and 41 a of the Amended Proposal) 
may give rise to particular concern in this regard.
One of the key devices in connection with the proposed border 
procedure is the return of asylum seekers on ‘safe third country’ or ‘first 
country of asylum’ grounds. Here we shall focus on the former notion 
that is likely to be the most relevant in practice and the most problem-
atic in principle. While the border procedure as such will be optional for 
Member States in these cases, the application of the admissibility criteria 
will be mandatory under the proposed Asylum Procedure Regulation 
(Article 36). Notably, the requirements for declaring an application inad-
missible without any examination of the need for protection are based on 
the more or less substantiated presumption that a given third country is 
‘safe’ for asylum seekers and refugees.
The 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (EU, 2013b) already lays 
down fairly modest criteria for applying the ‘safe third country’ notion, 
requiring that there is no risk of persecution or serious harm in, and no 
risk of indirect refoulement from, such a country. In addition, there must 
be the possibility to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, 
to receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention (Article 
38). The inadmissibility criteria in the Proposal for an Asylum Procedure 
Regulation (European Commission, 2016) are even weaker as the latter 
requirement will be modified to the effect that the possibility must exist 
to receive protection in accordance with the ‘substantive standards’ of 
the Refugee Convention or ‘sufficient protection’ (Article 45(1)). This 
apparent expansion of the inadmissibility grounds may extend the scope 
for political manoeuvre in situations where the solidity of the basis for 
assuming safety in a third country could be questioned. As is well known, 
this was indeed the case for returns to Turkey within the framework of 
the 2016 EU-Turkey arrangement (European Council, 2016). It is not 
hard to imagine future scenarios in which a flexible standard for assessing 
the ‘sufficiency’ of protection in a third country could be helpful for the 
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purpose of rejecting applications as inadmissible and returning asylum 
seekers to that country without examining their cases.
The effects of this inadmissibility ground will be crucially dependent 
on the actual possibility to rebut the presumption of safety and the 
assumed individual connection to the ‘safe third country’ in question. 
To the extent admissibility decisions are going to be made in a border 
procedure that is narrowly connected to, if not de facto coinciding with, 
pre-entry screening as discussed above, it may prove very difficult to 
uphold the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure effective access to 
rebuttal of the presumption of safety.
15.4 Safe countries of origin: distorting the perception of 
protection?
It is well established that the ‘safe country of origin’ notion cannot in and 
of itself justify the rejection of an asylum application. The only legally 
sustainable impact of the legal concept is that of creating a presump-
tion that the applicant is not in need of international protection for the 
purpose of channelling the case to an accelerated examination procedure. 
Like any other presumption, this procedural one has to be rebuttable, and 
the possibility to rebut the presumption of safety in an applicant’s country 
of origin must be real and effective. The possibility of rebuttal is clearly 
reflected in Article 36 of the 2013 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (EU, 
2013b). Importantly, however, the effectiveness of the access to rebuttal 
is at risk of being reduced as a consequence of the pending legislative 
proposals.
Introduced back in 1992, as described above in section 1, the ‘safe 
country of origin’ notion has become a central part of the CEAS. In the 
Asylum Procedures Directive (EU, 2013b) it is one of the key grounds 
for accelerated examination that may take place at the border (Articles 
31(8)(b) and 43). In addition, the EU Court of Justice (CJEU, 2013) has 
made it clear that this procedural criterion does not in itself constitute 
discrimination on grounds of applicants’ nationality, provided that the 
accelerated procedure complies with the basic principles and guarantees 
set out in the Directive. Nonetheless, the legislative proposals accompa-
nying the EU Pact will raise other and more severe fundamental rights 
concerns if adopted.
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Already the initial Proposal for an Asylum Procedure Regulation 
(European Commission, 2016) contains a provision that will reintroduce 
the designation of ‘safe countries of origin’ at EU level by way of an EU 
common list of such countries, including Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Northern Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey 
(Article 48 and Annex 1). While some of these countries may be rather 
uncontroversial in this regard, the latter appears highly disputable at least 
since the Turkish government’s reactions to the military coup d’état that 
was attempted just two days after the Proposal had been launched in July 
2016. The Commission has apparently neither modified this part of the 
Proposal nor explicitly addressed the question of how it may still be con-
sidered compatible with EU fundamental rights.
Furthermore, the Amended Proposal for an Asylum Procedure 
Regulation (European Commission, 2020c) launched with the EU Pact 
will introduce an additional ground for accelerating the examination 
procedure: the applicant’s origin in a country for which the proportion of 
decisions by authorities granting international protection is 20% or lower, 
according to the latest available yearly average Eurostat data. Exceptions 
are foreseen for situations where a significant change has occurred in the 
third country concerned since the publication of the relevant data, or 
where the applicant belongs to a category of persons for whom the pro-
portion of 20% or lower cannot be considered as representative for their 
protection needs (Article 40(1)(i)).
Leaving aside the apparent contradiction inherent in this exception, 
which is quite hard to reconcile with the very idea of accelerated pro-
cedures, the need for such an acceleration ground is not evident, given 
the abovementioned grounds that are based on similar considerations. 
The Explanatory Memorandum presents this proposal as being based on 
‘more objective and easy-to-use criteria’ and suggests that the percentage 
is justified by the significant increase in the number of applications made 
by applicants coming from countries with a low recognition rate and 
‘hence the need to put in place efficient procedures to deal with those 
applications, which are likely to be unfounded’ (European Commission, 
2020c: 13-14).
Considering that the proposed acceleration ground, along with the 
pre-existing criteria, will be mandatory for the channelling of cases into an 
accelerated examination procedure, and that examination in the border 
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procedure of cases accelerated on this ground will become mandatory as 
well, the totality of the procedural proposals seems to have the rather clear 
cognitive implication that many asylum seekers neither deserve nor need 
to undergo substantive examination in normal asylum procedures with 
the full scope of guarantees. While such seem likely to become a privilege 
for only a limited number of asylum seekers, sizeable categories of people 
will be confronting strong presumptions against their need for protection 
that will, due to the procedural devices discussed above, become de facto 
very hard to challenge in the context of border procedures.
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16. Setting The Right Priorities: Is the 
New Pact on Migration and Asylum 
Addressing The Issue of Pushbacks at 
EU External Borders?
Marco Stefan and Roberto Cortinovis
16.1 Introduction
The notion of ‘pushback’ describes practices of refusal of entry at the 
border as well as expulsions of individuals from a state territory without 
an assessment of their personal protection needs and with disregard for 
basic procedural guarantees. The term also encompasses hostile and 
violent actions by states’ authorities against individuals that are often 
associated with those practices.
Pushback practices represent a major threat to the fundamental rights 
and rule of law standards established under EU primary and secondary 
legislation, most notably the prohibition of refoulement and the right to 
seek asylum (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2019). 
They also stand at odds with the EU Member States’ obligation to uphold 
the international legal framework of refugees and migrants’ protection. 
The commitment to comply with this framework has recently been reaf-
firmed in both the UN Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM).1
Pushbacks have been reported at several sections of the EU external 
1  See Global Compact on Refugees, United Nations, New York, 2018 (https://www.
unhcr.org/5c658aed4.pdf); Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion, December 2018 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/73/195).
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borders, including along the Western Balkans Route, as well as in the 
Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean (European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights, 2020a; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, 2019; Refugee Rights Europe and End Pushbacks Partnership, 
2020). This contribution pays specific attention to the situation at the 
Greek-Turkish land and sea borders. Greek authorities’ systematic use 
of violence toward migrants and asylum seekers at the Evros River has 
been widely documented over many years (Pro Asyl, 2013). However, 
worrying reports of such practices have drastically multiplied over 2020 
(Wemove Europe and Oxfam International, 2020). Extensive accounts 
also exist of pushbacks at sea by the Greek Coast Guard (Kingsley and 
Shoumali, 2020).
Increasing evidence of the European Border and Coast Guards 
(Frontex) active involvement in and connivance with these kind oper-
ations have recently induced the European Commission to request 
the agency to investigate existing allegations of pushbacks and address 
persisting accountability gaps for fundamental rights violations in the 
Aegean Sea (Nielsen, 2020; Adkins, 2020).
Taking the steps from this backdrop, this contribution interrogates 
whether and how the Commission’s New EU Pact on Migration and 
Asylum (European Commission, 2020a) envisages the adoption of legal, 
procedural and operational responses that are required to address the 
increased use of pushback practices at EU external borders.
Special focus is paid to the Pact’s proposal to establish an independent 
fundamental rights monitoring mechanism in pre-border screening pro-
cedures. We evaluate the potential of such a mechanism to prevent devi-
ations from the non-refoulement principle, but also to redress the serious 
accountability challenges traditionally associated with pushbacks.
16.2 International, regional and EU fundamental rights 
standards
A state’s obligation not to expel or return a person to territories where 
his/her life or freedom would be threatened (non-refoulement) is the cor-
nerstone of the international protection regime. It is set out in Article 
33.1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as well as in other UN Human 
Rights Conventions (e.g. in Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture).
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The non-refoulement principle is also a key tenet of the system estab-
lished under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Article 2 (right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment) prohibit any return of an individual 
who would face a risk of a treatment contrary to those provisions. The 
obligation of non-refoulement under the ECHR is absolute: it does not 
allow for derogation, exception or limitation, even in situations of mass 
arrival of migrants at borders (Hruschka, 2020) or in the context of a 
health emergency such as the Covid-19 pandemic (Nicolosi, 2020).
Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR specifically prohibits the collec-
tive expulsion of aliens. Such prohibition constitutes a corollary of the 
non-refoulement principle as it grants every individual the possibility to 
assert the existence of a risk of treatment incompatible with the Con-
vention in case of expulsion from a state’s territory. The prohibition of 
collective expulsions is also a rule of international and regional human 
rights law stemming from the right to a fair trial: it implies the right to 
an individualized procedure taking into account the personal situation of 
any person subject to expulsion, regardless of the legal or administrative 
status of the latter (Carrera, 2020).
Prohibition of refoulement and summary expulsions are included in 
EU primary law, specifically in Articles 18 and 19 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. In addition, pushbacks are often associated with 
excessive use of force that may as well result in violations of the right to 
integrity and the protection from ill treatment (Articles 3 and 4 of the 
EU Charter). In extreme circumstances, violent actions might even lead 
to a breach of the right to life (Article 2) (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 2020b).
Non-refoulement obligations are also incorporated in the key legisla-
tive instruments of the Union’s asylum and border management acquis. 
The EU Asylum Procedures directive provides that whenever an applica-
tion for international protection is made (including at the border) access 
to an asylum procedure is to be granted (Article 6), and that applicants 
should have access to an effective remedy with suspensive effect against 
a decision rejecting their protection claims (Article 46).2 The Schengen 
2  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (re-
cast), OJ L 180/60, 29.6.2013.
183Marco Stefan and Roberto Cortinovis
Border Code states that border control should be carried out without 
prejudice to the rights of refugees and third country nationals requesting 
international protection (Article 3).3 The EU Return Directive requires 
Member States to take into account the non-refoulement principle 
throughout all the different stages of the return procedure.4 Legislation 
laying down the Frontex mandate imposes respect of the non-refoulement 
principle in all agency activities, including in the context of border sur-
veillance operations at sea.5
16.3 Fundamental rights monitoring under the new Pact
Allegations of pushbacks at the Greek-Turkish borders over 2020 have 
been accompanied by strong reactions by the European Parliament LIBE 
Committee (European Parliament, 2020) and civil society organizations 
(Wemove Europe and Oxfam International, 2020). Calls for the Commis-
sion to investigate allegations of illegal pushbacks by Greek authorities, 
– and eventually to launch an infringement procedure against Greece – 
have remained unanswered.
Proposals allegedly directed at addressing the potential breach of fun-
damental rights in the treatment of people seeking asylum at Europe’s 
borders have instead been tabled by the Commission on the occasion of 
the publication of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.
The proposal for a Regulation establishing a pre-entry screening aims 
at introducing uniform rules concerning the identification, registration 
and fingerprinting of migrants and asylum seekers and for conducting 
3  Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 
2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code) (codification), OJ L 77/1 23.3.2016.
4  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008.
5  Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations 
(EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, OJ L 295/1, 14.11.2019; Regulation (EU) No 
656/2014 of the European Parliament and of The Council of 15 May 2014 establishing 
rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational co-
operation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 
L 189/93, 27.6.2014.
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security and health checks at the EU external borders.6 The proposal also 
aims at establishing a tool for channelling individuals to the following 
procedure: return – or in case of application for international protection 
– normal, accelerated or asylum border procedure.
Article 7 of the proposed regulation envisages the creation of a new 
“Independent Mechanism for monitoring fundamental rights” which 
aims at ensuring compliance with EU and international law during the 
pre-entry screening process. The mechanism should ensure in particular 
that national rules on detention (including its grounds and duration) are 
respected during such process. It should also ensure that fundamental 
rights violations related to access to the asylum procedure and non-com-
pliance with the non-refoulement principle – which indeed might well 
occur during the pre-entry screening – are dealt with promptly and effec-
tively.
And yet, the proposal limits the monitoring mechanism to the 
pre-entry screening process only. This implies that the mechanism would 
not apply to the fundamental rights-sensitive border procedures following 
the pre-entry screening.7 Furthermore, and perhaps even more critically, 
the mechanism would not cover the whole range of border surveillance 
operations and border management activities that are performed by 
Member States (and the EU Frontex agency) before the activation of the 
screening procedures.
This limited scope casts doubt on the effectiveness of the proposed 
monitoring mechanism in properly addressing the fundamental rights 
and rule of law challenges linked to pushback practices. As underlined 
by the Greek case, such practices are characterized by a high level of 
informality: they are designed to escape public scrutiny and performed 
in remote areas which are often not accessible to independent monitors.
To effectively prevent abuses and increase accountability of national 
and EU border and coast guards, the mechanism should ensure that all 
border surveillance operations and border management activities at the 
6  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council introducing a 
screening of third country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations 
(EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817, COM(2020) 
612 final.
7  See Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and 
repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, COM(2020) 611 final.
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EU external (sea and land) border are actually monitored. Ensuring that 
independent human rights monitors oversee the work of the authorities 
responsible for controlling, surveilling, and patrolling the EU external 
borders is crucial in this respect. These independent monitors should 
be given the authority (and necessary human and financial resources) 
to initiate and carry out autonomous and thorough investigations over 
alleged pushbacks, collective expulsions and related abuses. Similar mon-
itoring mechanisms are already deployed in the field of forced returns 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2019).
Another key issue of concern is the potential role of the mechanism 
in handling complaints and providing access to justice to individuals who 
have had their fundamental rights (including access to asylum) violated 
at the border. As underlined by regional and international human rights 
bodies, a complaint mechanism can only be effective if it is in line with 
substantial and procedural standards of independence from state author-
ities. It also needs to be accessible in practice, and secure prompt and 
thorough follow-up procedures (Carrera and Stefan, 2020).
The Commission’s proposal for pre-entry screening regulation 
assigns a specific role to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
to provide guidance to Member States in ensuring the independence of 
the mechanism, as well as in providing a monitoring methodology and 
appropriate training schemes. In the explanatory memorandum to the 
proposal, the Commission also added that the mechanism should ensure 
that “complaints are dealt with expeditiously and in an appropriate way”.
The proposed legislation, however, does not specify the degree of 
independence that the envisaged monitoring mechanism should have 
from the authorities subject to the monitoring. The large margin of dis-
cretion left to Member States becomes especially problematic in contexts 
such as the Greek one, where institutional representatives (even at the 
higher level) systematically reject to acknowledge responsibilities of 
national authorities involved in push backs (Greek City Times, 2020).
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16.4 Ensuring effective enforcement of fundamental 
rights at EU external borders: the role of “accountability 
actors”
The fundamental rights monitoring mechanism proposed in the Pact 
should enable the work of the accountability actors which, at different 
levels, are responsible for ensuring respect of fundamental rights and for 
activating and delivering effective remedies within the EU legal and insti-
tutional system. These include judicial authorities, EU institutions and 
agencies and, crucially, independent NGOs promoting and protecting 
human rights of migrants and refugees.
16.4.1 Accountability gaps at the national level: the role of judicial 
actors
Within the EU legal framework, EU Member States courts and judges 
can be considered to all effects as ‘EU courts’ which act as rule of law 
guarantors and implementers of rights under EU law, including in the 
area of border management, asylum, and returns (Cornelisse et al., 2020).
Judicial actions over repeated allegations of systematic violence against 
migrants and refugees have indeed been launched in Greece (Statewatch, 
2019). So far, however, these procedures have not produced any tangible 
results, confirming the legal and operational challenges related to the 
activation of judicial proceedings over pushback cases (Carrera and 
Stefan, 2020). This circumstance should be read in conjunction with the 
lack of effective administrative remedies in the country, which has also 
been underlined by the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT, 2019).
In cases where evidence of pushbacks is brought before them, 
national judicial authorities have an obligation to investigate related fun-
damental rights violations, identify responsible actors and deliver redress 
to victims. Recent judicial developments in different EU Member States 
including for instance Italy (Bathke, 2020) and Slovenia (Bozic, 2020) 
highlight how judicial actors can and should assess responsibilities and 
deliver both criminal and civil justice remedies to third country nationals 
affected by pushbacks.
The establishment of a fundamental monitoring mechanism under 
the new Screening Regulation should not be considered a substitute for 
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the judicial oversight that must be made available at the domestic level. 
Instead, if truly independent and endowed with the necessary resources, 
the new mechanism could support the work of judicial authorities and 
increase their capacity to investigate pushback allegations. This could 
facilitate the collection of evidence needed to identify responsible actors, 
an issue that has so far made it particularly difficult for affected individ-
uals to initiate judicial proceedings before national courts.
16.4.2 Frontex’s fundamental rights responsibilities
Along the years, Frontex has acquired an increasingly relevant role in sup-
porting national authorities in the management of EU’s external borders. 
In Greece, Frontex is currently involved in almost every aspect of border 
management, as testified by the EU Action Plan to support Greece in 
managing its external borders with Turkey of March 2020 (European 
Commission, 2020b). The agency’s involvement puts border and return 
operations in Greece under a formal EU “umbrella”. This has important 
fundamental rights implications: as an EU agency acting within the scope 
of EU law, Frontex has a positive obligation to prevent abuses and secure 
respect of EU primary and secondary law acquis (Fink, 2020).
In spite of the fundamental rights responsibilities established in its 
recently amended founding regulation,8 Frontex has repeatedly refused 
to admit (let alone investigate) occurrence of pushbacks in Greece. 
The agency claimed instead that Greek authorities should be consid-
ered as solely responsible for any violation, because alleged episodes are 
happening outside the operational area covered by the Agency’s oper-
ations.9 This claim is based on a minimalist interpretation of Frontex 
human rights responsibilities, which does not reflect the substantial 
role the agency plays in Greece. Such position has become increasingly 
untenable considering mounting evidence of the direct involvement of 
Frontex-coordinated vessels in pushback operations in the Aegean Sea 
(Waters et al., 2020). Evidence of Frontex-deployed officers’ involvement 
8  In this regard, see Articles 1, 5, 7, 10.1(e) and(ad), as well as Articles 31.3(e) and (f), 
38.4, and Articles 43, 44, 46 and 47, of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and 
Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624.
9  Such claims were made public by Frontex Executive Director, Mr. Fabrice Leg-
geri, during the European Parliament LIBE Committee Meeting that took place 
on July 6 2020 (https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/libe-committee-meet-
ing_20200706-1645-COMMITTEE-LIBE_vd). 
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in pushbacks has been collected also in the Evros region (Karamanidou 
and Kasparek, 2020a).
After requests for clarifications from the European Parliament10 and, 
subsequently, the European Commission,11 the Management Board of the 
agency held an extraordinary meeting on 10 November 2020 to discuss 
the issue of pushbacks. The Meeting Conclusions confirmed the need to 
take urgent action to investigate ‘all aspects related to the matter’, and 
called upon the agency’s Executive Director to ensure a ‘solid’ mechanism 
for internal reporting and prompt follow-up of reported incidents. They 
also envisaged the establishment of a ‘sub-group’ within the Management 
board (European Commission, 2020c).
The specific mandate of the sub-group is expected to be defined in a 
following meeting of the Management Board. However, it is already clear 
that the creation of such a new body will not in itself address the struc-
tural shortcomings characterizing Frontex’s accountability framework. 
There are no indications related to the independence and impartiality of 
the sub-group, which remains purely internal and Member State driven. 
Furthermore, it appears that rather than focusing on the investigation 
of pushback allegations and incident reports, the sub-group will be 
tasked with ‘the interpretation of EU regulations’ provisions related to 
operational activities at sea’, and will be responsible for addressing ‘the 
concerns raised by Member States about “hybrid threats” affecting their 
national security at external borders’.
Legislative reforms of the agency over the previous years have not yet 
resolved the persisting deficiencies of the Frontex complaint mechanism, 
nor enhanced the role of the Agency’s Fundamental Rights Officer, which 
still fall short of existing standards of independence, accessibility and 
thoroughness of follow-up procedures. A generalized lack of transpar-
10  The European Parliament’s request for clarifications have been formulated through a 
series of written question included in a letter sent on 9 July 2020 by Fernando López 
Aguilar, Chair of the European Parliament LIBE Committee, and addressed to Fron-
tex Executive Director, Mr. Fabrice Leggeri. Mr. Leggeri replied to the letter with a 
letter drafted on 24 July 2020. See (www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/2020/10/FOI-1-
20200724_ED-reply-to-LIBE-Chairman.pdf). 
11  An official request to convene an urgent meeting of Frontex Management Board was 
made on 28 October 2020 by the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johans-
son. See, Borrás, M. (2020), “Commission calls for meeting with Frontex over alleged 
‘push-back incidents’”, Euractiv, 29 October (https://www.euractiv.com/section/jus-
tice-home-affairs/news/commission-calls-for-meeting-with-frontex-over-alleged-
push-back-incidents/). 
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ency concerning the specific roles and responsibilities of different actors 
involved in Frontex operations (compounded by a lack of public access 
to key operational documents) add to the structural accountability gaps 
mentioned above (Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2020b).
Legislative proposals under discussion at the EU level should be 
directed at addressing the shortcomings characterizing Frontex’s fun-
damental rights accountability. Provided it is properly designed and 
entrusted with the task of overseeing the entirety of activities falling 
under Frontex’s operational and coordination responsibilities, the 
envisaged independent monitoring mechanism could help address the 
serious accountability challenges identified above.
16.4.3 The role of independent NGOs
While reluctant to investigate responsibilities linked to violent pushbacks, 
Greek authorities have increasingly criminalized civil society actors 
supporting migrants and refugees, including NGOs involved in Search 
and Rescue (SAR) operations at sea (Vosyliūtė and Conte, 2019). While 
in itself a violation of regional and EU standards related to freedoms 
of expression and association, reprisals and retaliation against NGOs 
involved in SAR and other humanitarian activities also prevent these 
actors from contributing to independent monitoring of human rights 
abuses.
Independent NGOs can and should play a key role in the monitoring of 
fundamental rights at the EU borders. In its 2013 Decision on its own-in-
itiative inquiry concerning Frontex, the European Ombudsman recom-
mended making the Frontex complaint mechanism available to all stake-
holders with a legitimate interest in activating the procedure, including 
independent NGOs. The active involvement of independent NGOs in the 
monitoring process and the possibility for these organizations to submit 
public interest complaints would substantially increase the impartiality 
and effectiveness of the proposed monitoring mechanism.
16.5 Conclusions
Ongoing discussions concerning the scope and functions of the mon-
itoring mechanism envisaged by the Pact should take seriously the 
190 16. Setting The Right Priorities: Is The New Pact on Migration and Asylum Addressing  
the Issue of Pushbacks at EU External Borders?
alarming reports of fundamental rights violations coming from the 
Greek-Turkish borders (as well as from other areas of EU external 
borders).
Pushbacks are simply incompatible with a fundamental rights and 
rule of law-based approach to migration and asylum in Europe. They 
also stand at odds with the commitment to uphold the normative foun-
dations of the international refugee protection regime included in the 
UN Global Compact on Refugees. An express commitment towards safe 
and dignified return of third county nationals has also been undertaken 
in the UN Global Compact on Migration, where reference is made to 
the importance of respecting the prohibition of collective expulsions – in 
particular by guaranteeing an individual assessment and the exhaustion 
of legal remedies against return decisions – as well to the need to uphold 
the independence of monitoring mechanisms to ensure accountability of 
return operations.
The establishment of a new fundamental rights monitoring 
mechanism at the EU borders may contribute to address the challenges 
mentioned in this contribution. To effectively address existing account-
ability gaps, however, it is crucial to align the proposed instrument with 
internationally recognized standards of independence and adequate 
follow-up to identified violations.
The mechanism should complement the role of existing accounta-
bility actors and instruments within the EU legal system. Investigations 
over violent pushbacks need to be conducted systematically by national 
judicial authorities. This is crucial to secure effective judicial protection 
and deliver effective remedies, in line with EU law. Preserving the oper-
ational space of independent NGOs is also key to ensuring independent 
monitoring and accountability of border and immigration enforcement 
authorities.
Finally, the Commission as “Guardian of the Treaty” as well as EU 
agencies (notably Frontex) should take much more resolute action to 
address fundamental rights violations associated with pushbacks, in line 
with the means and procedures that are available under their mandates.
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17. The EU Pact on Migration 
and Asylum and the Dangerous 
Multiplication of ‘Anomalous Zones’ 
For Migration Management 
Giuseppe Campesi
17.1 Introduction 
One of the most qualifying aspects of the new EU Pact on Migration 
and Asylum (European Commission, 2020a) published on 23 September 
2020 are the proposals that the Commission has put forward to establish 
a ‘robust and fair management of external borders’, which find expression 
in the proposals for a Regulation on screening at the external borders 
(European Commission, 2020b) and in the amended proposal for an 
Asylum Procedure Regulation (European Commission, 2020c)
The Commission’s stated aim is to build a system for the ‘better man-
agement of mixed migration flows’, establishing a ‘seamless link between 
all stages of the migration process, from arrival to processing of requests 
for international protection until, where applicable, return’ (European 
Commission, 2020b: 4). According to the envisaged plan, migrants will 
be registered and screened at the border to establish identity and health 
and security risks and then be referred to the appropriate procedure, be it 
asylum, refusal of entry or return. In particular, screening procedures will 
help relevant authorities to decide whether an asylum application should 
be assessed without authorising the applicant’s entry into the Member 
State’s territory in an ‘asylum border procedure’ or in a normal asylum 
procedure. Where an asylum border procedure is used and determines 
that the individual is not in need of protection, an accelerated ‘return 
border procedure’ should follow.
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While it is specified (European Commission, 2020c: 4) that none of 
the proposals ‘abridge the exercise of individual rights’ and that asylum 
and return border procedures will be surrounded by ‘adequate proce-
dural safeguards’ ensuring access to protection for those in need, the 
Commission’s proposals risk institutionalising an asylum and return sub-
system where migrants’ rights will be protected by sub-standard legal and 
procedural guarantees. Overall, the focus seems to be placed more on the 
control of undesired migration and on the prevention of unauthorized 
secondary movements within the EU space, than on improving reception 
conditions and access to effective protection for incoming refugees.
In this contribution, I will assess the Commission’s proposals on the 
new mechanism for the management of external borders in light of the 
experience and lessons learned from the implementation of the so-called 
‘hotspot approach’ in Greece and Italy (European Union Fundamental 
Rights Agency, 2016).
17.2 Old wine in a new bottle?
The Commission’s proposals are not an absolute novelty. They take up 
and systematize ideas that had already emerged in 2018 and which 
actually aimed at normalizing the hotspot approach (Campesi, 2020), 
transforming it into an ordinary tool for the management of incoming 
migration by sea. The proposal for a reinforced asylum border procedure 
was already included in the 2016 proposal for a new regulation of asylum 
procedures (European Commission, 2016), while the idea of an accel-
erated border return procedure had surfaced in the controversial 2018 
non-paper on ‘controlled centres’ (European Commission, 2018a) and 
was then included in the proposal for a recast return directive published 
the same year (European Commission, 2018b). The Commission now 
brings together the rules on the asylum and return border procedures 
in a single legislative instrument, with the stated aim of closing the 
gap between the two stages of migration management and eliminating 
the risks of migrants’ unauthorised movements within the EU space 
(European Commission, 2020a).
Unlike the hotspot approach, the new mechanism for the manage-
ment of external borders is however envisaged as no longer circum-
scribed to cases of disproportionate migratory pressure and as limited 
to assisting frontline member countries in screening, debriefing and 
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fingerprinting incoming migrants by sea, but to effectively implement 
pre-entry screening and border procedures even outside ‘crisis’ situa-
tions. In particular, it would concern all third country nationals crossing 
external borders outside of the border crossing points, or disembarked 
after a search and rescue operation, and all third country nationals pre-
senting themselves at border crossing points without fulfilling the entry 
conditions who apply there for international protection.
Another important novelty is that the new mechanism for the man-
agement of external borders will also apply to all third country nationals 
apprehended within the territory of Member States, where there are indi-
cations that they eluded border checks at the external border on entry. 
This means that they will be subjected to pre-border screening and the 
subsequent border procedures as if they had never physically entered EU 
territory.
One of the most worrying aspects is that the envisaged mechanism 
for the management of external borders relies heavily and explicitly on 
the protracted confinement of migrants and asylum seekers in border 
areas. In particular, the proposals put forward by the Commission seem 
to encourage member countries to multiply the sites of border enforce-
ment, transforming EU borders into a space in which ‘anomalous zones’ 
will proliferate.
Gerald Neuman, who first used this concept in reference to the estab-
lishment of the refugee transit centre in Guantanamo, defines ‘anomalous 
zones’ as ‘a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise 
regarded as embodying fundamental policies of the larger legal system, 
are locally suspended’ (Neuman, 1996: 1201). Over the years, the practice 
of strategically manipulating the geographical scope of jurisdiction by 
creating areas where migrants’ access to rights and procedural safeguards 
were limited has been a hallmark of migration control policies imple-
mented by main destination countries (Mountz, 2011). While the idea 
of establishing extraterritorial processing centres has been occasion-
ally advanced (Noll, 2003), such an approach has never been officially 
pursued at the EU level.
The new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum does not represent an 
explicit move in that direction, since it does not envisage the establish-
ment of processing centres in third countries; yet it often alludes to the 
extraterritoriality of the areas or facilities where screening and border 
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procedures will be carried out. In what follows I will outline the potential 
implications of these references to the extraterritoriality of the new 
mechanism for the management of external borders.
17.3 The spatiality of the new mechanism for the 
management of external borders
One point on which the Commission places great emphasis is that during 
the new screening procedure third-country nationals concerned should 
not be authorised to enter the territory of Member States (see Article 4(1) 
of the proposal in European Commission, 2020b). In particular, Member 
States are explicitly called upon to adopt measures to prevent the persons 
concerned from leaving the ‘locations situated at or in proximity to the 
external borders’ (see Article 6(1) of the proposal in European Commis-
sion, 2020b) where the relevant procedures are carried out.
Such measures may ‘in individual cases’ include detention, but the 
Commission seems to suggest that this should not be the rule, apparently 
leaving Member States free to determine the appropriate locations to 
carry out pre-entry screening procedures ‘taking into account geography 
and existing infrastructures’. It is only suggested that the tasks related to 
the screening may be carried out in already established hotspot areas 
(see Recital 12 of the proposal in European Commission, 2020b). This 
reference to the hotspot approach is however particularly worrying here, 
as the experience of the past five years has clearly shown that hotspot 
areas were in fact managed as places of confinement, in which migrants’ 
freedoms were drastically curtailed even in the absence of formally 
adopted detention measures (European Union Fundamental Rights 
Agency, 2016).
Commissioner Johansson has argued before the LIBE Committee of 
the European Parliament that with the new pre-entry screening proce-
dures the Commission is not intending to promote detention1, yet it is 
easy to imagine that in order to prevent migrants from escaping the new 
mechanism for the management of external borders, Member States will 
be tempted to adopt automatic and generalized detention measures, or 
at least strongly encouraged to carry out pre-entry screening and border 




procedures in locations where, if not formally detained, migrants will 
actually be confined to islands or other geographically inaccessible areas.
Similarly, asylum seekers subject to border procedures shall not be 
authorized to enter Member States’ territory and, according to the Com-
mission’s plans (European Commission, 2020c), must be accommodated 
in dedicated ‘facilities’ set up in proximity to the sections of the external 
border or border crossing points where Member States expect to receive 
most asylum applications falling within the scope of the border proce-
dures. The Commission does not explicitly mention detention, but it is 
clear that the emphasis placed on the need to prevent entry will induce 
Member States to confine all asylum seekers subjected to border proce-
dures in the same locations where pre-entry screening takes place. This 
was for instance the approach followed by Greece in the implementa-
tion of the hotspot approach, with every migrant reaching a Greek 
island from Turkey subjected to a geographical restriction and prevented 
from moving to the mainland pending the definition of his/her position 
according to the asylum border procedure enacted with Law 4375/2016 
(Bousiou, 2020).
Finally, migrants subject to a border return procedure may be held in 
detention ‘in order to prevent unauthorised entry and carry out return’ 
for the duration of the procedure, which would last a maximum of 12 
weeks. This should be added to the 12 weeks during which the migrant has 
been placed under the asylum border procedure, which means that the 
new mechanism for the management of external borders gives Member 
States the power to curtail migrants’ personal freedoms for a total of six 
months. The proposal does not specify where migrants subject to border 
return procedures should be held in detention. Yet the Commission is 
arguably inspired by the Greek example, where migrants were prevented 
from reaching the mainland and repatriations under the EU-Turkey 
statement were carried out directly from hotspot areas (Illias et al., 2019).
Less clear is where screening procedures should take place in cases 
of third country nationals apprehended within the territory of Member 
States. Article 6(2) of the Commission’s proposal on the screening of 
third country nationals at the external borders (European Commission, 
2020b) simply says that in these cases ‘the screening shall be conducted 
at any appropriate location within the territory of a Member State.’ This 
means that Member States will have room to implement this provision 
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differently, possibly also using ordinary pre-removal detention facilities 
to that end. Yet the Italian case may be taken as an example of the impli-
cations that this provision can have – in particular when implemented by 
frontline member countries.
Following the enactment of Decree No. 17/2017, the Italian police 
have been vested with the power of returning irregular migrants inter-
cepted on Italy’s mainland to hotspot areas, thus giving a legal basis to 
the practice of forcibly dispersing migrants gathering near main border 
crossing points in an attempt to reach Switzerland, France or Austria 
(Tazzioli, 2018). In spite of the Commission suggesting that ‘submit-
ting the same third-country national to repeated screenings should be 
avoided to the utmost extent possible’ (Recital n. 19 of the proposal in 
European Commission, 2020b), the idea of submitting third country 
nationals apprehended within the territory of Member States to pre-entry 
screening is likely to encourage dispersal practices. The legal fiction of 
EU borders will be literally haunting migrants within Member States’ 
mainland areas by giving state authorities more room to curtail their 
personal freedoms and limiting access to ordinary asylum and return 
procedures.
17.4 The new legal geography of EU borders
The envisaged mechanism for the management of external borders is 
premised on the idea that ‘abusive’ asylum requests should be dealt with 
quickly by keeping migrants at the border and returning them as soon 
as possible. This idea is highly questionable because border procedures 
always increase the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination (ECRE, 2019), 
but it is also deeply flawed as it rests on the assumption that member 
countries will be able to quickly and effectively enforce returns. According 
to the Commission’s plans, when it is ‘from the outset’ clear that readmis-
sion of rejected asylum seekers would be impossible, Member States ‘may 
decide’ not to apply border procedures (European Commission, 2020c). 
Yet, given that the main objective of the proposed mechanism for the 
management of external borders is to prevent unauthorized entry, it is 
likely that the effect produced will be that of immobilizing asylum seekers 
in proximity of border areas, increasing as a consequence the pressure on 
the reception infrastructures of frontline member countries.
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Similar logic was already at work in the implementation of the 
hotspot approach. While the Commission never went so far as to classify 
hotspot areas as extraterritorial sites, the result of the hotspot approach 
was to encourage frontline countries to confine migrants to border areas, 
in many cases on islands or in otherwise remote and poorly accessible 
locations, such as transit zones. In the wake of the current pandemic, 
Italy has even experimented with the practice of confining incoming 
migrants into ‘quarantine ships’ (ANSA, 2020), which may be seen as a 
first experiment with the idea that was advanced in 2016 of establishing 
floating offshore processing facilities (Nielsen, 2016).
The EU pact seems to go a step further in the legal manipulation of EU 
border geography, describing the ‘locations’ where the new mechanism 
for the management of external borders will be implemented as outside 
EU territory. The legal implications of this attempt at de-territorial-
izing EU borders are obviously highly questionable, given it is doubtful 
that Member States may escape their obligations on human rights and 
refugee protection by simply reframing territory as non-territory (Gam-
meltoft-Hansen, 2014). On the contrary, as it has been suggested (Carrera 
and Stefan, 2020), the rule of law follows the state wherever it exercises 
jurisdiction over individuals.
The Commission seems to want to mitigate the fundamental rights 
challenges raised by the proposed new mechanism for the management 
of external borders by envisaging the establishment of a monitoring 
mechanism for pre-entry screening procedures (see Article 7 of the 
proposal in European Commission, 2020b). However, besides the struc-
tural limits already highlighted by Stefan and Cortinovis in their contri-
bution to this book (Chapter 16), one has to ask whether the envisaged 
monitoring mechanism will be able to effectively address the risk of 
human rights violations deriving from an approach which is premised on 
the idea of confining asylum seekers at the border.
As the experience of the implementation of the hotspot approach 
has demonstrated, Member States have managed hotspot areas as 
spaces of border enforcement where access to rights was mediated by 
distance creation. The relative remoteness of hotspot areas has greatly 
limited asylum seekers’ access to information and support, keeping 
them in isolation from local communities and resources that are more 
readily available in the mainland. While, as suggested, it is doubtful that 
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the insistence on the extraterritoriality of the new envisaged pre-entry 
screening and border procedures may legitimize any local suspension of 
the rule of law, the risk is that this may further encourage the multipli-
cation of remote places of confinement where asylum seekers’ access to 
rights will be mediated only by state representatives.
The effective protection of human rights in the framework of the 
new mechanism for the management of external borders will depend on 
the degree of independence that the envisaged monitoring bodies will 
be able to maintain with respect to national governments. It will also 
rely on the prerogatives with which they will be vested. Experience with 
the implementation of the hotspot approach suggests that multiplying 
the anomalous zones of border enforcement where asylum seekers – in 
addition to being subjected to less guaranteed border procedures, will 
also be kept isolated from civil society and advocacy groups – greatly 
increases the risks that their access to rights is limited or their protection 
needs not properly considered.
203Giuseppe Campesi
References
ANSA (2020), “Migrants quarantined on ships, controversy in Italy”, 15 
April 2020, (www.infomigrants.net/en/post/24102/migrants-quaran-
tined-on-ships-controversy-in-italy)
Bousiou, A. (2020), “From Humanitarian Crisis Management to Prison 
Island: Implementing the European Asylum Regime at the Border 
Island of Lesvos 2015-2017”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 431-447.
Campesi, G. (2020) “Normalising the ‘Hotspot approach’: An analysis of 
the Commission’s most recent proposals”, in Sergio Carrera, Deirdre 
Curtin and Andrew Geddes (eds.), 20 Year Anniversary of the 
Tampere Programme: Europeanisation Dynamics of the EU area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS, Brussels, pp. 93-104.
Carrera, S. and Stefan M. (2020), “Justicing Europe’s frontiers: effective 
access to remedies and justice in bordering and expulsion policies.”, 
Carrera, S. and Stefan M. (Eds.), “Fundamental Rights Challenges 
in Border Controls and Expulsion of Irregular Immigrants in the 
European Union”, Routledge, pp. 1-21.
ECRE (2019), “Policy Note: Border Procedures Not A Panacea” (www.
ecre.org/policy-note-border-procedures-not-a-panacea/)
European Commission (2016), “Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common 
procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing 
Directive 2013/32/EU”, COM(2016) 467 final, Brussels.
European Commission (2018a), “Non-paper on “controlled centres” in 




European Commission (2018b), “Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on common standards and proce-
dures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals (recast)”, COM(2018) 634 final, Brussels
European Commission (2020a), “Communication from the Commis-
sion on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum”, COM(2020) 609 final, 
Brussels. 
204 17. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Dangerous Multiplication of ‘Anomalous Zones’ For 
Migration Management
European Commission (2020b), “Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council introducing a screening of 
third country nationals at the external borders and amending Regula-
tions (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 
2019/817”, COM(2020) 612 final, Brussels.
European Commission (2020c), “Amended proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common 
procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing 
Directive 2013/32/EU”, COM(2020) 611 final, Brussels.
European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (2016), “Opinion of 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on funda-
mental rights in the ‘hotspots’ set up in Greece and Italy”, Vienna, 
29 November 2016 (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_
uploads/fra-opinion-5-2016-hotspots_en.pdf).
Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. (2014), “Extraterritorial migration control and 
the reach of human rights”, Chetail, V., and Bauloz, C. (Eds.), Research 
handbook on international law and migration. Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing, pp. 113-131.
Illias, Aggelos, Leivaditi Nadina, Papatzani Evangelia and Electra 
Petracou (2019) Border Management and Migration Controls in 
Greece. Respond Working Paper 2019/22 (https://core.ac.uk/
download/pdf/227005746.pdf).
Mountz, A. (2011) “The enforcement archipelago: Detention, haunting, 
and asylum on islands”, Political Geography, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 
118-128.
Neuman, G. L. (1996) “Anomalous Zones.”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, 
No. 5, pp. 1197-1234.
Nielsen, N. (2016), “Italy's ‘floating hotspot’ idea to sink in legal waters”, EU 
Observer, 2 June 2016 (https://euobserver.com/migration/133659).
Noll, G. (2003) “Visions of the exceptional: legal and theoretical issues 
raised by transit processing centres and protection zones.” European 
Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 303-341.
Tazzioli, M. (2018), “Containment through mobility: migrants’ spatial 
disobediences and the reshaping of control through the hotspot 
system.”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 44, No. 16, pp. 
2764-2779.
205
18. The New EU Pact on Migration  




On October 15, 2020, a press release issued by the EU Mission (2020) 
to ASEAN informed that there was a “a significant funding gap in the 
international response” to the Rohingya refugee situation this year and 
that the US, UK, EU and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) was set to co-host an online donor conference to 
bridge this gap. The conference, marked by Myanmar’s absence, was held 
a week later on October 22, where donors pledged $600 million to aid the 
Rohingyas (Besheer, 2020). It was at this conference Md Shahriar Alam 
(2020) the Bangladeshi State Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated 
that Bangladesh was no longer in a position to bear the burden placed 
by the refugee situation and that the Rohingyas would have to return to 
Myanmar at the earliest opportunity. On the evening of the donor con-
ference, the Chinese Foreign Minister during a telephonic conversation 
with his counterpart in Bangladesh informed that a foreign minister-level 
tripartite meeting between Bangladesh, China and Myanmar would be 
held soon and that Myanmar had assured China it would take back the 
Rohingyas (New Age, 2020). 
The new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum (EU Pact) “conditioned 
by the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees (UN GCR) and the 
EU Treaties” (Carrera, 2020; see Chapter 1) was proposed, in the words 
1  I thank Maja Janmyr, Lewis Turner and Sergio Carrera for helpful comments 
while writing this Chapter.
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of the European Commission (2020a), to build “a system that manages 
and normalises migration for the long term” and is “fully grounded in 
European values and international law”. This Chapter strives to shed some 
light on the EU’s potential role in the coming days in ending the Rohingya 
refugee situation with particular reference to EU Pact. It is written in light 
of two realities. First of all, the European Union (EU) has played a pivotal 
role in mobilizing funds to alleviate the plight of Rohingya refugees. 
And secondly, despite the humanitarian assistance, developmental and 
conflict prevention support extended by the EU (European Commis-
sion, 2020b), the Bangladesh Government instead of relying solely on 
the diplomatic assistance of the EU or utilizing UN-sponsored mecha-
nisms, actively solicited the involvement and help of China to resolve 
the Rohingya refugee situation. It is worth recalling that China has in the 
past, refused to condemn Myanmar (Amnesty International, 2017) for its 
atrocities against the Rohingyas, and did not take part in the Rohingya 
Conference alongside Russia despite being invited (Al Jazeera, 2020a). 
Bearing these realities in mind, this contribution briefly traces the 
historical evolution of the Rohingya refugee situation and Bangladesh’s 
engagement it. It then goes on to describe how the EU can take inspi-
ration from its new Pact in the collective global pursuit of ending the 
Rohingya refugee situation. In many ways, this contribution consciously 
asks more questions than it answers because its purpose is to offer a new 
starting point for further debates on the EU’s role towards the Rohingya 
refugee situation. 
18.2 In retrospect – the plight of the Rohingyas
In “one of the first major Western surveys of the languages of Burma” 
Francis Buchanan in 1799 noted the Rooinga as Mohammedan’s who had 
long settled in Arakan. Despite this and a range of sources documenting 
the presence of the Rohingyas dating back centuries,2 they remain unrec-
ognized as one of the 135 national ‘races’ living in Myanmar (Al Jazeera, 
2  See, Mihir Shekhar Bhonsale, ‘Evolution of the Arakan ‘Problem’ in Bur-
ma’ [2015] 76 Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 631-636; Moshe 
Yegar, The Muslims of Burma: a study of a minority group (Schriftenreihe des 
Südasian-Instituts der Universität Heidelberg 1972) and, Mohammad Sha-
habuddin, ‘Post-colonial Boundaries, International Law, and the Making of 
the Rohingya Crisis’ [2019] 9(2) Asian Journal of International Law, pp. 334-
358. 
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2018). Excluded from the nation-building process since independence, 
the Rohingyas were rendered ‘stateless’ (Lewa, 2009) through the passage 
of the Citizenship Law of 1982. Over the years, an unholy combination 
of general racism and hostile Armed Forces has played a central role in 
stripping the rights of the Rohingyas in Myanmar. An array of accusa-
tions ranging from being “illegal Bengali immigrants” (Akins 2018) who 
settled in Myanmar during the period of British colonization to being 
“militants” (Ratcliffe 2017) have been put forth to justify the continued 
persecution of the Rohingyas for decades. This is why, on the morning 
of December 05, 2017, when Pramila Patten, the United Nations Special 
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict described the Rohingya’s 
of Myanmar as the “most persecuted minority in the world” (OHCHR, 
2017), none of the remaining attendees of the Special Session of the 
Human Rights Council perceived her categorization as hyperbole. 
To survive the onslaught of the Myanmar Army, the Rohingyas fled 
to neighboring Bangladesh in ‘waves’. The earliest waves were recorded 
in 1948 when Myanmar became an independent State, followed by two 
more in the late 1970s and the early 1990s. The most recent wave began in 
August 2017 after a ruthless crackdown by Myanmar’s Army. As of today, 
roughly one million Rohingyas are residing in 34 refugee camps located 
at the southern tip of Bangladesh at a place known as Cox’s Bazar.
Bangladesh has a long history of collaborating with the EU, UNHCR, 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as other charities 
and NGOs, in assisting the Rohingyas inside these camps. Interestingly, 
a substantial amount of the efforts of the Bangladesh Government, 
UNHCR and other partners target the ‘visible’ Rohingyas, i.e. the ones 
who are officially registered ‘Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals’ 
or given ‘refugee’ status. They form only a part of the overall refugee 
situation, and the attention they receive casts a dark shadow on the plight 
of Rohingyas who over the years have fled across the border and inte-
grated themselves within the local communities because the Bangladesh 
Government, concerned that assisting unregistered refugees would create 
a ‘pull factor’ (Danish Immigration Service, 2011), chose not to recognize 
them. Living outside formal camps, several hundred thousand ‘invisible’ 
or unregistered Rohingyas live in dire conditions devoid of formal access 
to food, shelter or work permits.3 
3  Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury and Ranbir Samaddar, ‘Introduction’ in 
Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury and Ranbir Samaddar (eds) The Rohingya 
in South Asia: People Without a State (Routledge 2018), pp. 4.
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Although Bangladesh is not a State Party to the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol and does not 
have any national laws addressing asylum and refugee matters, it is not 
entirely devoid of a framework geared towards protecting refugees.4 
Much has changed since Pia Prytz Phiri (2008) described the adminis-
trative decisions taken by Bangladeshi authorities to protect and support 
the Rohingyas as “ad hoc, arbitrary and discretionary”. There is scope to 
argue that many of the Rohingya refugees do not “feel like deer caught 
between two tigers” as was once portrayed by Eileen Pittaway.5 
In recent times, Bangladesh has received praise for keeping her 
borders open to the fleeing Rohingyas and actively striving to meet 
their humanitarian needs. In 2017, the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh held that the 1951 Refugee Convention 
had “become a part of customary international law which is binding 
upon all the countries of the world, irrespective of whether a particular 
country has formally signed, acceded to or ratified the Convention or 
not.” In the absence of any constitutional provision clearly depicting the 
status of ‘customary international law’ in the legal order of Bangladesh, it 
remains a generally accepted principle that customary international law 
is binding as long as it does not contradict domestic law.6 Earlier this year, 
the Bangladesh Government’s decision to grant Rohingya children the 
access to education was widely lauded (Ahmed, 2020). 
Unfortunately, this does not negate the reality that there remain many 
gaps in the refugee protection regime. Instead of focusing on protecting 
and enhancing their rights, the discussion and discourse around the 
Rohingya refugee situation are leaning towards overcoming the challenge 
of how to return them to Myanmar. A Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) was signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar in November 2017 
for the purposes of repatriating the Rohingyas (VOA News, 2017) who 
4  The Foreigners Act 1946 remains one of the key pieces of legislation shaping 
the status of refugees in Bangladesh. 
5  Eileen Pittaway, ‘The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Failure of the In-
ternational protection Regime’ in Howard Adelman (ed) Protracted Displace-
ment in Asia: No Place to Call Home (Routledge 2008), pp. 83.
6  Bianca Karim and Tirza Theunissen, ‘Bangladesh’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) In-
ternational Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, 
and Persuasion (Oxford University Press 2012), pp. 8.
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fled from the atrocities of the Myanmar Army.7 The European Parlia-
ment (2017), at the time, insisted on the “direct implementation of the 
MoU and for the right of the Rohingya to voluntary, safe and dignified 
return to their places of origin […]” and expressed a note alarm that the 
Rohingyas may “not be repatriated back to their villages, but to refugee/
prison camps in Myanmar”. 
Another MoU between Myanmar and UN Agencies was signed in 
June 2018 to allow for the UNDP and UNHCR to assist the Myanmar 
Government to implement the MoU between Bangladesh and Myanmar.8 
In this MoU, the Myanmar Government agreed that it was “responsible 
for the safety, reception and reintegration of the returnees” and would 
“work for a comprehensive and durable solution to the displacement of 
persons in and from Rakhine State” in line with the recommendations of 
the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (2017).
Following the recent remarks of Md Shahriar Alam and the assur-
ances given by China, it appears that Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister 
of Bangladesh who once said “we have the ability to feed 160 million 
people of Bangladesh and we have enough food security to feed the 
700,000 refugees” (Tribune Desk, 2017), is running out of patience. One 
wonders whether, on the not so distant horizon, the Rohingyas will be 
repatriated to Myanmar at the expense of non-refoulement, a principle 
Bangladesh has upheld so far. 
In this context, the following section discusses how the EU drawing 
from its Pact on Migration and Asylum can positively shape the outcome 
of the Rohingya refugee situation.
7  The text of the MoU (Arrangement of Return of Displaced Persons from 
Rakhine State) could not be accessed at the time of drafting this contribution. 
However, it was possible to access the text of a subsequent arrangement titled 
‘Physical Arrangement for Repatriation of Displaced Myanmar Residents 
from Bangladesh Under the Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons 
from Rakhine State’. In this document, the Myanmar authorities assure that 
returnees will not be “settled in temporary places for a long period of time” 
and the transit camps in Myanmar will not become camps for ‘Internally Dis-
placed Persons’.
8  In May 2020, the MoU was extended to June 2021.
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18.3. The EU Pact’s potential impact on the Rohingya 
refugee situation
In the official Q&A relating to the EU Pact, there are two questions on 
refugees, namely, 1) “What funding is available to support refugees and 
address migration issues outside the EU?”; and 2) “What is the EU doing 
to help other third countries hosting large numbers of refugees?” The 
answers to these questions are straightforward. First of all, the Neigh-
bourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 
(NDICI) proposed at €79,462 billion envisions funding in support of 
refugees beyond the EU. Furthermore, the proposed flexible nature of 
EU financial instruments will allow responding to “unforeseen circum-
stances” (European Commission, 2020c) or crises relating to migration 
and refugees. Secondly, the EU already has an existing track record 
extending a helping hand to refugees in need through a range of dedicated 
instruments, such as the EU’s Facility for Refugees in Turkey, or other ini-
tiatives like the Global Refugee Forum. 
Although touted as “a new paradigm in the EU’s engagement with 
external partners” (European Commission, 2020c), the text of the EU 
Pact on Migration and Asylum explicitly mentions refugees and their 
host communities in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, but surprisingly 
say nothing about the Rohingyas. Bangladesh, alongside Afghanistan, 
Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, is listed as a ‘partner country’ in a footnote. 
One cannot ignore the possibility that the EU is concerned more about 
refugees on and near its borders than refugees from ‘faraway’ lands. 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the answers to the questions relating to 
refugees, there is scope to believe that the EU Pact has the potential to 
impact the Rohingya refugee situation positively. 
The EU Pact intends to deepen cooperation with partner countries 
by devising “tailor-made” (European Commission, 2020c) approaches 
that take into account their unique situations. These approaches will 
rely on a range of aspects which include, among others, the protection 
of refugees and supporting refugee-host countries, and also addressing 
the root causes of irregular migration. So far the EU’s response to the 
Rohingya refugee situation has been an amalgamation of extending 
financial aid and enforcing sanctions. Since 2017, the EU (2020d) has 
furnished humanitarian and development aid in the form of “food assis-
tance, shelter, health care, water and sanitation support, nutrition assis-
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tance, education, and protection services” valued over €226 million as 
a response to the plight of the Rohingyas. In April 2020, the European 
Council renewed the existing sanctions regime against Myanmar for 
another year. 
This does not imply, however, that the EU does not share a ‘rela-
tionship’ with Myanmar. Till date, after China and Thailand, the EU is 
Myanmar’s “third biggest trade partner” (European Commission, 2020e). 
Furthermore, although the EU is also one of the key partners in Myanmar’s 
transition to democracy, the mVoter 2020 application (Strangio, 2020) 
launched before the general elections held on November 08, 2020, is one 
of those things that stand out like a sore thumb. Funded by the EU’s STEP 
Democracy Project, the app was launched to assist Myanmar’s demo-
cratic transition. Despite many positives, this app has also ended up “vali-
dating Myanmar’s systemic discrimination and exclusion” (Stolton, 2020) 
of the Rohingyas by listing at least two Rohingya candidates as ‘Bengalis’ 
(Reuters, 2020), in other words implying that they are immigrants from 
Bangladesh. The EU’s strong calls to the Myanmar authorities to remove 
such controversial data (Reuters, 2020) which are very likely to exacer-
bate ethnic tensions (Strangio, 2020) were ignored. The end result has 
been the exclusion of about 2.6 million ethnic-minority voters, including 
the Rohingyas from the general elections. As of now, the several hundred 
thousand Rohingya’s remaining within Myanmar are confined in camps 
and villages with limited access to health care and the right to move (Al 
Jazeera, 2020b).
In realpolitik, it is not uncommon for compromises to be made 
during the long and arduous journey towards democratic rule. However, 
in light of the above, one wonders to what extent the EU (2019) is effec-
tively following through on its commitment to supporting “the voluntary, 
safe, sustainable and dignified return of Rohingya people to their places 
of origin, with the full involvement of UNHCR, in compliance with inter-
national law.” If the EU’s tailor-made approach of the future based on the 
EU Pact is to be effective, it needs to ensure that its funded projects do not 
end up “validating Myanmar’s systemic discrimination and exclusion” 
(Stolton, 2020). How the EU shall achieve this while simultaneously con-
tinuing to lend much-needed support to Myanmar in its transition to 
democracy will be tricky. This should not be a reason for the EU to shy 
away from rethinking its approach to solving a problem as complex as 
the Rohingya refugee situation, which is affecting millions of lives decade 
after decade. 
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18.4 Concluding thoughts 
In his speech at the recently concluded online donor conference, Md 
Shahriar Alam (2020) critiqued the international community’s “business 
as usual approach” and efforts to appease Myanmar “through increased 
bilateral trade, investment and development assistance”. One cannot help 
but speculate whether Alam was referring to, among other things, the 
EU’s existing relationship with Myanmar. Perhaps the most telling remark 
by Alam came at the very end of his speech when he said: “The role of 
the United Nations in saving ‘humanity from hell’ is also not visible in its 
policy actions towards Myanmar.” There is no way to interpret this as an 
off the cuff remark. Instead, it may well be a clear reflection of Bangla-
desh’s eroding confidence in the UN and the specifically UNHCR’s ability 
to resolve the Rohingya refugee situation. 
Even a cursory reading of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum 
shows how significantly it draws from the UN Global Compact on 
Refugees. It has been said that the UN GCR shall achieve its core objec-
tives through the “mobilization of political will”. One of the four core 
objectives of the UN GCR is to “support conditions in countries of origin 
for return in safety and dignity”. Bangladesh’s crisis of faith may stem from 
the belief that its partners like the EU and UNHCR have been focusing 
primarily on alleviating the plight of the Rohingyas inside Bangladesh on 
an ad hoc basis, but has been doing so at the cost of “pushing for any real 
change within Myanmar” (Tasneem, 2020). 
The EU would benefit from paying attention to critics who have 
voiced their concerns about how it has engaged with the Rohingya 
refugee situation so far. Echoing Mohammad Shahabuddin (2020), 
lending support to “a model of low-intensity democracy” that ulti-
mately exacerbates ethnic tensions is not the way forward. A genuinely 
tailor-made policy towards the Rohingya refugee situation, the kind of 
policy that is envisioned in the new EU Pact and reflects the ethos of the 
UN GCR, must strive for two complementary goals. First of all, the EU 
should work with Bangladesh so that it gives voice to and enhances the 
rights of the Rohingyas and respect the principle of non-refoulement, 
something the EU can do effectively if it acknowledges that Bangladesh 
is very likely suffering from a ‘crisis of faith’. And secondly, the EU must 
prioritize creating conditions to ensure the voluntary, safe, sustainable 
and dignified return of the Rohingyas to Myanmar by addressing the 
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‘root causes’ of their plight. This will catalyse the process of Bangladesh 
regaining its faith in the international community that has eroded with 
time.
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19. The New Pact’s Focus on  
Migrant Returns Threatens Africa-EU 
Partnership
Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo
19.1 Introduction
The European Commission (EC)’s New Migration and Asylum Pact (New 
Pact) is aimed at rebuilding trust and developing workable compromises 
within the European Union’s (EU) 27 states.1 This could well be achieved 
at the expense of partnerships with Africa. The New Pact’s emphasis on 
migrant returns and strengthening external borders is contrary to Africa’s 
position and could affect negotiations around the Post-Cotonou Partner-
ship Agreement (ACP) and the Africa–EU Strategy.
Decreasing irregular migrant arrivals and enhancing returns are 
among the seven thematic areas of the New Pact that aim to increase 
returns by implementing a common EU system that combines stronger 
structures with more effective cooperation with third countries. Measures 
include strengthening border control, signing returns agreements with 
third countries and allowing EU Member States to choose between reset-
tling refugees and sponsoring returns.
19.2 Europe’s growing focus on returns
Overall irregular border crossings to EU Member States have dramati-
cally decreased since Europe detected 1.82 million illegal external border 
1  Part of this Chapter was published by the Institute for Security Studies (Abe-
be and Mbiyozo, 2020).
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crossings in 2015. According to UNHCR (2020a) data, 95,031refugees 
and migrants crossed the Mediterranean into the EU during 2020.
As irregular arrivals have decreased, EU institutions and Member 
States have increased their focus on returning migrants. Within the EU, 
where migration is deeply divisive among Member States, enforcing 
returns is one of the few unifying topics. According to the New Pact:
“EU migration rules can be credible only if those who do not have 
the right to stay in the EU are effectively returned. Currently, only about 
a third of people ordered to return from Member States actually leave. 
This erodes citizens’ trust in the whole system of asylum and migration 
management and acts as an incentive for irregular migration.” It goes on 
to state that an average of 370,000 asylum applicants are rejected each 
year and a third are returned home.
19.3 Pressure on Africa
According to Eurostat (2020), Africans make up a small minority of 
asylum claims in the EU per year. Their claims are far exceeded by those 
of other nationals including Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis, Pakistanis, Turks, 
Iranians and more recently Venezuelans and Colombians. In 2019, only 
9,655 returnees – six percent of total returns – were sub-Saharan African 
nationals.
Despite these low numbers, the EU directs a lot of returns pressure 
towards Africa. In recent years, the EU and its Member States have tried 
to compel African states to accept and facilitate returns and readmissions 
through various legal and political instruments. Under the European 
Commission’s (2016) New Partnership Framework, 13 of the 16 priority 
countries are in Africa, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia.
19.4 Africa’s divergent priorities
African negotiators have consistently resisted forcing states to take back 
their returned nationals and failed asylum seekers. African migration is 
predominantly intra-continental. According to the International Organ-
ization for Migration (IOM, 2020) Africa Migration Report: Challenging 
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the Narrative, 21 million of the world’s 39.4 million African-born migrants 
(53.2%) live in Africa. UNHCR (2019) says Africa also hosts 25.7 million 
of the world’s 79.5 million displaced people. The continent is working 
towards free movement, free trade and regional integration. Strength-
ening securitised measures to prevent or deter migration are contrary to 
these priorities.
Contrary to the narrative that portrays African migration flowing 
principally to the EU, far more Africans are using the Eastern Routes 
to get to the Middle East and Gulf via Yemen. In 2019 alone, 138,000 
Africans used the treacherous Eastern Route; between 2006 and 2016, 
over 800,000 African migrants and refugees crossed to Yemen.
Accepting returns is politically difficult for many African countries. 
Cooperating with EU members on forced returns can hurt the legitimacy 
of governments. This resistance by African governments is driven by the 
urge to avoid being branded as facilitators of deportation of their own 
citizens.
According to VOA (Hoije, 2016), in December 2016, Mali was offered 
USD 160 million to cooperate on migrant returns, but it withdrew from 
the deal due to a public outcry. According to the New Humanitarian 
(Hunt, 2020), the Gambia faced public outcry after it signed a similar 
informal  arrangement  in May 2018. Returns from Germany began 
accelerating and media images of deportees in handcuffs and shackles 
arriving in the Gambia from Germany at a time of massive youth unem-
ployment resulted in mass protest. The government eventually stopped 
cooperating on returns to offset potential damage to their constitutional 
role as protectors of their citizens – and subsequently hurt public trust 
in them.
The other factor is remittances which serve as the most dependable 
source of income to many African societies. According to IOM (2020) 
Africa Report, Africa received USD 81 billion in remittances in 2018. 
In contrast, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, 2019) reported a total USD 46 billion in foreign direct invest-
ment to Africa. The World Bank (Ratha, 2019) has established that remit-
tances are the most important source of external financing in low- and 
middle-income countries; in most cases they are larger than development 
aid and foreign investment combined. Cooperation on returns could 
attract development funding, but citizens fear losing remittances.
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The New Pact proposes a “one stop asylum” system with a central-
ised and accelerated system for asylum decisions. It applies mandatory 
pre-entry identity, health and security screening. Those likely to receive 
asylum would be designated to an EU country responsible for their appli-
cation. The rest would enter a ‘fast-track’ application process in border 
facilities, based on their country of origin. If rejected, they would be 
returned to their country of origin. Both processes will take 12 weeks. 
Overall, this approach erodes refugee protection regimes, raising many 
procedural and human rights concerns such as eliminating the chance to 
appeal if rejected.
Vulnerable Africans genuinely seeking protection must surpass 
extraordinary barriers to reach Europe. The measures taken to stem 
irregular migrants increase the barriers for legitimate travellers and have 
made these pathways even more difficult and dangerous.
19.5 Securitisation of human mobility
Returns form part of the EU’s migration approach towards Africa that 
is focused on externalisation policies and an overall securitisation of 
human mobility. These measures have reduced irregular entries to the 
EU at severe costs to Africa and are not aligned with Africa’s migration 
priorities.
A 2019 Institute for Security Studies report (Abebe, 2019) examining 
the impacts of European policies in Agadez, Niger, revealed many adverse 
impacts. Agadez is a key transit point between West Africa and the Sahel 
and the Maghreb region. It is estimated that a third of all migrants trav-
elling through Agadez end up on a boat to Europe. The EU’s interven-
tions to dismantle Agadez’s ‘migration industry’ without putting in place 
alternative means of income generation for its residents have significantly 
diminished the local economy. Traders who provided goods and services 
such as food, water or phones have lost their livelihoods. Development 
aid promising to replace these livelihoods has not arrived fast enough 
and many people have been disenfranchised.
While these measures have curtailed the local smuggling industry, 
they have unwittingly contributed to a rise in others. Large criminal 
syndicates have been able to adapt and continue to provide smuggling 
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services, while smaller Nigerien smuggling operators such as drivers or 
hostel operators have lost their business. Sudanese smugglers have capi-
talised on these shifts and offered new – and riskier – pathways through 
less-travelled parts of Chad and Sudan, including active conflict zones. 
This journey costs five times more than the one via Agadez.
The government’s inability to protect local economic actors has 
eroded public confidence in the local government. Molenaar (2017) 
quotes one official who said, “the locals ask us why we work for the EU 
rather than them, the people who elected them”.
19.6 Development funds and visas used as leverage
The New Pact states all available tools should be used to enforce more 
returns. These include offering an additional 10% in development assis-
tance to countries that cooperate and applying restrictive visa measures 
to those who don’t. The Pact’s visa proposal deepens the 2019 EU revised 
visa system by shifting to a multilaterally binding instrument.
Previous EU migration platforms included plans to expand visa 
pathways. Expanding immigration and humanitarian pathways has 
shown to successfully slow irregular migration when combined with 
strong enforcement measures, but the EU has moved away from these 
proposals.
Koch et al. (2018) argue that, in recent years, the EU has re-oriented 
migration policies to bundle restrictions within development funding 
under the auspices of addressing the ‘root causes’ of migration. The 
New Pact directs even more funding towards security and surveillance 
measures – including allocations to  repressive  governments – than 
projects with true development potential.
Mbiyozo (2020) argues that this approach  enables  the horrific cir-
cumstances for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Libya. Migrants 
– mainly from East and West Africa – who pass through or are returned 
from failed boat crossings to Europe  face  ‘unacceptable and extreme’ 
forms of violence such as indefinite detention, extortion, torture, sexual 
violence, conscription and forced labour.
Since 2015, the EU Trust Fund for Africa has  given  Libya €435 
million, including €57.2 million for border management. The EU has 
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provided direct funding, training and equipment to the Libyan Coast 
Guard, whose members have been implicated in smuggling and sus-
taining informal detention centres that operate as lucrative trafficking 
and smuggling hubs. EU development assistance is supposed to be spent 
on helping those in need and visa measures should remain bilateral.
19.7 Returns are complex
Removing unauthorised people from one country requires another 
country to accept them. Countries must cooperate and coordinate on 
nationality identification and the issuing of travel documents. Deter-
mining nationality is a state’s sovereign right. It can be complicated to 
prove, particularly if migrants dispute their origin or are unwilling to 
cooperate.
According to Frontex’s (2020)  Risk  Analysis, 14,346 people of 
‘unspecified sub-Saharan nationals’ arrived in Europe in 2019, up from 
69 in 2018 and 0 in 2017. These statistics suggest that authorities created 
a new classification for undocumented migrants whom they suspected 
were African but could not confirm it because those individuals refused 
to disclose or dispute their country of origin to avoid being returned.
Third-country returns, meaning expelling someone to a country 
where he or she is not a national, are particularly contentious. Transit 
countries have strongly resisted accepting returns of non-nationals. 
Some have been expelling migrants and asylum seekers themselves. 
Human Rights Watch (2020) reports that, during 2020, Algeria has force-
fully expelled thousands of migrants and asylum seekers to Niger regard-
less of nationality. Expelling people to transit countries does not sustain-
ably resolve any issues and sets a problematic precedent.
The Institute for Security Studies (Mbiyozo, 2019) found that, 
even when all parties agree to returns, reintegration schemes for failed 
asylum seekers or irregular migrants from the EU to Africa have been 
largely ineffective. They have instead resulted in hardship, violence and 
even re-migration. Many cases have been documented where returnees 
have not received the assistance they were promised. Some people have 
even been returned to the wrong countries.
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19.8 Negotiations at a standstill
The African Union (AU) and its Member States maintain that returns 
must be voluntary despite mounting pressure across bilateral and multi-
lateral platforms. According to Slagter (2019), only Cape Verde has signed 
a formal readmission agreement with the EU, while Ethiopia, Guinea, the 
Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire have agreed to informal arrangements.
Returns are one of the key factors behind the existing EU-ACP 
negotiation deadlock. The current Cotonou Agreement includes a non-
binding clause (under Article 13) for countries to readmit nationals 
whose asylum applications are rejected. The Council of the European 
Union (2018) wants to include a legally binding clause forcing states to 
accept non-voluntary migrant returns.
The existing EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement expired in February 2020 
and hasn’t been replaced. African member states – comprising 48 of the 
79 ACP states – strongly oppose forced returns and insist that any returns 
must be voluntary. The disagreement on returns has contributed to this 
deadlock. The New Pact’s reiterated focus on returns could further com-
promise negotiations.
Enhancing returns and readmission is also a critical area of focus of 
the migration and mobility priority area of the EC’s Joint Communica-
tion and Council Conclusions related to the Africa-EU Strategy. Nego-
tiations on this deal were postponed until 2021 due to Covid-19. Abebe 
and Maalim (2020) concluded that, despite insisting that the Africa-EU 
strategy is a “partnership of equals”, as it stands, the Communication and 
Council Conclusions don’t sufficiently reflect Africa’s priorities, including 
reiterating securitised perspectives towards African migration.
African negotiators have  consistently  resisted forcing states to take 
back their returned nationals and failed asylum seekers, including 
throughout the duration of the UN Global Compact for Migration. 
Notably, this compact isn’t mentioned in the New Pact – nor are the 
Global Compact’s principles on safe and dignified returns that respect 
the rights of returnees in line with international and regional laws and 
norms.
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19.9 Conclusions
The New Pact reflects the EU’s priorities, underscoring that returns are 
one of the key unifying factors among its Member States. It does so at the 
expense of African partnerships or true solutions to migration manage-
ment from Africa. The renewed focus on returns will affect important 
non-migration agreements, most notably the ACP and the Africa-EU 
Strategy.
The EU’s reorientation of migration policies prioritising the stemming 
of migration flows has had numerous adverse effects – intended and 
unintended – on Africa. These restrictive policies are incompatible with 
the EU’s own free movement regime and are inhibiting Africa’s efforts to 
implement its own version.
The New Pact wrongly assumes that the threat of fast deportation 
will deter migrants and refugees from attempting any movement. They 
undertake extraordinary risks because they have to. There is also no 
evidence that a country’s willingness to accept forced returns will result 
in a high number of returns or deter future arrivals.
The AU and its Member States should remain focused on their key 
priority – Africa’s regional integration agenda. Implementing the African 
Continental Free Trade Area and expanding free movement are critical 
to achieving Africa’s objectives – sustainable and inclusive growth, good 
governance, and peace and security.
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20. Trends In Brazil’s Practices of 
Refugee Protection: Promising 
Inspirations For the EU?
Liliana Lyra Jubilut and João Carlos Jarochinski Silva
20.1 Introduction
Last October, Brazil was elected to chair the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee (ExCom) 
(Brasil- Ministério das Relações Internacionais, 2020) in what can be seen 
as a culmination of positive perceptions of the country’s refugee protec-
tion practices (ACNUR, 2003; Murillo Gonzales, 2010; Grandi, 2019). 
These practices encompass both traditional topics of refugee protection 
and durable solutions – starting with the national law on refugees in the 
late 1990s, followed by the proposal and implementation of resettlement 
in solidarity in the early 2000s, the adoption of humanitarian visas from 
the 2010s and, more recently, the treatment of Venezuelans arriving in 
the country. 
At a time when the European Union (EU) is discussing refugee 
protection and governance (even though there are questions about the 
comprehensiveness and honesty of the proposals (Crisp, 2020), as well 
as of combining migration and asylum (Gilbert, 2020; see Chapter 3)), 
assessing existing practices that (i) are said to be based on solidarity, (ii) 
are perceived as responses to ‘crisis’, and, (iii) might inspire or be replicated 
(through the practices in themselves or from trends among them) can be 
relevant. This is true especially in terms of ensuring integral protection 
(i.e. human rights and migratory status rights) (Jubilut and Apolinário, 
2008a), as well as the balance between states’ interests and refugees’ 
rights. This text aims to aid in this endeavour, by briefly describing each 
of these practices and diagnosing trends in Brazil’s protection of refugees.
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20.2 Brazil’s praised practices of refugee protection
The first praised Brazilian practice towards refugees was its national law 
on the issue – Law 9474 of 1997 (Brasil, 1997). It was adopted after the 
redemocratization of the country, in a period of increased concern for 
human rights (Jubilut, 2006) and was seen as a model for the region 
(ibid.). This perception derived from the fact that it:
1. adopted, alongside the universal definition of refugee, the 
regional concept stemming from the Cartagena Declaration 
(Rodrigues, 2020) thus allowing persons fleeing gross and gener-
alized violence of human rights to be regarded as refugees, 
2. created a federal organ vested with the responsibility for refugee 
status determination (RSD) and policies towards refugees, 
3. established an administrative procedure for RSD in the country 
and 
4. linked refugee protection and human rights (Jubilut and Zamur, 
2017). 
Secondly, Brazil became an emerging resettlement country in the 
early 2000s and regionally proposed the ‘Resettlement in solidarity' 
initiative (Jubilut and Carneiro, 2011), which was adopted in the 2004 
Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action. It encouraged countries in Latin 
America to create resettlement programs and to implement them based 
on solidarity, i.e. not focusing on the potential of refugees for integra-
tion but rather on their protection needs (ibid.). The initiative resonated 
in the region especially due to the Colombian crisis. Brazil has resettled 
mainly Colombians and Palestinians through the initiative (Jubilut and 
Zamur, 2018). The numbers of resettled refugees in Brazil are small, 
and reception of new cases was almost paralyzed in recent years – even 
though resettlement is a key component in the “solutions” aspect of the 
2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (paras. 90-93), but the practice 
has been lauded as it has opened new avenues of protection (ibid.).
In 2012, once again beginning with a regional focus, Brazil adopted 
humanitarian visas to assist in the protection of Haitians in light of the 
2010 earthquake. This has been a third praised practice and in 2013, 
it was extended to persons affected by the Syrian conflict. The ad hoc 
measures aimed at facilitating the entry of displaced persons from these 
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contexts into Brazil; in what could be understood as a complementary 
pathway to admission, an avenue of protection sought by the GCR 
(paras. 94-96). However, they did not secure legal migratory status for 
them once they were in the country, leaving them with a precarious legal 
basis (Jubilut, Andrade and Madureira, 2016). The adoption of the new 
Brazilian Migration Law - Law 13 445 of 2017 (Brasil, 2017) has largely 
changed this scenario as it establishes humanitarian welcoming as a 
principle (Article 3, VI) and temporary humanitarian visas (Article 14, I, 
c) as a possibility. Moreover, since the law’s adoption, the humanitarian 
visa regulations seem to have built-in measures to grant legal migratory 
status (thus being both an entry visa and a residency visa) (Brazil, 2019). 
The ad hoc component of the granting of humanitarian visas, however, 
remains.
This may be explained by the fact that geopolitics still plays a relevant 
role in Brazil’s practices towards refugees, which is exemplified in the 
fourth praised practice to be mentioned - the treatment of Venezuelans 
arriving in the country, by Operação Acolhida (Brasil, n/d). Due to the 
increased influx of Venezuelans, the federal government established this 
operation in 2015, giving a leading role to the Armed Forces, aimed at 
ordering the border of the northern state of Roraima (the Venezuelans’ 
main entry point into Brazil in this current displacement). The initia-
tive led to the creation of shelters, the enhanced presence of international 
organizations and NGOs in the region, the structuring of bureaucratic 
procedures for legal migratory status, and the novel practice of interi-
orização, i.e. the redistribution of the refugees to other Brazilian states. 
Interiorização can be perceived as an “internal resettlement” and has a 
dual focus – firstly, to relieve pressure on Roraima (which historically 
has had high levels of inequality, insufficient social and economic struc-
tures and problems in terms of access to rights and services (Jubilut and 
Jarochinski Silva, 2020a) and secondly, to aid refugees in rebuilding their 
lives. 
However, even though the operation has earned prizes (Godinho, 
2018) and inspired suggestions of a similar approach in the EU (Góis, 
2020), certain realities have come to light, namely:
(i) integration remains a challenge; 
(ii) the success of relocations also needs to be explained by the 
limits that the geography of the northern states naturally create; 
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(iii) refugee numbers in general in Brazil although high compared 
to the country’s history are still small in comparison to others 
in the region, and 
(iv) there are concerns about the respect of international norms 
in some practical aspects of the treatment of Venezuelans 
in Brazil, such as access to adequate procedures and even to 
refuge itself (Jarochinski Silva and Jubilut, 2018; Jubilut and 
Jarochinski Silva, 2020b). 
(v) moreover, it seems that resettlement has been put on hold as 
the government has focused on Operação Acolhida (Jubilut and 
Zamur, 2018). 
20.3 Trends in Brazil’s Refugee Protection
Although praised as “good”, these practices have attracted criticism both 
in themselves and for not being systemic decisions but rather ad hoc 
polices – within a broader critique of Brazil’s non-holistic migration and 
refugee governance, as well as due to concerns regarding human rights 
and international refugee law, as outlined in the GCR’s principles (paras. 
5 and 9). However, they seem to put good “bones” in place, from which 
improved protective structures can be built. Furthermore, most of these 
practices have been created in light of and as responses to significant 
increases in the influx of refugees into Brazil compared to the national 
numbers, and seem to be innovative.
In this regard there are three aspects of Brazil’s practices that can also 
be seen as noteworthy trends: a focus on solidarity, the implementation 
of multi-level partnerships, and the crucial role of cities.
Solidarity can be noted both in the ‘Resettlement in solidarity’ ini-
tiative and in the practice of interiorização, and is present both towards 
the states (i.e. those countries that were receiving large numbers of 
Colombian refugees in the first, and the state of Roraima in the latter) 
and to the displaced, in a dual approach. Solidarity might be a principle 
worthy of replicating in a regional context of developed cooperation and 
open internal borders such as the EU, (and also) in a scenario where trust 
seems to be lacking (Thym, 2020).
Multi-level partnerships, which seem to be long-operating in Brazil, 
is another interesting practice to be considered in discussing the new EU 
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New Pact on Migration and Asylum (EU, 2020). Since before its national 
law on refugees, but with renewed strength after it, a tripartite structure 
of refugee protection (involving the federal government, the interna-
tional community represented by UNHCR, and civil society) has been in 
place in Brazil (Jubilut, 2006; Jubilut and Apolinário, 2008b) pre-existing 
the approach of partnership and multi-stakeholder participation of the 
GCR (paras. 13, 22, 33-44, for instance). 
Initially working on RSD, assistance and integration, the structure has 
been replicated in the resettlement in solidarity initiative, as well as in 
the Operação Acolhida (including interiorização). In the latter, a signif-
icant increase in the number of participating national and international 
civil society organizations, and of organizations and organs linked to the 
United Nations, has been noted. Multi-level partnerships in Brazil play a 
key role in integral refugee protection, as well as in delineating the issue as 
belonging to the country as a whole and not just of the government. This 
might be a positive lesson for when considering constructive and protec-
tive governance. Moreover, a new local actor has also gained relevance 
and added a new layer to multi-level partnerships in Brazil – i.e. cities.
Cities have become key partners in the interiorização (for example, 
their acceptance in receiving Venezuelans, at least in theory – given that 
in practice most internal redistribution seems to stem from personal or 
familial ties of the refugees themselves), thus allowing for the observance 
of two axes of multi-level partnerships in Brazil’s refugee protection: 
government-international community-civil society; and federal govern-
ment-states-international organizations-cities. 
The role of cities had already been highlighted in the ‘Resettlement 
in solidarity’ initiative as they had volunteered to receive the resettled 
refugees, took part in the selection process, and worked with civil society 
and UNHCR in their integration (Jubilut and Carneiro, 2011). In Brazil, 
cities do not have the power to issue documents, which in the case of 
interiorização is provided prior to relocation, by a nationally accepted 
document – even with provisional status – (this immediate and at the 
point of entry issuance is a good practice that could be replicated by 
the EU). Cities also cannot make decisions in terms of legal status for 
migrants, but, in Brazil’s federal system, the municipal governments 
are vested with the responsibility of the direct implementation of social 
programs (even some funded by the national government), therefore 
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being essential in the issues of health, education and shelter. Thus, having 
this increased role of cities is a positive step toward integral protection of 
refugees and other migrants. 
Besides solidarity, multi-level partnerships and the increased role of 
cities, there are three other trends that can be identified in Brazil’s refugee 
protection good practices and that may be interesting to assess when the 
EU is re-thinking its governance of migration.
First, there is the fact that, as mentioned, Brazil’s actions in migration 
in general and refugee protection more specifically are not as a rule 
systemic but rather ad hoc policies. In this sense, they differ from the EU’s 
New Pact that is said to posit general principles for later consensus (Betts, 
2020) or be a police guide (Carrera, 2020; see Chapter 1). This ad hoc 
nature can have both positive and negative aspects, as, on the one hand, 
actions may be faster and grant rapid protection while more general rules 
and practices are being determined and can also be tailored to specific 
situations while political will is gathered for more systemic policies, and, 
on the other hand, they are impacted by political will and action.
Second, and relating to this last point, another trend in Brazil’s 
refugee protection is that it seems to default towards a reactive nature. 
On the one hand, this leads to ad hoc policies and a non-systemic archi-
tectural structure of protection; on the other, it shows that good practices 
can emerge in light of a crisis or emergencies, highlighting that inno-
vative refugee protection and policies that combine states’ interests and 
refugees’ needs can exist. 
Lastly, another relevant trend is that Brazil’s refugee protection 
practices by and large respect rights. Although there is always room for 
improvement, and there are occasional violations (that might be severe, 
such as in the closing of borders without exceptions for refugees (Jubilut 
and Jarochinski Silva, 2020a), individual cases of non-refoulment in the 
past (Jubilut, 2015), and more recently a government decision of denying 
claims without allowing the asylum seekers to be interviewed (DPU, 2020; 
CNDH, 2020), they tend to be more contextual than systemic. Respecting 
rights is central to the political decisions of migration governance; hence 
this trend, as a general aspect and upheld to a great extent by the tripar-
tite system (particularly civil society and human rights-mandated public 
organs), in Brazil’s refugee protection practices is noteworthy.
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20.3 Conclusions
From the aforementioned practices regarded as “good”, to several of the 
identified trends, Brazil might offer inspiration for new structures of 
migration governance. There is room for criticism as well as for improve-
ment, but some of the broader brushstrokes can offer positive paradigms 
towards enhancing protection for both refugees and other migrants in an 
increasingly challenging global environment.
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no Brasil: a proteção brasileira aos refugiados e seu impacto nas 
Américas. Brasília: ACNUR, Ministério da Justiça.
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21. Redistributing EU ‘Burdens’:  
The Tunisian Perspective on The New 
Pact on Migration and Asylum
Betty Rouland
21.1 Introduction
Regarding the so-called ‘New’ Pact on Migration and Asylum published 
on 23 September 2020 by the European Commission, Tunisia is more 
than ever in the firing line of the European Union (EU) for the imple-
mentation of its extraterritorial migratory policies (European Commis-
sion, 2020). The country, located at the Southern shore of the Mediterra-
nean Sea and sharing a border with Libya, represents a central player for 
the EU with its multiplying arsenal of instruments for managing human 
mobility in the macro-region. This situation stands in a long line of 
instances of ‘cooperation’ on migration between Tunisia and the EU that 
started on 25 April 1976 (Limam, 2020a).
By an even stronger reinforcement of the security approach initiated 
over the last decades, the Pact places cooperation with third countries at 
the heart of its strategy of externalisation. It insists on control, tracking 
and expeditious screening for ‘return’ or relocation while making 
the refugee status process extremely tedious. In view of the migratory 
situation and the multidimensional tensions characterizing the Medi-
terranean Sea region, room for manoeuvre by the Tunisian government 
might be renegotiated. In the Pact, the focus on ‘migration partnerships’ 
exemplifies how Tunisian mobility facilities is conditioned by readmis-
sions agreements, and how the label ‘partner’ proves not to be appro-
priate. So far, Tunisia has deployed a strategy based on a triple approach: 
officially resisting, cooperating on the ground and adopting a lethargic 
position on legal issues.
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21.2 The Pact: from territorial exclusion to inclusive 
cooperation with third countries
Not shifting from previous paradigms, the Pact is merely an extension 
of a coercive approach for promoting externalised and de-territorialised 
policies on migration and asylum in third countries including Tunisia. 
The Pact makes a priority of excluding non-EU citizens from its territory 
while it advocates inclusive cooperation with third countries.
Classified as a country of departure (of origin and transit), Tunisia 
accumulates what the EU considers ‘burdens’ to be redistributed. On the 
one hand, Tunisia supplies the most important contingency of ‘irregular-
ized’ migrants arriving to the Italian coasts. On the other hand, the insta-
bility in Libya positions Tunisia as an irresistible gatekeeper for the EU in 
regards to migrant and refugee flows. On top of that, the sensitive political 
transition as well as the economic gloom triggered by the uprisings have 
made the country one of the main providers of jihadists since 2011 (Attia, 
2019). In 2020, the pandemic crisis caused by Covid-19 further exacer-
bated multidimensional tensions favouring departures from Tunisia.
Consequently, the current context undeniably plays into the hands 
of the European Commission’s Migration and Asylum Pact. With a total 
of 11,212 Tunisians arriving to the Italian coasts since the beginning of 
2020 (41.2% of the total arrivals), the tone changed over the summer 
between both Mediterranean countries.1 While this situation reminds 
us of similar frictions caused by the uprisings in 2011 (AFP, 2011), dip-
lomatic pressures  increased and the Italian foreign minister Luigi Di 
Maio threatened Tunisia with cutting economic support (equivalent to 
€6.5million) (Haddad, 2020). In response, a bilateral agreement on the 
readmission of approximately  80 Tunisians a week in two flights  was 
concluded between Italia and Tunisia (Ziniti, 2020). The civil society has 
been denouncing the lack of transparency of this agreement as well as 
the lack of accountability and the systemic violation of human rights 
(FTDES, 2020).
The terrorist attack on the Notre Dame Basilica in the French city of 
Nice on 29 October 2020, committed by a Tunisian national, placed the 
security question back on the table. The terrorist arrived in the EU on 
1  For more data, see: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/loca-
tion/5205. 
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the island of Lampedusa, one European fortress gateway for migrants. In 
the aftermath of this tragedy, the French Minister of the Interior Gérald 
Darmanin met his North African counterparts in Tunis in November 
2020. His goal was to pursue cooperation against terrorism and to 
negotiate the expulsion of radicalized Tunisians. While neither negoti-
ation on readmissions nor cooperation against terrorism are new diplo-
matic topics, the analogical picture linking irregular migrants, refugees 
and terrorists has effectively moved the humanitarian debate into a ‘jus-
tification of security’ narrative. During an official visit in France, the new 
head of the Tunisian government, Hichem Mechichi, had struck a fatal 
damaged declaring ‘and who says illegal migration, also says terrorism’ 
(Perelman, 2020).
21.3 A matter of form and substance
If the Tunisian government firmly affirms its sovereignty on migration 
issues refusing the project of ‘hotspot’ on its territory, several types of 
cooperation remain in substance from the 1990s including a long series 
of agreements (Bisiaux, 2020). Those agreements essentially link the EU’s 
financial support in Tunisia to the  European Union Emergency Trust 
Fund (EUTF for Africa), estimated at €57m to be distributed to different 
tasks for managing migration and asylum issues (controls, strengthening 
of capacity-building, fighting human and migrant traffic, etc.) (Bisiaux, 
2020).
The Pact multiplies concepts or instruments for returning irregular-
ized or undesirable people to their home countries or third countries: 
‘Return Directive’, ‘effective return policy’, ‘return systems’, ‘return border 
procedure’, ‘return policies’ ‘return sponsorship’, ‘return programmes’, etc. 
In doing so, the lexicon used in the Pact clearly embodies the priorities 
made to exclude non-EU citizens from quicker and more effective pro-
cedures. In the Pact’s proposal, the ‘return’ for non-pre-selected people 
facilitated by the cooperation with third countries appears a key objective 
as shown by the occurrences of the term ‘return’ (-s, –ed, –ees, –ing) (98 
times), ‘cooperation’ (70) or ‘third countries’ (35).
While ‘voluntary return’ is a recycled objective (from the Commis-
sion’s 2018 proposal on the Return Directive), the introduction of the 
concept of ‘return sponsorship’ is well worth a cosmetic terminolog-
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ical operation. Defined in the Pact as providing support to the Member 
State under pressure ‘to swiftly return those who have no right to 
stay’ (European Commission, 2020: 5), the objective in substance aims 
to achieve the same goal. As a complex puzzle of procedures, the ‘return 
sponsorship’ is an unclear incentive of ‘solidarity practice’ and ‘partners’ 
from third countries have not been taking into consideration (Cassarino, 
2020).
21.4 Upstaging the ‘monkey on our back’: asylum and 
refugees in the context of a legal vacuum
In the Pact, the novelty is that screening procedures seek efficiency in 
‘instituting a concomitance’ between the examination and the application 
for asylum or the return decision (Limam, 2020b). The document clearly 
underlines the aim ‘to establish a seamless procedure at the border appli-
cable to all non-EU citizens crossing without authorisation, comprising 
pre-entry screening, an asylum procedure and where applicable a swift 
return procedure – thereby integrating processes which are currently 
separate’ (European Commission, 2020: 4). By making asylum and 
return as ‘part of a single system’ (European Commission, 2020: 3), the 
screening upstages the refugee’s assistance and contradicts the humane 
approach  claimed by the von der Leyen Commission (European Com-
mission, 2020). Priority is clearly on the protection of EU borders rather 
than on the protection of people; refugees and asylum are now a ‘subset’ 
of irregular migration (Spijkerboer, 2020; see Chapter 5). As a result of 
the relegation of this thorny ‘burden’, the Pact emphasizes that juridical 
status supplants human rights.
Despite the ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees 
and other associated protocols, Tunisia does not offer legal protection 
to refugees. In 2014, impelled by the context of democratic transition, 
Tunisia adopted a new constitution which recognizes the right to political 
asylum in Article 25 (Haon, 2012/3). This took place alongside a project 
of law on asylum in Tunisia. It was reworked until 2018, but since then 
nothing has happened (Limam, 2020b). In compliance with international 
standards, the adoption of this law would permit expulsion or depor-
tation (called ‘return’) to Tunisia including Tunisians but also citizens 
from third countries. Widely mobilized, the civil society is calling for the 
establishment of an effective asylum system (Euromed Rights, 2019).
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To some extent, the camp of Choucha was a prelude for upstaging assis-
tance to asylum seekers and refugees. Near the Libyan-Tunisian border 
post of Ras Jedir, this camp opened in 2011 and was managed by the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) primarily to contain flows of people fleeing 
the armed conflicts in Libya (Haon, 2012/3). In the camp, procedures 
of returns (organized by the International Organization for Migration), 
or resettlement in a third country (administered by UNHCR), coexisted 
(Haon, 2012/13). Regarding the procedures for seeking asylum, multiple 
irregularities  have been denounced (e.g. lack to access to interpreters) 
(Carrera et al., 2018). With almost 18 000 individuals in the camp, it 
closed officially in 2013 but it was dismantled in 2017 by Tunisian author-
ities. Back then, people refused to leave the camp because Tunisia does 
not legal perspectives (asylum, residence or work permit). Since then, 
people have desperately been waiting for refugee status – which does not 
yet exist in Tunisia (Blaise, 2019).
Tunisia has developed a strategy of ‘response/resistance’ and the law 
on asylum is not the only project pending (Limam, 2020a). It is precisely 
the absence of a clear legal framework for asylum procedures combined 
with the violation of human rights that contradicts the idea one should 
consider Tunisia as a ‘safe country’ or among the list of ‘safe third 
countries’ – even though some EU countries refer to Tunisia as such. 
The Pact refers to ‘a greater degree of harmonization for the concepts of 
safe (third) country on the EU list of countries identified as such’ (Pact, 
5). Tunisian NGOs and civil society organisations denounce this status 
quo  advocating that only real measures for helping Tunisia become a 
safe place would permit one to consider the country hospitable (Bisiaux, 
2020).
21.5 Complex chessboard
A key innovation of the Pact is the call for solidarity among EU states 
preaching the notion of interstate for  mutual trust (Carrera, 2020). In 
reference to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, EU countries must improve their 
cooperation in order to redistribute more equally the ‘burden’ of asylum 
seekers and refugees. A sustainable approach prioritizing assistance to 
migrants and refugees was seemingly discarded by the Pact which all the 
same advocates rather inclusive cooperation with third countries for con-
taining, returning or relocating undesirable flows of migrants.
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In doing so, the result (intended or not) has been international part-
nerships which are based on a balance of power rather than solidarity 
and mutual trust. The Pact mentions the importance of ‘an assessment of 
the interests of the EU and partner countries’ through ‘mutually benefi-
cial partnerships’ (European Commission, 2020: 13) with neighbouring 
countries (specifically referring to) the North African region. However, 
this principle of reciprocity is conditioned above all by the level of cooper-
ation of third countries on readmissions. Even more explicitly, the Com-
mission indicates the application of restrictive visa measures in cases of 
‘substantial and practical problems’ (European Commission, 2020).
Initiated in 2012, a ‘Mobility Partnership’ between the EU and Tunisia 
was signed in 2014 with the purpose of improving the management of 
migratory flows (Euromed Rights, 2014; European Commission, 2014). 
This includes, inter alia, the opening of negotiations for readmissions in 
exchange for a visa facilitation agreement (Limam and Del Sarto, 2015). 
If this  partnership agreement  is not implemented, the new conditions 
advocated in the Pact might compromise negotiations further.2
In the Tunisian context of democratization, legal progress is being 
driven by the mobilization of Tunisian civil society. Denouncing actively 
human rights violations (e.g. systemic racism) (Akrimi, 2020), NGOs are 
a new key actor for politicising the conditions of migrants and refugees 
without status in Tunisia. In respect to the Mobility Partnership, the 
Tunisian civil society criticizes the fact that  it has not been consulted 
(Euromed Rights, 2014). Legal progress can be noticed as attested by 
the approved law in 2016 to prevent and fight against human trafficking 
(Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, 2016). Furthermore, 
a 2018 law sought the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
in Tunisia (even if the associated Commission has not yet been estab-
lished) (Euromed Rights, 2018).
Since the 2011 uprisings, Tunisia has gone through major and mul-
tifaceted transformations  including important challenges in terms 
of migration and asylum issues (Rouland and Bachmann, 2015; Boubakri, 
2015). Furthermore, the migration landscape changed significantly as a 
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consequence of flows of people fleeing not only armed conflicts in Libya 
but also contexts of instability and insecurity in other countries (with an 
overrepresentation of Syrians, Ivorian, Sudanese, Eritreans, Somalis, and 
Guineans in 2020) (Castiello d’Antonio, 2020).
By barricading the EU fortress with long and discouraging visa proce-
dures, Tunisia is receiving new and varying inflows (e.g. patients seeking 
care in Tunisia rather than in Europe) (Rouland and Jarraya, 2015). Con-
sequently, labor migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are attracted by new 
labour possibilities (domestic work, construction) or specific services 
(higher education, private health services). As the EU transfers restric-
tive policies to third countries, thereby placing them under even further 
pressure, the Tunisian government in turn is developing  strategies for 
control without establishing a legal framework for labor migrants. Local, 
national and (trans)regional intra-African mobility contexts are being 
ignored, and in the end, everyone is losing.
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22. Fresh Start Or False Start? The 
New Pact on Migration and Asylum
Petra Bendel
22.1 Introduction
On 23 September 2020, the European Commission presented its New Pact 
on Migration and Asylum, accompanying it with an ambitious statement 
of intent. The commissioners in charge, Ylva Johansson and Margaritis 
Schinas, promised no less than a ‘fresh start’ covering all aspects of EU 
migration and asylum policy, to the end of easing tensions and conflicts 
among the Member States and with the ultimate aim of forming the basis 
of a reliable common migration and asylum system.
The Commission was and is in an unenviable position: It has to 
rebuild trust and strengthen consensus among Member States after a 
long period of serious disputes over refugee policy. It has to stop the ‘race 
to the bottom’ in refugee protection and provide a framework for orderly 
migration. In the past few months, the Commission´s preliminary 
negotiations with its Member States and the European Parliament have 
entailed a lot of hard work that has resulted in a number of compromises. 
In what follows I will analyse the Pact’s principal proposals as to their 
innovative potential, their reliability, their chances of being implemented 
in negotiations, their potential efficiency and the protection of rights they 
afford, taking the two Global Compacts into consideration.
22.2 A communicative false start
The Commission did not do itself any favours with the unnecessarily high 
expectations it raised in advance of announcing the Pact. The proposals 
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in their current form, in line with their compromising character, have 
not been able to sustain their defined narrative of migration as a normal 
process rather than a crisis event (Bendel, 2017). Instead, the discourse 
of ‘irregular migration as the typical case’ or indeed of the ‘refugee crisis’ 
is in evidence again and again. The Commission’s introductory commu-
nication fails to explain how the proposals improve on the  status quo. 
Indeed, quite to the contrary, it has left experts and non-experts strug-
gling with an extensive loose-leaf collection of proposals for regulations 
and recommendations, opaque in form and content.
22.3 Familiar initiatives with a ‘twist’
The nine legal initiatives set out in the Pact do not offer many proposals 
with which we are not already familiar. Its centrepieces are pre-entry 
screening, asylum procedures at the EU’s external borders, and a 
proposal for ‘flexible solidarity’ rather than shared responsibility among 
the Member States. There is, then, little innovation in evidence; yet each 
aspect of the Pact has been given a new ‘twist’ to increase their appeal to 
the negotiating partners both in the Council and in the European Par-
liament.
First, the Pact (again) presents a proposal to abolish the Dublin Reg-
ulation and replace it with the screening of asylum seekers prior to their 
entry to a country (the criterion of the first irregular entry of the Reg-
ulation, however, among others, are maintained), flanked, if required, 
by asylum procedures at the EU’s external borders (Hruschka, 2016; 
Maiani, 2020; Carrera, 2020). In contrast to proposals presented in the 
past – specifically prior to the commencement of Germany’s EU Council 
presidency (July-December 2020) – the pre-entry screening procedure 
outlined here does not include any preliminary decisions on asylum 
(Statewatch, 2019). Its purpose is to capture a more detailed registra-
tion of asylum seekers and an additional security and health check. The 
asylum procedure would commence after this screening. 
The proposal bears an evident resemblance to the ‘integrated refugee 
management’ introduced in Germany in 2016, whose central idea was to 
dive the applicants into different clusters for the asylum procedure right 
from the start (Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, 2020). Very 
much like the clusters established there, the New Pact would implement 
253Petra Bendel
a distinct procedure for asylum applicants from countries with ‘low rec-
ognition rates’ and for those whose applications include information that 
is false or abuses the process, or from those who may represent a danger 
to national security. Depending on the group to which they are assigned, 
the system would channel asylum seekers into one of four possible pro-
cedures: resettlement, the ‘conventional asylum procedure’ (yet with very 
tight deadlines), a fast-track asylum procedure, or relocation to another 
Member State for consideration of asylum.
Second, the Commission has turned away from the principle of fair 
distribution of people seeking protection among the Member States – 
which has de facto never been in operation – and intends to replace it 
with a ‘new solidarity mechanism’ (at the same time mandatory and 
flexible). In accordance with the new mechanism, not every Member 
State will have to accept people seeking international protection and may 
opt for other instruments of ‘solidarity’ instead. 
The ‘twist’ as compared to the principle of ‘flexible solidarity’ 
proposed by the Slovak Council presidency in 2016 is the new instru-
ment of ‘return sponsorship’. Instead of receiving refugees, a Member 
State can ‘sponsor’ people required to return to their countries of origin. 
This entails arranging the return; if the ‘sponsoring’ Member State fails 
to do this within a period of eight months, it must permit the person to 
enter its own territory – an idea that aimed both at facilitating coopera-
tion with those Member States not willing to receive refugees (particu-
larly the Visegrad-States) and at accelerating returns. However, Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic were quick in rejecting even these new 
plans (Euronews, 2020). The Commission intends to specify at a later 
date a separate catalogue of operational and technical support measures 
that may serve as instruments of solidarity in this context. It remains to 
be seen whether this catalogue contains more elements that support, for 
instance, the reception and asylum standards in Member States under 
pressure or the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and how the 
different possible contributions will be rated in the announced ‘solidarity 
pool’(De Bruycker, 2020). The proposal further states that, where the 
migration system in a Member State is overloaded, the other Member 
States should take on a certain ‘fair share’ of refugees. It even provides 
for the possible relocation of recognised refugees in countries other than 
those of their first arrival.
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22.4 No commitment to ‘legal routes of entry’, sea 
rescue or cooperation with third countries
Depending on the issue at hand, the proposals submitted differ widely 
on the extent of legal obligation they confer. Whenever they cover ‘hard 
topics’, the proposals are legally binding draft regulations. This is the 
case for the pre-entry screening and asylum procedures at the border 
(including an expansion of the EURODAC fingerprint system), the 
new regulation on the responsibility of Member States in times of crisis 
intended to replace the ‘mass influx directive’ of 2001, and the instru-
ments of ‘flexible solidarity’.
However, those aspects of the Pact relating to humanitarian issues 
of asylum and migration are recommendations only, and will lack any 
legally binding character. Obviously, the Commission anticipated 
Member States’ poor agreement on these topics, therefore according 
them low priority. They include legal routes of entry, cooperation with 
countries of origin or transit (in order to achieve EU borders, migration 
and asylum objectives –  which perpetuates the EU’s well-known little 
attention to the interests of third countries  and reinvents the wheel of 
the returns partnerships (Guild, 2020). The precise content of most of 
these recommendations remains vague, regrettably so in the context of 
the Commission’s recommendations for stabilisation of the resettlement 
system  and its designation of funding (including  private sponsorship) 
for this purpose (Leboeuf, 2020; Feith Tan, 2020; see Chapter 6). This 
is an issue that has also been encouraged by the Global Refugee Forum 
in order to reduce the pressure on host countries, but is here possibly 
combined with containment aspects (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019). In 
some instances, the fuller formulation of these ‘softer’ aspects will not 
take place until sometime in 2021.
One of the areas thus affected relates to the opening of additional legal 
pathways to entry to the EU, which – also corresponding to the call for 
‘Global solidarity in the Global Compact on Refugees (United Nations, 
2018) – has the potential to represent an opportunity to create a ‘win-win’ 
situation in negotiations with migrants’ and refugees’ countries of origin 
or transit, but is overshadowed by the Commission’s  conditionality on 
return, readmission and fighting against migrant smuggling as the centre 
piece  of the external dimension of migration policies (Anrade, 2020). 
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The EU’s New Pact’s reference to ‘Talent Partnerships’, which might be 
inspired by the Global Compact on Migration’s ‘Global Skills Partner-
ships’ remains vague and certainly non-binding (International Labour 
Organization et al., 2018).
Refraining from the criminalisation of private search and rescue 
organisations and coordinating rescue-at-sea operations among the 
Member States are further recommendations of the Pact, and doubtless 
desirable courses of action. The issue of search and rescue otherwise 
remains undefined, and certainly not subject to proposals of binding 
regulation; a contact group yet to be established would be required to 
report to the Commission once a year. Nevertheless, the Commission 
did provide for technical and detailed provisions for disembarkation 
following search and rescue operations.
The proposals remain grossly deficient in the other, crucial issues, 
such as substantial future regulatory arrangements regarding secondary 
movements and substantial measures pertaining to the internal borders 
of the Schengen area (Thym, 2020). Without these aspects, questions 
must remain as to the new asylum system’s effectiveness in practice.
22.5 An over-ambitious timeline and unclear prospects of 
implementation
Taking into account the legal form chosen for the Pact – regulations 
instead of directives – , the prospects of implementing the laws and 
regulations directly effective in the Member States during the negotia-
tions in the Council appear poor. Following the tendency noted in the 
context of  previous efforts to reform the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS), the Commission, in these new proposals, has completely 
refrained from drafting directives, which would still have to be transposed 
and implemented in the Member States (Pollet, 2019; Migration Policy 
Institute, 2020). Instead of directives, it proposes the issuance of binding 
and directly applicable regulations. This means that much is at stake for 
the Member States in the negotiations, and the negotiations are accord-
ingly likely to be intense. It may therefore prove at the least challenging 
to keep to the ambitious timetable, which provided for mutual political 
consent by the end of 2020 and adoption by June of 2021.
256 22. Fresh Start Or False Start? The New Pact on Migration and Asylum
This is still more the case, due to the fact that the Commission 
continues to insist upon completing the reforms to CEAS stuck in 
different stages of negotiations. These have been negotiated in a ‘package’ 
and largely depended on the Dublin regulation’s revision from which the 
Pact, however, now withdraws: the Reception and Qualification Direc-
tives, the Resettlement Framework and the regulation of the European 
Union Agency for Asylum (formerly EASO), on the reform of which pro-
visional political consent is in place.
The content of the Pact appears to promise tough negotiation 
processes ahead. It would be surprising indeed if the States located on 
the EU’s external borders gave their consent to the new system, which 
transfers responsibility for preliminary examinations and border proce-
dures onto them. Those States which opt to take on ‘return sponsorships’ 
are unlikely to agree without a murmur to take in all asylum applicants 
that they are unable to return after the scheduled period of eight months. 
Finally, still to take place are political negotiations regarding which addi-
tional instruments might be applied by Member States that refuse to 
receive asylum seekers within the ‘solidarity à la carte’. Defining these will 
be no simple endeavour.
22.6 Potential efficiency: More questions than answers
Even if the Dublin system will not be applied – at least not under that 
name – in the future, the new procedure at the heart of the suggested Pact 
raises numerous questions:
• How can we make certain that it will genuinely ease the pressure on 
Member States with external EU borders?
• How can we guarantee faster and more reliable screening, within 
the timeframe envisaged by the Commission of five to ten days, and 
quicker asylum procedures at the border, for which the Commission 
has set a timescale figure of 12 to 20 weeks at most?
• How can we ensure that Member States will comply?
We are yet to hear details of the resources, skills and powers that will 
be available – and necessary – for the achievement of these objectives. We 
might have been able to look forward to more efficient and harmonised 
procedures had a more radical proposal been presented, one proceeding 
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far beyond the reform of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) – 
on which consensus has already been reached – and following the (albeit 
still perfectible) model of the German Federal Office on Migration and 
Refugees (BAMF), responsible for the registration, examination and 
decision of asylum claims and whose branch offices with specially trained 
personnel file the asylum cases. But here, too, the Commission did not 
venture far enough (Graff and Schneider, 2018).
Similar considerations apply to the question of how to avoid a 
backlog, and the potential concomitant development of new, perhaps 
even long-term flashpoints, in the Member States with external EU 
borders, which are currently already struggling to cope with the strain. 
The implications for accommodating refugees also merit consideration, 
with the much criticized pilot project on camp accommodation under 
EU supervision (Sanderson, 2020; European Commission, 2020).
22.7 Appropriate regard to fundamental rights and 
‘vulnerable persons’?
Questions also arise on how these procedures will ensure respect for the 
fundamental rights of the migrants and refugees undergoing them, as 
required by international and regional refugee protection and human 
rights standards, as enshrined in the UN Global Compacts on Refugees 
and Migrants, as well as in the EU Treaties (Bendel, 2016). 
The Commission has responded to concerns by installing a new inde-
pendent monitoring mechanism, which might have had innovative 
potential if its operation had been placed under the auspices of the 
European Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) or another, independent institution (Cortinovis and Stefan, 
2020; see Chapter 16). As it is, Member States will be tasked with con-
ducting their own monitoring of respect for fundamental rights, which 
will entail forming a committee and possibly consulting the FRA. The 
worst-case scenario here is that this distribution of powers in an ‘inde-
pendent monitoring mechanism’ will result in a situation in which the 
same State which has violated a law will judge these violations – a con-
tradiction in terms.
The Pact proposes the identification of ‘vulnerable persons’ (as 
referred to in the diction of the Commission) during screening. These 
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individuals will not have to go through the accelerated asylum procedure 
mandatory for all others – a principle familiar to us from the Reception 
Directive. But what appears to be a humanitarian measure may suffer 
from important limitations on its practicability in view of the existing 
time pressure. Validation of the legal correctness of such a procedure 
and allocation of responsibility for its conduction will also be required. 
An additional question as yet unanswered is that of access to legal 
instruments: To whom can an asylum seeker (who has been rejected or 
deported) appeal, and who are the ‘appropriate authorities’ mentioned in 
the proposals?
22.8 Conclusions: A Herculean task rather than ‘a fresh 
start’
Rather than representing ‘a fresh start’ and instead of providing a new 
vision on real common principles and policies, the Pact re-issues well-
known policy choices out of the drawer, although sometimes ‘with a twist’. 
Instead of presenting a new idea of solidarity, so strongly recommended 
in the Wikström-Report of the European Parliament, it relies more on 
the logics of ‘flexible solutions’ based on nationalistic interests (Hruschka 
and Maiani, 2017). The reliability of the suggested policies differs largely 
according to their ‘hard’ (securitized) or ‘soft’ (humanitarian) policies, 
thus showing where priorities are being set. Their chances of being 
implemented in negotiations are at least restricted, given that they are 
presented as regulations, not as directives. For the protection of rights 
the suggestions may afford the monitoring mechanism may be crucial, 
but should be re-designed.
To conclude, we are in no doubt that reconciling the increasingly 
diverging interests of individual States and managing the humanitarian 
disaster of European refugee policy represent a Herculean endeavour. 
Of course, our hope is that the Commission will successfully negotiate 
between the Member States and between Council and Parliament, ideally 
with the result of shaking up the existing impasse and softening intran-
sigent stances. It may then be possible to return to the original targets: 
the protection of refugees and the regulation of migration which until 
now has remained largely unregulated. These proposals run to over 500 
pages, yet with good reason we find their content wanting. We await the 
legislators’ views and decisions with interest.
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23. EU External Migration 
Management Policies in West Africa: 
How Migration Policies and Practices 
in Nigeria Are Changing
Amanda Bisong
23.1 Introduction
European Union policies have shaped the evolution of migration moti-
vations, patterns and structures across West African states. From slave 
trade to colonial times, countries within the European Union (EU) have 
influenced who, where and for how long people in West Africa move. 
This influence continued in post-colonial West African states with the 
reduced but available mobility options for West Africans to European 
countries to study, work or reunite with family.
But these migration policies  have become more restrictive over 
the years (Abebe and Mbiyozo, 2020). Consequently, the changes in 
migration policies between EU and West African countries have resulted 
in changes in migration patterns and decisions of migrants (Beauchemin 
et al., 2020). Although bilateral migration cooperation between West 
African and EU states has evolved to reflect these changing patterns, 
such measures have had the effect of externalising migration policies 
of EU states in West African countries. For most migrants and refugees 
in the EU that originate from large West-African countries like Nigeria, 
externalisation of the EU’s migration policies has meant adopting an 
approach that extends European borders beyond the frontiers of African 
countries and into their internal territories (into the internal workings of 
the state). This has far reaching impact on the legal and political systems 
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in these countries and does not necessarily contribute to the intended 
outcomes of migration cooperation.
The EU identifies Nigeria as a priority country for migration coop-
eration. However, this cooperation has resulted in several practices with 
the potential to contradict its regional (ECOWAS), continental (Abebe 
and Mbiyozo, 2020) and International commitments, including the UN 
Global Compact on Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) and the 
Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). The  focus on return of Nigerian 
migrants from the EU (Uzomah, 2021), for example, has several potential 
areas for conflicting with the Objective 21 of the GCM which calls for 
cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination in facil-
itating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable 
reintegration. Furthermore, while most asylum seekers from Nigeria, 
may not be categorised as refugees within the definition of the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees (see article 1 of the Geneva 1951 refugee con-
vention), they may still require complementary protection or non-ex-
pulsion on humanitarian grounds, hence emphasising the need for indi-
vidual assessment of asylum requests.
23.2 The effects of EU external migration management 
policies on migration in Nigeria and free movement of 
people in Africa
As the external dimension of the EUs’ migration policies continues to gain 
traction, their direct and indirect effects can be observed in the national 
and regional practices, policies and legislations of migration partnership 
countries including Nigeria. While the EU has failed to achieve a read-
mission agreement with Nigeria, it has adapted its development coopera-
tion which has yielded more results than formal agreements (Vermeulen 
et al., 2019).
23.2.1 Changes to national migration legislation and practices
Over the last decade, migration policies and reforms to immigration laws 
in West Africa have been supported by EU countries, either directly or 
through international organisations like the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM). These national migration policies include sections 
that address reducing irregular migration from West Africa to Europe. 
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Nigeria is no exception. The national migration policy was supported by 
international organisations. Although the consultations and inputs were 
provided by the national stakeholders, the inputs still follow the standard 
template of most national migration policies, thus raising the question 
about ownership of the content of these policies.
Most of the West African countries have adopted the UN protocol 
against the smuggling of migrants, in addition to anti-trafficking laws. 
These anti-trafficking laws are useful in the region, which is rife with 
trafficking in persons especially women and children. Although traf-
ficking in the region is mostly linked with economic survival and some 
cultural practices carried out by ordinary individuals and not necessarily 
transnational criminal networks (Sanchez, 2020). However, the arbitrary 
interpretation of immigration agencies in implementing laws on the 
smuggling of migrants have led to restrictive practices with negative 
effects on the movement of persons with in the country and the region. In 
Nigeria, national courts have begun to adopt a restrictive interpretation 
of immigration laws in restrictive ways. 
For example, a federal high court in Katsina, recently charged twelve 
persons for attempting to irregularly migrate to Europe through Niger 
(Radio Nigeria, 2020). This is particularly noteworthy as there is no 
provision in Nigerian law which criminalises attempts to migrate irregu-
larly, either in the Immigration Act or in the Nigerian Criminal or Penal 
Codes. The migrants were therefore charged with evading immigration 
clearance while crossing Nigerian borders, based on section 46(3)(b) 
of the 2015 Immigration Act which states that “if a person… refuses or 
fails to produce or furnish to any such officer or person any document or 
information which he is required to produce or furnish to that officer or 
person under this Act, or otherwise obstructs any such officer or person in 
the exercise of his functions thereunder; he shall be guilty of an offence.”
Furthermore, an increasingly worrying practice of immigration 
authorities within the region who have been arresting circular or seasonal 
migrants for irregular entry and overstay in neighbouring countries, has 
also been observed in Nigeria. These increased arrests and deportations 
are in a bid to curtail irregular migration movements in the region. 
However, “irregular migration movements” are not defined and on the 
basis of the ECOWAS regulations are subject to varied interpretation by 
the Member States. More so, deportations are not carried out in accord-
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ance with the conditions stipulated in the ECOWAS regulations of 1979 
(see article 11), thus flaunting ECOWAS protocols and regional human 
rights commitments. Through the support of the EU and international 
organisations (including those implementing the UN GCM), restrictive 
definitions of irregular migration are adopted with the effect of curtailing 
or restricting regional human mobility.
23.2.2 Focus on returns and readmission: return into unemployment
Current migration cooperation between the EU and its Member States 
and the Nigerian government is focused on returns and readmission. 
There is still no readmission agreement between the EU and Nigeria, 
however Nigeria has several agreements with some EU Member States 
which are not regularly respected. For the Nigerian authorities, the focus 
is on exhausting all available local remedies in the host country before 
return is conducted, while EU countries on the other hand have the pref-
erence of conducting returns immediately when a migrant in an irregular 
condition is identified. Thus, the challenge for both authorities has been 
to find a compromise between these two positions.
Nigerian nationals are granted asylum in the EU on grounds of com-
plementary/ subsidiary protection or non-expulsion due to humani-
tarian reasons. In  2019, 4365 out of 29660 applications were granted 
asylum in the EU in first instance and some after appeal (EUROSTAT, 
2020). While some EU Member States authorities may erroneously 
assume that Nigerian nationals are not entitled to international protec-
tion, the violence in the country may necessitate protection under other 
statuses (UNHCR, 2020). This highlights the need for states to ensure 
that migrants and asylum seekers especially from large migrant origin 
countries do not fall within cracks of the migrant categories, especially 
where these do not reflect specific rights, needs or migration realities. 
More broadly, the case of Nigeria highlights the need to better explore 
and develop the linkages and protection gaps emerging from a strict 
application of the division between the GCM and the GCR.
However, while the return of migrants from EU countries is cat-
egorised by political gimmicks and uncooperative national author-
ities,  return migration from African countries occurs more frequently 
and with less hassle (Ahrin-Sam and Zanker, 2019). This may be because 
of the negative and horrific human conditions in which migrants and 
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asylum seekers in neighbouring countries (such as Libya) find themselves. 
Consequently, while the number of yearly returns from EU countries to 
Nigeria has fluctuated between 100 – 500 returns, returns from Libya and 
neighbouring African countries to Nigeria are in the range of thousands 
(IOM, 2020; Zandonini,  2020). These returns are organised with the 
support of international organisations such as the IOM funded by the EU 
or its Member States.
One thing that the governments of both Nigeria and EU countries 
have failed to consider is the situation in which the returned migrants 
find themselves in Nigeria (Vermeulen, 2020). In some communities, the 
rate of re-emigration is higher because the conditions which migrants 
return to are much worse than the conditions which motivated them to 
migrate initially.
For some of these migrants, they may have taken loans to fund their 
migration (Sanderson, 2019), and on their return (without sufficient 
income and without having been able to earn income at their intended 
destination), have to begin repaying these loans. However, the employ-
ment and business conditions in the country are not such that would 
enable them to repay these loans swiftly in order to avoid negative conse-
quences. Other migrants, on their return, are given support to start small 
businesses through micro-credit loans and facilities received from inter-
national organisations. However, these organisations fail to acknowledge 
the difficult business environment and the harsh conditions which limit 
the success rate and survival of small businesses. Consequently, these 
businesses do not thrive because of the challenging environment and the 
high costs of doing business (e.g. lack of power supply, multiple taxation 
by government agencies, high costs of inputs, high costs of rents etc.). 
Therefore, many returned migrants find themselves in a worse situation 
than the one they had prior to emigration (Zandonini, 2020).
23.2.3 Bilateral cooperation on development with a renewed focus 
on migration
Through bilateral cooperation on development, EU states have inten-
sified their support towards curbing irregular migration from Nigeria 
to Europe. Although there are  several studies  that highlight the 
inconclusive  effects  of using development aid to address migration-
related issues, the practice still continues, with such interventions framed 
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within the narrative of addressing the ‘root causes of migration’, which 
focus on the drivers that motivate people towards migration (Siegel 2019; 
Dennison et al., 2019). However, this narrative on root causes fails to 
acknowledge the role of current migration policies and other overar-
ching economic policies (like trade and agriculture) and structural global 
inequalities in contributing to the current situation. Youth employment 
and economic empowerment programmes, linked to the so called ‘root 
causes’, are implemented in ‘migration prone’ communities in order to 
discourage young people from migrating to the EU. The outcomes of 
these programmes remain opaque.
The problematic relationship between development aid and migration 
is further demonstrated by the use of conditionalities to elicit the cooper-
ation of migrant sending countries in their bilateral relations with the EU 
(Statewatch, 2020; ECRE, 2020). Several projects funded under the EU 
trust fund in Africa provide examples of the use of development coopera-
tion instruments to achieve migration control (Oxfam, 2017). In Nigeria, 
development cooperation to fund migration control can be observed in 
the training and equipping of Nigerian immigration authorities with the 
objective of enforcing migration control on behalf of EU countries (TV 
360, 2021; Punch Nigeria, 2019). More recently European states have 
focused on empowering authorities in Nigeria to play a more direct role 
in restricting migration.
23.2.4 Securitisation and militarisation of migration
Through increased cooperation with FRONTEX, West African states have 
carried out border controls, instituted border management systems and 
regular travel checks within the region (DW, 2019). These interventions 
are aimed at saving migrants from trafficking networks, being exposed 
to harm at sea or in the desert, thus motivated by humanitarian and 
anti-criminal motives. However, this cooperation also has the effect of 
increasing border checks in the region and in practice, imposing difficul-
ties on the free movement of persons within the region by criminalising 
migration. This goes against the ECOWAS protocol on free movement 
(Zanker et al., 2020).
In Nigeria, migration discussions have become synonymous with 
terrorism, banditry and smuggling. Consequently, the use of military 
force to address these challenges and by extension restrict the movement 
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of persons even within the region is justified by the government. These 
military interventions motivated by the focus on counter-terrorism and 
anti-smuggling are aimed at reducing transnational organised crime in 
the region. However, these practices risk exacerbating other factors of 
insecurity and political instability, such as protests and social disorder by 
disgruntled youth seeking means to migrate. These interventions are now 
strongly linked to addressing irregular migration in the region, including 
controlling irregular migration and promoting border management.
23.2.5 Conflict between state and federal governments over the 
mandate relating to migration
In Nigeria, federal government ministries and agencies are in competi-
tion with state level ministries and agencies over access to funding for 
activities to curb migration and their mandate on addressing issues of 
migration (Olakpe, 2020). Consequently, in states such as  Edo, where 
migration through irregular channels is rampant, there has been a 
taskforce on migration set up by the government (Houttuin and Haaij, 
2018). Beyond economic reasons, migration is equally important in Edo 
because of the role of the diaspora in governance (the current governor 
of Edo has received huge support from the diaspora community) 
(Vanguard, 2020). 
Moreover, measures at the state level are being taken to curb irregular 
migration and support the reintegration of returning migrants into their 
communities. To ensure the implementation of these measures at the 
community level, state governments demand direct support from their 
counterpart development and international organisations. This conflict 
is also an outcome of EU external migration management policies as it 
instigates a competition for resources between actors in the Nigerian 
federal system.
23.3 No end in sight? EU’s continued fixation on the 
external dimension of migration
Presently, West African countries like Nigeria still find themselves con-
fronted by the contradictory demands of two free areas of movement: 
ECOWAS and the EU. The new EU pact on Migration and Asylum aims 
to be a continuation of the efforts to externalise EU migration policies 
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in countries such as Nigeria. The crisis is now the new normal as argued 
by Landau and Freemantle (2020; see Chapter 24). One of the reasons 
for adopting this pact stems from and the need to adopt a more ‘human 
and humane approach’ to migration as emphasised by President von der 
Leyen in her State of the Union address (EC, 2020). 
However, the recommendations provided by the New Pact in actual 
practice does not consider the human rights of migrants, which involves 
trading of migrants between countries and encampment in detention 
sites before deportation and summary deportation on arrival in the EU. 
Practices such as these contradict several commitments to which Nigeria 
and EU countries are signatory at the international level and further may 
undermine the implementation of the GCM and GCR related objectives. 
More worrying is the fact that international organisations which support 
Nigeria in the implementation of its migration commitments are also 
used to promote the implementation of the EU’s externalisation agenda 
in the country.
Movement of persons – including Nigerian migrants in various 
countries on the African continent is important for socio-economic 
development. However, the current externalisation practices of the EU in 
several African countries does not bode well for the implementation of 
regional free movement measures and neither for the much wider con-
tinental free movement protocol which has been adopted by 33 African 
countries and is being pushed by the AU. By extension, this focus on 
restrictive migration policies and closing the opportunities for available 
migration channels, contradicts the UN GCMs objective to facilitate safe, 
orderly and regular migration. For countries like Nigeria, it is important 
to emphasise the human rights of migrants are respected and that the 
conditions to which migrants are returned are more stable and make 
them less vulnerable to exploitation. However, this equally requires intro-
spection on the part of the Nigerian government as well as the EU.
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24. Containment Development and 
Africa’s Time-Space Trap
Loren B Landau and Iriann Freemantle
24.1 Introduction
In 2015, a moral panic engulfed Europe. Long uneasy with African 
migration across the Mediterranean, the European Union (EU) and 
its Member States responded with unprecedented levels of peacetime 
defensive action. In the subsequent years, panic engendered a sophis-
ticated, multilateral apparatus to suppress African mobility. The New 
Pact on Migration and Asylum represents the next stage in its evolution 
(European Commission, 2020).
24.2 From crisis to containment
The  Pact  demonstrates that what began as a crisis has now become a 
new ‘normal.’ It furthers efforts to institutionalise strategies that code 
‘ungoverned’ and ‘irresponsible’ migration as existential threats to the 
EU, to host countries, and to migrants themselves. It outlines a series of 
initiatives – coercive, narrative and ‘developmental’ – to contain Africans’ 
ambitions to move.
Importantly, the paternalism used to frame these efforts discursively 
reconciles intercepting and pre-empting Africans’ movement with the 
EU’s liberal, universalist foundations. The EU’s raison d’être stems from 
respect for rights and dignity; concerns with safety and freedom; and 
dedication to progress for all (European Union, n.d.). It wants a future 
where Africans are ready to join the world. Within this rubric lies the 
rub: only the deserving and developed will be allowed to move; however, 
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demonstrating deservingness requires adherence to ever more restrictive 
if amorphous moral codes connected to legality, safety and responsibility. 
In effect, qualifying to move means surrendering the desire to do so. 
To gain entry, refugees and asylum seekers must demonstrate that they 
migrated almost exclusively by compulsion. (Ruy and Yayboke, 2020).
The justification for this approach and the EU’s extra-territorial 
modalities are outlined in the Pact’s opening pages (European Commis-
sion, 2020: 2): 
Addressing the root causes of irregular migration, combatting 
migrant smuggling, helping refugees residing in third countries 
and supporting well-managed legal migration are valuable objec-
tives for both the EU and our partners to pursue through compre-
hensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships.
In this short statement, the European Commission is proposing that 
the EU dedicate itself, inter alia, to slowing migration by addressing the 
reasons people move. It also designates that to move legitimately means 
doing so in ways that states authorise and make legal. Ensuring that the 
only movements are righteous ones justifies extraordinary measures to 
regulate not just people’s ability to migrate, but even their desire to do so.
24.3 Containment development and the ‘time-space trap’
This Chapter argues that the apparatus furthered by the Pact entrenches 
two interrelated regimes of knowledge and control: Containment Devel-
opment (Landau, 2019) and the Time-Space Trap (Freemantle and 
Landau, 2020). These institutional and discursive constructions not only 
recalibrate the EU’s relations to Africa and Africans, but also to its own 
history and ethical commitments. It does this by casting migration man-
agement in humanitarian terms: to counter material and moral depriva-
tions in ways that ready Africans for a universal liberal project. Working 
with allies across sectors and continents, this produces a regulatory 
regime that intercepts and prevents mobility while coding even the most 
coercive means as necessary to ‘protect’ Africans and foster their conti-
nent’s development. Stepping back, we can consider the elements that set 
this trap.
It begins by reframing undocumented African mobility as both 
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illegal and immoral. It is worth noting the Pact’s language: this is not a 
campaign to extinguish human trafficking and exploitation. It rather aims 
to suppress human smuggling. Given the tightening of borders into the 
EU and across Africa – in law if not in practice – almost anyone moving 
or planning to move will somehow intersect with agents, operators or 
actors otherwise complicit in human smuggling (Brachet, 2018). By 
default, almost anyone poor who has not pre-authorised a trip to the EU 
but begins a journey that may end there, becomes complicit in a crime. 
As the Pact notes (European Commission, 2020: 15):
This criminal activity therefore damages both the humanitarian 
and the migration management objectives of the EU. The new 
2021-2025 EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling will focus 
on combatting criminal networks, and in line with the EU’s 
Security Union Strategy, it will boost cooperation and support the 
work of law enforcement to tackle migrant smuggling, often also 
linked to trafficking in human beings.
Borrowing from dystopian science fiction (Niles, 2010), the EU goes 
beyond just punishing those who move, but has launched a form of 
‘chronoscopy’ or ‘pre-crime’: to identify and correct those likely to trans-
gress. Part of the correction comes through ‘Containment Development.’ 
This works by discursively removing the imperative to migrate. Although 
almost all empirical models suggest ‘development’ (i.e. economic growth) 
spurs movement (—  including analysis by the European Commission 
(See Landau and Kihato, 2019; Natale et al., 2018) – the EU clings to 
the position that ‘Economic opportunity, particularly for young people, 
is often the best way to reduce the pressure for irregular migration’ 
(European Commission, 2020: 18). 
In this, the EU shifts the goal of development from expanding human 
agency and opportunity, to immobilisation. In its own words, “The EU 
is the world’s largest provider of development assistance [and] this will 
continue to be a key feature in EU engagement with countries, including 
on migration issues. Assistance will be targeted as needed to those 
countries with a significant migration dimension” (European Commis-
sion, 2020: 19-20). The European Commission is quite clearly proposing 
an institutionalisation of containment development.
Sprouting from the foundation myth that aid-spawned development 
prevents mobility, Africa becomes a space of potential and patriotism, not 
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desperation. Development also means fewer conflicts and declining dis-
placements. One no longer needs to move to realise a desirable future or 
safety. Indeed, movement not only endangers yourself but threatens the 
prospects of your family, community and country. With the exception of a 
narrowly defined subset of refugees and asylum seekers, the Pact further 
entrenches the idea that Africans should dedicate themselves to achieving 
prosperity, in situ (Curzi, 2016). Only once people have realised appro-
priate, but amorphously defined, levels of wealth, education and respect 
for law – standards established by people outside African—are they 
ready to enter a global, mobile future. It is with this goal in mind that the 
European Commission will “…launch Talent Partnerships in the form 
of an enhanced commitment to support legal migration and mobility 
with key partners” (Euroepan Commission, 2020: 23). For the skilled and 
morally vetted, the EU and the world awaits.
For this to work, the EU explicitly recognises the value of creating 
visible but limited legal pathways. The Pact highlights that ‘Safe channels 
to offer protection to those in need remove the incentive to embark on 
dangerous journeys to reach Europe, as well as demonstrating solidarity 
with third countries hosting refugees. Legal migration can bring benefit 
to our society and the economy’ (European Commission, 2020: 22). In 
practice, these are effectively countermeasures intended to legitimise 
exclusion rather than open doors. As noted, throughout the  Pact  and 
other EU documents,  sedentarism should be the default; mobility the 
exception. Yet pathways are a necessary part of the promise available 
to those who meet the right, restrictive criteria. Those who behave 
properly can take this road. But most cannot. Those moving via other 
means become marked, stigmatised. As the Pact notes, “developing legal 
pathways should contribute to the reduction of irregular migration” 
(European Commission, 2020: 23). In reality, it will exacerbate it by 
rendering almost all moves irregular.
24.4 Monitoring as moral policing
The EU aims to predict, quantify and publicise each African move. 
Each time someone moves (or even contemplates doing so) without 
authorisation it reinforces the appearance of Africans’ morally com-
promised lawlessness and justifies further intervention. To do this, the 
EU is working with partners to  strengthen its surveillance of Africans 
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(Fallon 2020), their behaviour and their moral adherence. New research 
centres are part of this strategy as are high tech solutions and informa-
tion systems (CORDIS, n.d. a). One of these, ROBORDER (Roboborder, 
n.d.), is an almost nine-million-euro effort to develop “a fully functional 
autonomous border surveillance system with unmanned mobile robots 
including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground vehicles, capable 
of functioning both as standalone and in swarms, which will incorpo-
rate multimodal sensors as part of an interoperable network.” This and 
similar efforts are essential to its chronoscopic project. As the Pact notes, 
“A seamless migration and asylum process needs proper management 
of the necessary information…An upgraded Eurodac would help to 
track unauthorised movements, tackle irregular migration and improve 
return.” Elsewhere (European Commission, 2020: 12-13) the Pact argues 
that “Interoperability will connect all European systems for borders, 
migration, security and justice, and will ensure that all these systems 
‘talk’ to each other, that no check gets missed because of disconnected 
information, and that national authorities have the complete, reliable and 
accurate information needed.”
The  Pact’s  current proposals complement  significant investments 
in census offices, NGOs and university research centres (Barana and 
Toaldo, 2016), which will generate information on African migration 
like never before. But this is knowledge with a purpose – to regulate, to 
promote sedentarising interventions and to naturalise the desire to stay 
fixed in place and out of global time. Indeed, to naturalise these efforts, 
the EU is sponsoring dozens of programs aimed at  localising Africans’ 
future imagination: through education and advocacy African youth are 
instructed that migration is a betrayal of nation and family (IOM, 2019). 
The  MIRROR project  (Migration-Related Risks caused by mis-
conceptions of Opportunities and Requirements) aims to identify and 
‘correct’ African views about Europe’s potential (CORDIS, n.d. b). These 
campaigns are set to continue as “Tools such as strategic communica-
tion will be further deployed, providing information on legal migration 
opportunities and explaining the risks of irregular migration, as well as 
countering disinformation” (European Commission, 2020: 20). For those 
who still wish to move, an assemblage of surveillance and violence will 
keep them in place.
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24.5 The illusory lure of futures elsewhere
In disingenuously dangling a global and mobile future to Africans willing 
to mould themselves into externally defined parameters of moral respect-
ability, the EU asserts a form of temporal, pastoral power over would-be 
African migrants. Adherence to immigration regulations authored and 
often imposed by the EU, together with a demonstrated commitment to 
family, community and country mark one’s suitability to enter a global 
future (see Adam and Trauner, 2016). But meeting these legal and moral 
standards effectively means building a life dedicated to ‘development at 
home’. It is founded on a fundamental irony: only Africans willing to 
suppress mobility desires and adhere to EU-authored legal and social 
moralities can access the fruits of the EU’s prosperity. Conflict and dis-
placement are but further evidence of Africa’s (and Africans’) propensity 
to violence – a moral failing that can only be rectified through particular, 
place-bound political and social institutions.
It is important to note that contrary to analyses positing restric-
tive migration policies as betraying the liberal universalism on which 
EU polities and futures are founded, the  Pact  positions ‘migration 
management’ as an integral part of its reproduction. Warding off 
its own ‘isolation and divisions’ and ensuring its own ‘freedom, protec-
tion and progress’ (Macron, 2019), it effectively imposes on Africa the 
former and denies it the latter. It justifies raising borders and external-
ising its project of socialisation and subjectification so that in the future it 
may eventually allow ‘in’ the threatening, African ‘other’.
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25. The New Pact on Migration 
and Asylum and African-European 
Migration Diplomacy
Andrew Geddes and Mehari Taddele Maru
25.1 Introduction
While labelled as a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, there is much 
within the European Commission’s proposals as they relate to the 
‘external’ dimension of migration and asylum policy that continues to be 
consistent with a direction of travel established during the 1990s when 
the EU looked towards closer cooperation with non-member states. 
This external dimension has become particularly relevant in relation 
to migration from African countries and an explicit recognition that 
the attainment of EU objectives requires working closely with African 
governments and African regional organisations.
In this contribution we draw from a recent working paper that we 
co-authored for the Migration Policy Centre at the European University 
Institute to consider the implications of the Pact for ‘migration diplomacy’ 
as it relates to migration relations between African and European gov-
ernments and regional organisations (Geddes and Maru, 2020). We 
also change the focus from the EU perspective and consider the views 
of African governments and regional organisations in the context of 
‘migration diplomacy’ and the associated transnational dynamics.
These considerations are urgent not only in the context of the Pact but 
also in relation to ongoing challenges (displacement from Ethiopia being 
the most recent) and also the underlying assumptions that inform EU 
thinking more generally on migration. There is a long-standing tendency 
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for the EU and its members to view Africa as a potential source of large-
scale migration to the EU where relative inequalities of income and 
wealth, the effects of conflict between and within states and demographic 
changes are compounded by the consequences of the climate crisis and 
are then seen as sources of migration pressures on the EU (de Haas, 2007). 
This baseline assumption is important because it has played a substan-
tial role in driving EU actions to tighten external border controls and to 
develop agreements with non-EU countries with the purpose of reducing 
flows towards the EU or dealing with ‘root causes’ (Geddes, 2021).
In 2017, in its White Paper on the Future of Europe (WPFE) the 
European Commission outlined visions of the EU’s future development 
(CEC, 2017). As the WPFE puts it, ‘the pressures driving migration will 
also multiply and flows will come from different parts of the world as 
the effects of population growth, widespread tensions and climate change 
also take hold’ (ibid.: 11). Strikingly, while migration for work, family 
reasons and study remain key drivers for flows to the EU, the reference 
in the Commission’s WPFE is to forms of migration shaped by crises – 
poverty, war, and climate change.
This kind of thinking provides an important backdrop for the devel-
opment of diplomatic relations between the EU and African countries 
that, from an EU perspective, is driven by perceptions of crises of varying 
kinds and then designed to stem flows from Africa to Europe. It is, of 
course, the case that migration from Africa is not a simple unidirectional 
move towards the EU, but there is concern among EU governments about 
the potential for large-scale flows. Whether accurate or not, such percep-
tions have powerful effects.
25.2 Migration diplomacy
Migration has become a subject for diplomatic activity and assumed 
a more prominent place in the foreign policy agendas of African and 
European states, particularly in the form of formalised, multilateral 
platforms for migration diplomacy that bring together a wide range of 
state and non-state actors. Adamson and Tsourapas (2018: 115-16) show 
how strategies of migration diplomacy are shaped by states’ economic 
and security interests with the use of ‘diplomatic tools, processes, and 
procedures to manage cross-border population mobility’ and pursue 
these interests. Tools of migration diplomacy can include bilateral and 
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multilateral agreements and ‘arrangements’ not qualifying as legally 
binding instruments such as the Global Compact for Migration. A key 
focus of these diplomatic processes will be on capacity-building and on 
persuasion, which is why the ideas that underlie policies are important 
because they influence the ways in which capacity to attain the objectives 
of the agreement or arrangement is built.
We now focus very specifically on African-European migration 
diplomacy to consider the ways in which it is constituted as well as some 
of the gaps. Addressing these gaps can be a way to build more effective 
partnerships by enabling a wider range of voices to be heard and for 
non-EU perspectives on policy challenges to be more central to debate.
The adoption process of the GCM and GCR presented Africa with 
a unique opportunity not only to articulate and share common priori-
ties, opportunities and challenges but also to affirm its collective resolve 
to play its part in building an effective global migration partnership. 
Coming together as 55 countries representing a broad spectrum of stake-
holders, Africa’s contribution to the GCM enabled Africa’s priorities and 
demands to be conveyed to the international community in a well-de-
fined and well-communicated manner.1 More importantly, Africa used 
the consultation process to demand that the international community 
guarantee the protection of fundamental human rights of migrants, 
including those from Africa. Efficient and sustainable migration 
governance architecture is unthinkable without the active participation of 
national and local authorities and local communities in African countries. 
The multilateral consultations on the formulation of the Global Compacts 
helped Africa to focus on local, national and continental partnerships and 
transformative capabilities for fair and effective migration governance 
within Africa. Crucially, African countries, through the AU and RECs, 
viewed the GCM not as an end in itself but as a means for building a 
progressive migration governance partnership at global and continental 
1  Africa’s concerns were communicated at the 2018 international conference 
that led to the GCM; to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 
acting jointly with the AUC; and to other UN agencies such as the Interna-
tional Organization on Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Orga-
nization (ILO), as well as to RECs.
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levels including with the EU.2 
That said, due to power asymmetries between African and European 
actors, ‘participation’, ‘consultation’ and ‘dialogue’ on their own are not 
enough because they can just mean meetings without substantive action 
on the ground. Participation alone rarely leads to outputs and impacts. 
Attention must be paid to a shared strategic vision and to the develop-
ment and implementation of strategic migration governance at local 
level. Thus far, African-European migration diplomacy has not led to 
strategic migration governance in Africa. Current African approaches 
to migration tend to lack a clear and comprehensive policy direction 
that reflects the national priorities and interests of those same African 
countries. Instead, there is a focus on the criminal justice system, with the 
emphasis on irregular migration, refugees and the prosecution of traf-
fickers and smugglers through legislation. A more strategic approach can 
help shift away from migration management to migration governance 
with the potential to address the securitization of borders, the criminal 
approach to most migration-related public work and an undue focus on 
the negative aspects of migration. 
25.3 Strategy first
Strategic migration governance requires not only the development of 
strategy but also identification of where responsibility for implementation 
lies. States will retain primary responsibility for stability and the provision 
of decent living standards meaning that responsibility lies primarily 
with national governments supported or enabled by sub-regional and 
regional organisations working with a range of other actors including 
international organisations and civil society. States bear responsibility for 
protecting their citizens and are expected to institute normative, insti-
tutional, collaborative and financial frameworks for migration govern-
ance. Hence, assisted by the international community, it is axiomatic that 
African countries should be held responsible for providing stability and 
essential economic delivery for decent living standards. 
This also requires that strategic migration governance has a per-
2  UNECA, Global compact consultative meeting agrees Africa needs to 
drive and won migration narrative, October 31, 2017, available from-
www.uneca.org/stories/global-compact-consultative-meeting-agrees-afri-
ca-needs-drive-and-own-migration-narrative (accessed 2 November 2017).
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spective that looks to the medium and longer terms. Clearly, the chal-
lenges related to migration are unlikely to be resolved – and may actually 
be worsened – by short-term containment strategies at the borders of 
countries of origin, transit and destination. African-European migration 
diplomacy should go beyond a response to irregular migration and dis-
placement. Instead, it is necessarily linked to the African development 
agenda at national, local and international levels. The consequent social 
stability would make it possible to address the causes, triggers and accel-
erators of irregular migration and displacement. These require foresight 
and long-term strategic engagement. Unless governments get the fun-
damentals of migration governance right, current engagement with the 
EU will remain on weak foundations, and always brittle. A key problem 
is that African governments have yet to come up with a necessary degree 
of political determination and leadership for effective implementation 
mechanisms at national and regional levels. There is an urgent need for a 
nationally-owned, politically-led migration governance agenda. Effective 
migration governance cannot be achieved without acquiring and building 
the necessary capabilities to implement.
An argument can be made that priority in developing African-Euro-
pean partnerships on migration should have been – but was not – placed 
on building migration governance structures throughout Africa to 
develop comprehensive, stand-alone policies, as well as provide strategic 
thinking and clarity about the benefits and costs of migration. To do this 
requires a normative, institutional and collaborative state framework – 
in cooperation with non-state actors – that could facilitate voluntary, 
safe, orderly and legal mobility and a consequent reduction in forced or 
irregular migration.
25.4 Articulation of national migration policies
A first step to building such an institutional architecture could be 
national consultative conferences to articulate the policy direction of the 
countries at the national level dealing with existing normative frame-
works on migration at the level of the African Union and Africa’s regional 
economic communities.  Given the transnational nature of migration, 
effective migration governance requires well-coordinated, coherent and 
harmonised national and regional collaboration. Such collaboration 
should extend beyond organisations and Member States to the develop-
ment of bilateral, regional and global cooperation. 
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25.5 Diplomats in migration governance
Diplomacy is also necessary to ensure the protection of migrants’ and 
refugees’ rights and coordination among those involved, including the 
migrants themselves and the governments in their countries of origin, 
transit and destination. Regional frameworks and processes foster 
harmonised policies and shared minimum standards for consistency, 
cooperation and complementarity among Member States. Diplomacy 
can also facilitate harmonised policies at regional and national levels, 
help in the fight against criminal networks involved in human traf-
ficking and smuggling and protection of refugees and the human rights 
of migrants.  All this is likely to require greater numbers of migration 
diplomats including labour attachés – specifically more diplomats trained 
in migration governance.
Diplomats are also needed in the negotiation and implementation 
of agreements aimed at the facilitation of regional free movement and 
labour migration, which are unthinkable without regional policy har-
monization. This is supported under both the GCM3 and GCR. This, 
at the regional level, could also foster complementary initiatives such 
as training, education and job market matching with an impact on 
migration within and outside Africa. In the Horn of Africa, for example, 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has initiated 
regional- and national-level processes, all of which require dynamic 
migration diplomacy programmes staffed by diplomats and officers who 
understand migration governance. 
25.6 Progressive norms, regressive implementation
The AU and EU have long stated their commitment to a normative 
framework, but while progress in norm-setting has been relatively rapid, 
implementation has been slow. Practical steps are required to provide 
3  See labour mobility under GCM objectives 5 (Enhance availability and flexi-
bility of pathways for regular migration), 6 (Facilitate fair and ethical recruit-
ment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work) and 18 (Invest in 
skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications 
and competences) and GCR on labour mobility paragraph 42 (A multi-stake-
holder and partnership approach), paragraph 95 (Complementary pathways 
for admission to third countries).
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resources for implementation. African states generally still lack the will 
(as manifested by low levels of budgetary allocation), determination, 
institutional framework and resources necessary to govern migration 
effectively. Putting into effect those policies advanced in AU-EU policy 
documents demands coherent, consistent and comprehensive planning, 
and resourcing of implementation. Governance and institutional inad-
equacies are attributable primarily to the meagre resources allocated to 
migration governance in national budgets, and challenges will remain for 
the foreseeable future unless partners devote larger resources to plug gaps 
in funding, address institutional weaknesses and help implement the rec-
ommendations advanced in AU-EU policy documents. 
25.7 Implementation is local
‘Localization’ and local ownership are likely to be crucial implementation 
mechanisms, a fact recognised in both the GCM and GCR. Migration 
diplomacy can be a valuable tool for effective local governance of 
migration in border areas. Building an efficient and sustainable migration 
governance architecture is unimaginable without the active engage-
ment and devolution of powers, including financial, to national and 
local authorities and engagement with local communities. Community 
engagement means considering the particularities of localities and com-
munities, their emerging issues and the priorities of migration source 
hotspots and border areas. To avoid the common mistake of ‘one size fits 
all’ or EU-centric ‘our size fits all’ programmes, migration policy requires 
decentralised planning and implementation to enable migration govern-
ance to recognise the necessity of embracing proximity, local expertise 
and legitimacy and to tailor interventions to local contexts. Localiza-
tion can encourage local entities to initiate their migration management 
proposals and potentially help to reduce the negative impacts of secu-
ritized migration management and excessive border controls that have 
substantially undermined the other useful components of cross-border 
trade, including significant opportunities for peace, mobility, integration 
and regional prosperity.
A productive path for future AU-EU migration diplomacy would 
be a focus on localising the migration agenda and devolving migration 
governance with greater involvement of local populations, allocation of 
resources and decision-making powers by local authorities as provided 
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under GCM and GCR4 – co-opting them as vital participants in finding 
solutions to the challenges of migration governance. This includes cross-
border areas. Clearly, decentralisation demands the capacity to implement 
and discharge the responsibility that can be developed in the context of 
enabling the state and local authorities to take responsibility for the gov-
ernance of migration in the regions and localities they administer.
The EU and other international actors should not be encouraging 
– or funding – national systems that coercively replace local priorities 
and disempower local authorities. Migration diplomacy should have as 
its objective the aim of endowing local authorities with the capacity to 
govern migration effectively in their areas. Many African countries need 
a strategy-led migration governance, replacing the current legislation-led 
migration management. They also need clarity in strategic vision and 
building the requisite capabilities for implementation at local, national 
and regional levels. A corollary of this is the urgency of a shift of mission 
for the EU’s migration partnership with Africa which is not clearly spelt 
out in the new pact.
4  See GCM’s Whole of Society approach and Objective 17 (Eliminate all forms 
of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape 
perceptions of migration); Objective 15 (Provide access to basic services for 
migrants); Objective 16 (Empower migrants and societies to realize full in-
clusion and social cohesion); Objective 8 (Save lives and establish coordi-
nated international efforts on missing migrants); and paragraphs 40—54 on 
implementation and follow-up, and GCR under paragraphs 3, 37, 62, 67 and 
97 all of which require the full engagement of local authorities and commu-
nities.
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26. When Principles Are Compromised: 




Some ‘rebelling’ EU Member States have been challenging the principle 
of equal solidarity and fair responsibility-sharing over asylum seekers 
and refugees for the last five years (Frasca and Gatta, 2020). In response, 
the new European Commission came up with a compromised solution in 
the new Pact on Migration and Asylum (Carrera, 2020), attempting to 
get the same rebels on board by blending a political priority to increase 
the EU’s return rate (a policy dubbed ‘return at any costs’ (Eisele et al., 
2020)), with the so-called ‘new forms of solidarity’ (European Commis-
sion, 2020a).
Return sponsorship is the new option on the menu.  The proposed 
directive on asylum and migration management (European Commis-
sion, 2020a, Article 55, para. 1) outlines: “a Member State may commit 
to support a [benefiting] Member State to return illegally staying third-
country nationals by means of return sponsorship”. In essence, the ‘new 
approach’ allows those who are unwilling to show heartfelt solidarity in 
relocating asylum seekers from frontier EU Member States (labelled as 
‘benefiting Member States’), to offer ‘half-hearted’ solidarity. It seems that 
a committed marriage of solidarity (in sickness and in health, in poverty 
and in wealth…) within the Union under Article 80 of the TFEU, has 
been replaced with a ‘friends with benefits’ arrangement, referred to as 
the oxymoronic phrase ‘mandatory flexible solidarity’.
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The ‘sponsoring’ Member State (e.g. Hungary or Poland) would 
arrange returns of certain nationalities directly from and in close coop-
eration with the ‘benefiting’ or frontier EU Member States (e.g. Greece 
or Italy). The assumption is that the sponsoring Member State would use 
their bilateral agreements with third countries to push ‘voluntary’ returns 
or deportations. If both countries do not manage to return a person 
within eight months (under normal circumstances), such a person would 
be ‘relocated’ to continue the return procedure directly from the spon-
soring country. This inevitably prompts the question: was it realistic 
for the European Commission and the EU Member States to count on 
governments such as the Visegrad group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia) to  sponsor returns  of irregular migrants? More 
importantly, how can the EU guarantee vis-à-vis third countries that such 
returns will be implemented in line with EU and international law?
I argue that the ‘sponsored returns’ strategy is neither a solidarity-ad-
vancing nor an evidence-based strategy. It stands at odds with the EU’s 
commitment to its own Better regulation guidelines (European Commis-
sion, 2017). Furthermore, this ‘compromised solution’ does not build on 
lessons learned from carrying out the EU readmission agreements and 
arrangements with third countries (Carrera, 2016) or implementing the 
EU return directive (Eisele et al., 2020).
Firstly, governments that do not uphold internationally agreed and 
legally binding human rights standards cannot be seen as trustworthy 
partners among third countries – especially in the sensitive area of returns 
and readmissions (Carrera, 2016). The EU is compromising the standards 
and principles agreed upon with the rest of the world just two years ago 
within the scope of the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration  (GCM) (UN General Assembly, 2018a) and 
the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (UN General Assembly, 2018b).
Secondly, the Pact’s proposal for ‘sponsoring returns’ requires an even 
higher degree of trust among the EU Member States of the first arrival 
of asylum seekers and other migrants and countries ‘sponsoring returns’ 
– those same countries who have not agreed to cooperate with reloca-
tions in the first place. Many things could go wrong here without making 
explicit the EU’s internal and external cooperation principles as well as 
ongoing independent monitoring.
Finally, we must grapple with the reality that is the mishandling of 
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returns by ‘sponsoring countries’.  The Commission’s (2018a) proposal 
to recast the EU Return Directive has introduced a ‘border procedure’, 
lowered procedural safeguards, and encouraged returns to be based on 
informal bilateral agreements in the absence of post-return monitoring 
(Vosyliūtė, 2019a). It also foresees that EU institutions and agencies will 
get even more involved in handling returns and readmissions.
The ‘return sponsorship’ increases the likelihood of fundamental 
rights violations while simultaneously diffusing accountability across the 
‘benefiting’ Member State, ‘sponsoring’ Member State and the relevant 
EU agencies and institutions. If such breaches are enabled by the EU 
return policy via laws, policies, funding or operations, the glaring prob-
lematic is: who will be held accountable for the violations of fundamental 
rights?
26.2 New EU vocabulary: what ‘solidarity’ means in the 
EU
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (2020a) in joined cases 
of  Commission v. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic  (C-715/17, 
C-718/17 and C-719/17) has confirmed that the principle of solidarity is 
a legally binding obligation under Article 80 of the TFEU. Nevertheless, 
instead of applying political pressure to implement this CJEU decision, 
the European Commission (2020b) decided to reformulate what ‘soli-
darity’ means in the EU political vocabulary by coining a new oxymoron, 
namely ‘mandatory flexible solidarity’ in their  New Pact on Migration 
and Asylum, launched on 23 September 2020. The new approach to soli-
darity has been detailed in proposal for directive on asylum and migration 
management (European Commission, 2020a) and the Commission Staff 
Working Document accompanying it (European Commission, 2020c).
The EU Member States were given a new menu with several options. 
They could choose between ‘sweet and salty’ – whether to show solidarity 
in relocating asylum seekers and/or in sponsoring return. The Com-
mission expected that the Visegrad group would take the latter bait. In 
some instances, the Commission (2020c) also allowed for a ‘dessert’ – to 
make other contributions, for example in capacity building, operational 
support or an external dimension.
The European Commission (2020c) has foreseen that once the 
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flexible aspect fails, ‘compulsory solidarity’ via a ‘corrective mechanism’ 
would kick in, after a long back-and-forth procedure. Nevertheless, the 
Commission left implementation of ‘sponsored returns’ for a Member 
State-run show with ‘built-in flexibility’. For instance, “Member States 
would have to submit Solidarity Response Plans indicating which sol-
idarity contributions they will make.” The Commission (2020c) would 
simply cross-check these submissions against the distribution key based 
on 50% GDP and 50% population.
The Commission (2020a) has proposed a time-frame for sponsoring 
Member States to carry out a return: “a period of 8 months (4 months 
in situation of crisis)”. If this period has expired, the person concerned 
would need to be relocated to a sponsoring country to continue 
return procedures from that territory. The frontier EU Member States, 
namely Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain called to reduce this time-frame 
to 6 months or even 3 months (Nielsen, 2020a). Those, labelled as ‘ben-
efiting ones’ were not convinced. The frontier Member States, dubbed 
the Mediterranean axis EUROEFE-Madrid (2020), voiced their concerns 
over the lack of ‘mandatory solidarity’  and  called for greater clarity 
(Nielsen, 2020b)  in assigning responsibilities on ‘return sponsorships’. 
One of their concerns related to their liability for (in)actions of the 
sponsoring country. The  proposed directive on asylum and migration 
management (European Commission, 2020a, Article 55: para. 4) foresees 
that “These [return sponsorship] measures shall not affect the obligations 
and responsibilities of the benefitting Member State laid down in [EU 
return] Directive 2008/115/EC.”
On the surface, this seemed to at least benefit some ‘rebelling’ EU 
Member States playing ‘bad cop’ – quickly brokering bilateral deals and 
deporting irregular migrants on behalf of another EU Member State 
without fear of public shaming or repercussions from human rights 
bodies. Such sponsoring Member States would be seen as improving EU 
return rates, while maintaining anti-migrant sentiments in front of their 
voters.
Instead, the day after the Commission launched the  New Pact on 
Migration and Asylum, the Hungarian and Polish prime ministers rushed 
to Brussels to denounce any mandatory aspect of ‘solidarity’ in the EU 
return policy on behalf of the Visegrad bloc (Brzozowski, 2020). They 
knew too well that the task ahead would not be an easy one. Such 
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‘sponsors’ would need to broker returns with ‘countries of origin’ and ‘safe 
third countries’ with which they may not have good relations (Carrera, 
2016; Cortinovis, 2018; Vosyliūtė, 2019). However, leaving aside a Euro-
centric approach, it may be useful to explore on which bases partners 
around the globe could trust them.
26.3 The basis of trust for international cooperation in 
the area of returns and readmissions
The international trust-based cooperation in migration and asylum 
would require a different set of principles be followed than the flexible 
approaches proposed in the Commission’s New Pact. For instance, in 
the area of migration, all cooperating states are seen as equal partners. 
They treat migrants – citizens of another state – with equal dignity and 
respect. In the area of asylum, the UN Geneva Convention foresees that 
refugees are entitled to international protection and non-refoulement by 
the receiving state because the refugee’s country of origin cannot be 
trusted. These principles were recently reiterated and re-confirmed in 
the New York Declaration of 2016 (UN General Assembly, 2016). It led 
to the drafting of two UN Global Compacts in 2018 – one on refugees 
and the other on migration (UN General Assembly, 2018b and 2018a 
respectively).
Both Compacts upheld previously existing international and regional 
human rights standards on returns. The GCR proclaimed that states 
should aim at “durable solutions” (UN General Assembly, 2018b, para. 
89). The GCR also called states “to expand access to third-country 
solutions and to support conditions in the country of origin for return 
in safety and dignity”. The GCR promotes “enabling conditions for 
voluntary repatriations” as opposed to “forced returns” (UN General 
Assembly, 2018b, para. 87). Similarly, Objective 21 of the GCM (UN 
General Assembly, 2018a) emphasises the commitment to “facilitate safe 
and dignified returns” and “to guarantee due process, individual assess-
ment and effective remedy” to protect from ‘refoulement’.
The few EU governments who abstained or voted against the Global 
Compact for Migration (GCM) demonstrated a political choice to depart 
from  already internationally agreed standards (Carrera et al., 2018a). 
The GCM has  not been signed or ratified by nine EU Member States: 
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the  Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (voted against the GCM); 
Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania (abstained) and Slovakia 
(did not attend this UN General Assembly meeting to adopt the GCM) 
(Vosyliūtė, 2019b).
Hungary is also not a party to the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). 
While 181 countries voted in favour, Hungary and the United States were 
the only two nations that voted against the GCR. Thus, the Hungarian 
government demonstrated a clear stance of unilateralism and departed 
further from non-negotiable standards undermining its national con-
stitution and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Such a 
departure of EU Member States is somewhat anecdotal since Ferris and 
Donato (2019) argue that the EU has initiated this process to find a global 
solution to the so-called ‘European refugee crisis’.
The misunderstanding shared by the Hungarian government and 
others who haven’t approved the GCM is that they are not obliged to 
comply with international and regional human rights standards. The 
GCM summarises existing commitments in international human rights 
and labour law without adding any new legal obligations. It does, however, 
propose an evidence-based and human-centred narrative around human 
mobility. The EU delegation in New York and the European Commis-
sion have confirmed that the GCM was reflecting EU’s acquis (Vosyliūtė, 
2019b). The Commission (2018b) even put forward a proposal for the EU 
Council to approve the GCM on behalf of the Union (it was later revoked 
due to lack of support).
Thus the  controversy around the GCM  is a clear indicator of how 
these Member States are also departing from EU treaty principles of 
the rule of law, fundamental rights and democratic accountability 
(Vosyliūtė, 2019b). The European Union is likely loathe to admit that 
such Member States are invariably pushing the Union’s migration and 
asylum policies  further away  from the EU’s founding values and those 
agreed in Global Compacts.
In spite of the concessional wording, the Visegrad countries initially 
have not agreed to ‘mandatory flexible solidarity’, perhaps because they 
know too well that returns and readmissions require international coop-
eration and not unilateralism. Indeed, Carrera (2016) finds that for the 
sensitive area of readmissions, trust and international reputation may be 
crucial for the much sought-after ‘efficiency’ of returns. , Carrera (2016) 
297Lina Vosyliūtė
argues that “identification procedures in light of the EU’s Readmission 
Agreements, present many challenges and require verifiable and 
rebuttable (not blind) trust-based international cooperation with third 
countries”.
The New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum encourages Member 
States to ‘pool’ their bilateral agreements and informal arrangements – as 
it regards who could return which third country nationals. The Commis-
sion had tested this approach when Member States were cherry-picking 
asylum seekers rescued at sea for their potential returns based on their 
nationalities (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019). While this approach has 
worked on a small scale, the dynamics in bilateral agreements and 
arrangements are far more complex.
For instance, Cassarino and Marin (2020) argue that although there 
are “320 bilateral agreements linked to readmissions” concluded by EU27 
and third countries, “bilateral cooperation on readmission [cannot] be 
viewed as an end in itself, for it has often been crafted onto a broader 
framework of interactions.” Bilateral agreements and arrangements have 
stakes on both ends. They are unlikely to become the Trojan horse to 
pursue the EU’s self-interested goal to deport all irregularly staying third-
country nationals through the doors of the EU Member State who have 
the best relations with the given third country of origin. This would very 
likely upset such bilateral relations.
Besides, European countries often underestimate other competing 
priorities with the third countries. For instance,  remittances in many 
developing countries continue to be a far more relevant income source 
than development aid (Konte and Mbaye, 2021). They also overestimate 
incentives from the EU’s visa policies (Cassarino, 2020). Consequently, 
EU-centred readmission agreements or informal deals may also be 
implemented half-heartedly by third countries.
Cassarino and Marin (2020)  summarise it aptly: “readmission is 
inextricably based on unbalanced reciprocities”. Carrera (2016) provides 
evidence for how such a top-down approach backfires. For instance, 
in readmission procedures, mobility of certain nationals is treated as 
quasi-criminal activity. Thus, the country of origin may be less willing 
to cooperate in issuing documents as such treatment of its citizens 
undermines sovereignty and equal standing in the international arena.
The  European Parliament  report on return  highlights that lack of 
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cooperation from third countries in identification and documentation 
procedures is “one of the main reasons for non-return” (Strik, 2020). 
Therefore, European Parliament (2020) called “to improve relations with 
third countries in a constructive migration dialogue based on equality” 
and to aim at “sustainable returns.”  Parliament  (2020) also criticised 
the use of informal bilateral deals, which escape democratic control, 
unlike formal EU readmission agreements (EURAs). The latter have 
better-defined responsibilities and require ex-ante and ongoing human 
rights impact assessments. However, this Commission’s (2020d)  list of 
EURAs raises serious questions about EU principles, too. For instance, 
the latest EU Readmission agreement was concluded with Belarus in June 
2020, in the midst of violent suppression of civic protests against the dic-
tatorial regime (EU and Belarus, 2020).
26.4 What is the basis of trust among the EU Member 
States cooperating on returns?
The  Commission’s (2018a) explanatory memorandum of the proposal 
to recast the Return Directive highlighted the importance of “common 
standards and procedures”. However, fundamental rights standards have 
been reframed as obstacles for ‘efficiency’ of return rates (Vosyliūtė, 
2019a). While the Commission was satisfied with the explanatory memo-
randum, the European Parliament conducted a substitute impact assess-
ment (Eisele et al., 2019) and an implementation assessment of the EU 
return directive (Eisele et al., 2020). The latest assessment (Eisele et al., 
2020) concluded that the EU’s return policy is over-relying “on inter-
state trust and the procedural safeguards available to the person prior 
to removal or readmission”. These findings are in line with the academic 
evidence highlighting the importance of verifiable trust (see  Carrera, 
2016; Cassarino and Marin, 2020; Cassarino, 2020).
The  Commission’s (2018a) proposal to recast the EU Return 
Directive  attempted to lower procedural safeguards. For instance,  the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2019) 
argued that no person shall be returned before the negative decision on 
asylum application becomes final. The FRA (2019) raised concerns over 
the speed and quality of such decisions, particularly in the context of 
border procedure. The border procedure (if approved) would introduce 
an alternative return regime with even lower procedural safeguards than 
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those proposed in the recast Return Directive (Vosyliūtė, 2019a).
The Commission (2018a) stressed increasing efficiency of returns as a 
primary reason behind the ‘targeted revisions’ in the proposed directive. 
The European Parliament’s implementation assessment of the current EU 
Return Directive  (Eisele et al., 2020) cautioned that: “To prioritise the 
return rate as the primary indicator runs the risk of incentivising ‘return 
at all costs’, without taking stock of the full human, foreign relations and 
other costs”.
The new  EU return policy  has been an outcome of a blame-
shifting game among the EU Member States, the European Commis-
sion and Frontex. For instance,  the Commission (2018a) stressed  that 
“the shortcomings of Member States’ return procedures and practices 
hamper the effectiveness of the EU return system.” The EU return policy 
has shifted towards more  coercive approaches over durable solutions 
and migrants’ agency  (Vosyliūtė, 2019a). The Commission’s ‘targeted 
revisions’ are likely to fall short of ‘efficiency’ in light of its better regula-
tion guidelines, since ‘efficiency’ requires an assessment of individual and 
fundamental rights impacts (European Commission, 2017).
The EU return policy has been moving further away from the GCM 
(Vosyliūtė, 2019b).  The EU draft law foresees the EU Member States’ 
obligation to detain those “at risk of absconding”. Such a political choice 
does not encourage investing in alternatives to detention. Detention risks 
becoming a default option in the EU, including for minors. As such, the 
Commission’s current proposal is incompatible with GCM (UN General 
Assembly 2018a) Objective 13 “using detention as a last resort”. Besides, 
GCM Objective 7 calls on States to ensure “basic rights”, including pro-
cedural rights, despite the status and “to facilitate access […] to an indi-
vidual assessment that may lead to regular status” to those migrants that 
cannot be removed. The Commission’s (2018a) proposal has not reflected 
these considerations. However, the European Parliament (2020) proposes 
an alternative view on return management in the EU. Strik (2020) in her 
report  argues for including possibilities to regularise non-removable 
persons’ status, as it would resolve administrative limbo, would “reduce 
vulnerability to labour exploitation and may facilitate individuals’ social 
inclusion and contribution to society”.
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26.5 When everyone gets involved in returns – who is 
responsible for breaches?
As foreseen with the New Migration and Asylum Pact, EU institutions and 
agencies will become more involved in handling returns, thus creating a 
chain of responsibility. As argued by Carrera and Stefan (2018) the more 
players are cooperating without clear mandates and responsibilities the 
harder it is to access justice and seek effective remedies.  The explana-
tory memorandum of the proposed EU Return Directive (European 
Commission, 2018a)  highlighted that challenges for ‘efficient returns’ 
arise from EU Member States’ non-flexible interpretation of the current 
Return Directive and for third countries that are not keen to readmit 
their nationals.
Meanwhile, the European Commission has equipped Frontex with 
more power in returns operations. Civil society and some academics 
have dubbed it ‘EU’s  deportation machine’(Jones et al., 2020). As the 
EU’s return agency, Frontex only has a mandate “to support and monitor” 
Member States, and decisions on merits (i.e. whether there are risks 
of refoulement) in return procedures remain the sole responsibility of a 
Member State. Frontex – as other EU agencies – should be accountable 
to both EU institutions, EU supervisory authorities and courts. However, 
the increasing role of Member States in the management board once 
again blurs the lines of accountability (Carrera and Stefan, 2018; Jones et 
al., 2020). While Frontex is required to monitor the treatment of migrants 
during deportations, there is no subsequent post-return monitoring to 
ensure that a returnee was re-integrated and did not experience any 
further violations of human rights (Jones et al., 2020). So: how would 
Frontex would go about following instruction that is ‘international and 
EU law’ non-compliant? Mishandling of returns by ‘sponsoring countries’ 
is already an inconvenient reality. The following case study illustrates the 
point of likely controversies.
In May 2019 Hungarian authorities attempted to return an Afghani 
family in contradiction with EU asylum acquis and international laws 
(Thrope, 2019). The watchdog civil society applied for interim proce-
dures at the European Court of Human Rights and managed to suspend 
deportation of the family.  United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)  (2019) raised public concerns for the grave viola-
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tions of the Geneva Convention since Hungarian authorities have not 
considered their asylum claims, declaring them ‘inadmissible’. Media 
(Thrope, 2019; Palfi, 2019; Aljazeera, 2019) have vividly depicted this 
episode, reporting deprivation of food and other inhuman and degrading 
treatment, including intimidation with the return procedure to Afghan-
istan so as to force people to turn back to Serbia. Eleven of them did so.
In this case, the Hungarian authorities used the EU’s involvement to 
legitimise such returns. The Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office 
(IAO) said to journalists that “the measures were part of a joint operation 
with European border and coastguard agency Frontex, in which 39 
people were flown to Afghanistan altogether” (Aljazeera, 2019). Later, 
Frontex refused to deport some Afghani nationals due to pressure from 
civil society and human rights bodies, however human rights violations 
such as deprivation of food or overuse of violence have continued (Jones 
et al., 2020; Statewatch, 2020; ECRE, 2020). 
In January 2021, Frontex announced “suspending operations in 
Hungary” (Nielsen, 2021a). According to the  media, Frontex became 
concerned that despite the CJEU decision in December 2020, Hungarian 
authorities pushed out more  than 4400 people  without assessing their 
asylum claims (Nielsen, 2021a).  The Frontex Consultative Forum, 
composed of civil society representatives, has been calling for years not to 
support Hungarian authorities in returns (Jones et al., 2020; Statewatch, 
2020). The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE) mission report in 2020 reiterated that Frontex is 
under obligation to withdraw support in operations where fundamental 
rights are not respected. It led to the European Parliament launching an 
inquiry into the agency’s activities in January 2021 (Nielsen, 2021b). This 
episode illustrates that the EU agencies and even EU institutions carry 
the ‘chain of responsibility’ whenever human rights violations arise.
‘Return sponsorship’ places EU Member States – especially those that 
departed from ‘equal solidarity’ and human rights standards reiterated at 
the GCM – at the core of implementing the return decisions made by ‘the 
benefiting country’. Thus, such breaches are ‘enabled’ by EU return policy 
via laws, policies, funding or operations and it will invoke the Union’s 
responsibility via the  portable justice approach (Carrera et al., 2018b). 
But who would be responsible to define who is accountable for funda-
mental rights violations if everyone gets involved? A chain of respon-
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sibility model could be useful in capturing the direct or indirect roles 
of all actors involved in fundamental rights violations during and after 
returns. This could lead to more effective remedies for rights violations 
of returnees.
It seems that immense pressure is mounting on the international and 
regional human rights bodies, EU supervisory institutions and inde-
pendent ‘watchdog’ actors – civil society and journalists (Vosyliūtė and 
Chun Luk, 2020). ‘Sponsored returns’ are likely to be brokered and imple-
mented by some Member States where the EU rule of law, fundamental 
rights and democratic accountability principles are already compro-
mised. Vosyliūtė and Chun Luk (2020) demonstrated that governments 
that fear accountability and liability are curtailing watchdog actors in the 
area of migration. Some EU Member States are policing and criminal-
ising those who are trying to uphold EU and international legally binding 
principles (Carrera et al., 2019; Vosyliūtė and Conte, 2019; Allsopp et 
al., 2020). When principles agreed upon in both Global Compacts and 
among the EU Member States are compromised, the EU founding values 
become an empty shell rhetoric.
26.6 Three scenarios on how ‘sponsoring returns’ can 
backfire
The New EU pact on Migration and Asylum already blurs the lines of 
‘who does what?’ (Carrera 2020).  I argue that return sponsorship as a 
‘new approach on solidarity’ further blurs accountability. The EU return 
policy by design creates a chain of responsibility. What follows are three 
hypothetical and equally concerning scenarios that illustrate this point. 
They are based on previous experiences with the EU mandatory reloca-
tion schemes (ECRE, 2018) and with the implementation of EU returns 
policy (Eisele et al., 2020), both attempts to externalise responsibility for 
asylum (Carrera et al., 2018b) seekers:
• first scenario: quick returns to third countries;
• second scenario: ‘sponsoring countries’ overtake pre-return 
detention; and
• third scenario – ‘sponsoring countries’ leave the burden of detention 
to the ‘benefiting countries’.
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First scenario: quick returns to third countries
The New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum foresees that migrants 
who could not be deported within eight months in a normal situation 
and within four months in a situation of crisis would need to be brought 
into a sponsoring country and deported from there. So, a ‘sponsoring 
country’ e.g. Hungary would need to proceed speedily with returns, as 
otherwise they would risk ending up with irregular and non-removable 
migrants from the ‘benefiting country’, e.g. Greece.
The speed and lack of oversight of how the return decisions are 
made by the ‘benefiting’ country and implemented by the ‘sponsoring’ 
one, would risk violating procedural safeguards, including effective 
remedies and the ‘non refoulement principle’. Persons would be sent to 
third countries with the knowledge and involvement of EU agencies, 
regardless of whether they would be ‘safe’ for the person in question (i.e. 
LGBTQ+ to Pakistan, where it is a criminal offence) and whether indi-
viduals have any prospect of a dignified, humane and just existence. In 
some third countries, returnees face automatic detention, for instance in 
Libya; in others they have to pay penalties for ‘unauthorised exit’, as in 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and others (Grange and Flynn, 2014).
The first scenario aims to  externalise responsibility  and delegate 
the containment practices to countries of transit and origin via various 
informal bilateral deals and multilateral arrangements that do not 
consider human rights impact (Carrera et al., 2018b). Simultaneously, 
the EU would lose any political leverage to criticise how such returnees 
are treated after their return, as has happened with similar third country 
arrangements, such as in Turkey, Afghanistan or Pakistan. In this 
scenario, returnees are left at high risk of human rights violation during 
and after the return procedure, so who would be responsible in courts?
Second scenario:  ‘sponsoring countries’ do not manage to complete 
returns quickly and thus have to overtake pre-return detention
The second scenario foresees that if ‘sponsoring countries’ (working 
in close coordination with ‘benefiting countries’) are not successful in 
brokering voluntary returns or obtaining valid documents and sending 
people to third countries, they would overtake pre-return detention in 
their territory. Thus the ‘concentration of arrivals’ in benefiting countries 
such as Greece or other EU frontier countries would be replaced by ‘con-
centration of returns’ in sponsoring countries. As discussed above, the 
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‘return sponsorship’ was invented to bring on board Hungary or other 
countries in the Visegrad group that were unwilling to cooperate in relo-
cations. Those same countries were also not willing to recommit to the 
international standards in the GCM. Some of them have poor migrants’ 
rights record (Council of Europe Special Representative on Migration 
and Refugees, 2017; UN Special Rapporteur on migrants, 2021), thus 
making the EU vulnerable to inviting another more dangerous situation.
Illegal pushbacks, collective expulsions,  torture and other inhuman 
and degrading treatment  practices have already been reported by the 
European and international human rights bodies (Council of Europe, 
2017; Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE), 2019; Strik, 
2019; The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2018; UN Special Rapporteur 
on human rights of migrants, 2021). They are likely to escalate further 
and give rise to the EU’s complicity in crimes against humanity. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture (2018) Nils Melzer has openly warned 
that: “personal involvement in shaping, promoting and implementing 
policies and practices which expose migrants to torture or ill-treat-
ment may amount to complicity or other participation in crimes against 
humanity or war crimes.”
The prolonged detentions of non-removable migrants in sponsoring 
countries would risk going in that direction. Thus, if a M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece (European Court of Human Rights, 2011) judgment logic is 
applied by the courts, it could already preclude benefiting countries to 
relocate irregular migrants to certain sponsoring countries due to the 
likely fundamental rights violations. Again, how would benefiting and 
sponsoring country and EU agencies resolve their inter-related account-
ability?
Third scenario: ‘sponsoring’ countries leave the burden of detention to 
‘benefiting’ countries
Let’s imagine that the ‘sponsoring return’ state does a lousy job of 
obtaining documents, finding voluntary return solutions or using its 
bilateral deals – and a person is detained for a prolonged period in the 
‘benefiting country’. Eventually, the sponsoring country would find oper-
ational or even legal excuses (including on the grounds of EU law), as to 
why such individuals should not be relocated to ‘sponsoring’ countries 
for return (for example, the health risks in light of the pandemic, public 
policy or national security).
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In the past, for instance, the Hungarian authorities have been very 
creative in placing obstacles for asylum seekers (coming from Serbia) – 
with measures such as accepting applications at only two border crossings 
to capping the number of applications at a few people per day. The CJEU 
(2020b, para.118), the EU’s highest court in Luxembourg judgement in 
Case C-808/18  concluded that Hungarian authorities created a “virtual 
impossibility of making their [asylum] application”. Such creativity would 
likely be revived.
The third scenario leads to lengthier detention and overcrowding 
detention facilities and increased risks for inhuman and degrading 
treatment in the countries of asylum seekers’ first arrival. The ‘benefiting’ 
countries would be left alone to carry out illegal pushbacks, pull-backs, 
collective expulsions or returns incompatible with the non-refoulement 
principle (PACE, 2019; Strik, 2019). The EU institutions would have little 
say, since ‘equal solidarity’ and ‘fair responsibility-sharing’ are no longer 
the EU’s principles.
In this scenario, the European Commission would be engaging in 
attempts to further lower fundamental rights safeguards to accommodate 
the situation. The benefiting countries would aim to limit democratic 
accountability and access to justice for the mistreatment of irregular 
migrants. This would lead to greater secrecy, informality and silencing of 
any watchdog civil society, independent journalists, supervisory authori-
ties and even courts. In this case, again, clarity is sorely lacking as to who 
would be the accountable one – the benefiting country, the sponsoring 
one or the European Commission.
26.7 Conclusion
It was a risky bet for the European Commission to entrust countries that 
were unwilling to participate in global solutions, such as the GCR and 
GCM, to sponsor returns and readmissions of irregular migrants. Such 
a sensitive issue requires verifiable and rebuttable ‘international trust-
based cooperation’ with third countries. Who is going to trust those who 
are putting themselves above internationally agreed standards and prin-
ciples?
For the EU, the headache is not only its international reputation as 
a partner that ‘walks the talk’ but also the risk of legal liability. ‘Return 
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sponsorship’ blurs who is accountable for what. On the one hand, the 
long ‘chain of responsibility’ makes it is increasingly difficult to assign the 
accountability for fundamental rights violations of detained or expelled 
individuals. On the other, it is hard to imagine the situation where all 
the relevant actors directly or indirectly involved (‘benefiting’ and 
‘sponsoring’ EU Member States, EU institutions and agencies, namely 
Frontex) would be called out. This will only increase the blame-shifting 
game among them. To avoid such chaos, the EU needs to stand firmly – 
with actions and words — behind the meaning of solidarity.
The implementation of Global Compacts and independent moni-
toring of the EU treaties principles are ever more critical for establishing 
trust among Member States, EU institutions and agencies, third countries 
and – not least – migrants and refugees themselves.
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